The Trench

Paris Threatens NATO’s Afghan Umbrella

2012-01-29T20:23:00.000-08:00

At first Nicholas Sarkozy’s rhetoric sounded relatively harmless.

Pressured by an impending election, challenger Francois Hollande and chronically low approval for war in Afghanistan, France’s incumbent Prime Minister needed to make up some ground. Hollande has pledged to withdrawal all troops from Afghanistan and, sensing an opportunity to close the gap, Sarkozy utilized the deaths of four French soldiers (shot by a Taliban infiltrator) to float his own accelerated withdrawal. The premier initially backed off from his expedient reaction last Tuesday, when Foreign Minister Alain Juppe told Parliament that Sarkozy would make a decision after meeting Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Paris.

Pointing out a “clear distinction” between “organized withdrawal and rushed withdrawal," Juppe promised that his government “will not give in to panic.” Except Sarkozy is now generating this exact sensation in Afghanistan, Washington and NATO capitals after closing ranks with Karzai. His current plan would bring 1,000 of France’s 3,900 troops home in 2012 and accelerate the final withdrawal from 2014 to 2013. "A few hundred" advisers would remain in the country.

"The pursuit of the transition and this gradual transfer of combat responsibilities will allow us to plan for a return of all our combat forces by the end of 2013," he said on Friday.

What Sarkozy fails to address in depth is the disproportionate effects of his words and actions. The immediate military upshot could first manifest in Kapisa, where Sarkozy promised to transfer French control by March instead of late 2012. The Taliban is almost certain to mount an offensive in the vulnerable province, a possibility that could dampen NATO’s overall transfer of the country. Afghanistan’s provincial and national levels could then become trapped in a mutual cycle of violence and propaganda typical of fourth-generation warfare (4GW).

For their part, U.S. officials realize that Sarkozy’s primary damage was inflicted in the political sphere, not on the battlefield. Withdrawal is already unpopular with conservatives and President Barack Obama cannot accelerate based on French politics - even if both capitals may share the same political boat. Reactions range from terse to approving; U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings insisted that "ISAF sees no effects to our current campaign plan.” Similarly, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland argued that Washington knew about Sarkozy’s change of course prior to the incident in Kapisa. Citing Sarkozy’s meeting with Karzai, she claimed that “this timetable was worked through both with the Afghans and with NATO as part of our collective process...”

“So this was a national decision of France. It was done in a managed way. We will all work with it. As the President has said with regard to our own presence, we are working on 2014. The alliance as a whole is working on 2014, but we are also going to work within this French decision.”

These comments indicate that the Obama administration is more worried than it publicly admits. An honest reaction was delivered by NATO’s own Secretary General, who warned Paris to make its decision “following consultations with commanders and ISAF partners.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen also told reporters, "It's important to the success of the operation that we maintain a commitment to this agreed plan.” The main threat of Sarkozy’s plan is overwhelmingly political in nature, and a textbook example of the dilemmas created by guerrilla warfare. Unwilling to be seen as acting in isolation, France’s premier also says he will use next month's NATO summit to accelerate its entire transfer.

"We have decided in a common accord with President Karzai to ask NATO to consider a total handling of NATO combat missions to the Afghan army over the course of 2013," Sarkozy said.

As the situation currently stands, France’s government would undertake a politically expedient decision with no basis in reality. Although the transfer of authority should occur as quickly as possible - many Afghans want foreign troops out of the country ASAP - much of Afghanistan remains unprepared for authorities to govern or police. This exchange cannot occur within two years. Of equal importance, Afghans won’t be leading Special Forces raids when 2014 dawns on the horizon. Karzai did qualify his conditions, saying 2013 marked the “earliest” deadline, but Sarkozy’s political damage is already being felt in Afghanistan’s provinces and capital.

Time will reveal the effects of Sarkozy’s reaction on NATO’s own coalition. Intense U.S. pressure is already being applied in order to keep the coalition from openly dividing, while British Prime Minister David Cameron attempted to establish a middle ground by relating to Paris: “Obviously, between now and 2014 there will be opportunities for different countries to reduce their troop numbers. Britain has reduced our troop numbers over the last year.”

However Cameron advised Sarkozy to act within NATO’s common perimeters, saying the rate of withdrawal and provincial transfers “should be the same for all of the members of NATO.”

Problematically for NATO, no contributing country enjoys a majority consensus on Afghanistan. The war is particularly unpopular in France, England, Germany, Italy, Spain and Australia, unnerving other contributors such as Poland. Sarkozy has effectively poisoned the well by unilaterally announcing a divisive proposal, one with significant approval in Western households. This damage is left to expand in all directions, starting with Afghanistan's provincial security and reverberating nationally by impairing the perceptions of Afghans. Boosting Taliban morale in the field is likely to be dwarfed by a propaganda campaign directed at NATO’s “weakness.”

Sarkozy’s rhetoric has opened Pandora’s Box a little wider. A concerted NATO effort is required to prevent France’s actions from becoming a systemic threat to the mission in Afghanistan.

White House Directs Sneak Attack Against Bahraini Opposition

2012-01-28T17:01:00.000-08:00

President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address made minor headlines in Bahrain by ignoring its 11-month uprising. Pro-democracy protesters expected nothing less, having vocalized their realization of America’s double-standard for months. This new batch of silence, though, turns out to be particularly potent.

Not only did Obama refuse to tell Bahrainis or Americans what his administration is up to - he won’t even tell Congress.

Hoping to polish U.S.- Bahraini relations through arms, the White House and Pentagon carried their weapons package straight into the unwelcome obstacle of democracy. A small coalition of Senators (allegedly six) opposed to the deal, first leaked in September, would briefly raise Bahrain’s profile high enough to temporarily block the delivery. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon knows the odds are stacked against Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement and hasn’t stopped lobbying the cause.

“Imagine if everyone in Congress had kept quiet and this arms sale had been completed,” Wyden wondered in December. “What kind of message would this have sent the world or to the people aspiring for freedom and democracy? America should NOT be rewarding brutal regimes with arms. It’s that simple.”

Instead of encouraging true reform in Bahrain, the Obama administration decided to respond by expanding the island’s political vacuum and media blackout. Copying the process of his “National Dialogue,” which collapsed in less a month, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) took center stage as the administration defended its actions. All questions related to the arms sale and daily state-sponsored violence were redirected to the impending BICI, ultimately highlighting the regime’s willingness to reform. By offering silence and inaction to Bahrain’s opposition, the Obama administration telegraphed its intent to deploy arms under the BICI’s cover.

"There is merit in naming and shaming and embarrassing, in pushing, in enlisting public opinion, domestic and international,” said Cherif Bassiouni, who chaired and initially defended the King’s inquiry. “This is not the style of Secretary Clinton or President Obama, and I'm not sure they are necessarily doing the right choice.”

Nevertheless, the administration has decided that Bahrain’s profile dipped enough to smuggle the arms past Congress - using the most duplicitous means available. As Foreign Policy reports, “the State Department has not released details of the new sale, and Congress has not been notified through the regular process.” The administration “simply briefed a few congressional offices and is going ahead with the new sale,” disregarding the need for formal notifications and a public explanation. Congressional sources said the State Department found a “legal loophole” around $1 million notifications; the $50+ million package will be broken down into “multiple sales of less than $1 million” to “avoid the burden.” The packages’ contents (reportedly Humvees, missiles and other technology) are now being kept secret.

"The Bahraini government has shown little progress in improving their human rights record over the last few months and in some ways, their record has gotten worse," Wyden told The Cable in response to the administration's actions. "Protesters are still being hurt and killed, midnight arrests are still happening and the government continues to deny access to human rights monitors. The kingdom of Bahrain has not shown a true good faith effort to improve human rights in their country and the U.S. should not be rewarding them as if they have."

Naturally, U.S. officials continue to base their argument precisely on the “recommendations” of King Hamad’s BICI. They will likely hedge their language along a similar line as one of Foreign Policy’s anonymous sources, who welcomed the King’s “important initial steps” before urging him “to take action on the full range of recommendations that we believe will help lay the foundation for longer-term reform and reconciliation." After exploiting the BICI’s torture findings and rejecting its superficial reforms, Al Wefaq and a growing majority of street protesters no longer trust the King’s ability to reform.

"This message of ‘business as usual' will only strengthen the regime's belief that there will continue to be lack of consequences to their human rights violations internationally," Maryam al-Khawaja, the head of the foreign relations office at the Bahrain Center for Human Rights BCHR, told Foreign Policy. "At a time when the United States is already being criticized for practicing double standards when it comes to the so-called Arab spring, to the protesters in Bahrain, the U.S. selling any arms to the government of Bahrain is exactly like Russia selling arms to Syria. Bahrain has become the United States' test on how serious they are about standing against human rights violations, and they are failing miserably."

The administration’s impending shipment comes three weeks after the State Department’s Victoria Nuland insisted that Bahrain hasn’t “fallen off Washington’s radar.” Of course not - the administration is actively minimizing its uprising. More weeks of silence would elapse as funerals were dispersed with ubiquitous tear gas and protesters died of “mysterious” circumstances. No U.S. response followed the government’s assault on Al Wefaq’s office, while Nabeel Rajab’s confrontation with security forces prompted both concern and praise for the King. The BCHR chairman is a vocal critic of U.S. policy in Bahrain and has directed his energy towards its double-standard. These factors generate a jarring experience: the Obama administration seeks to restore public confidence in U.S.-Bahraini relations, but must do so in secret.

The same juxtaposition is unfolding at a policy level. Maria McFarland, deputy Washington director at Human Rights Watch, predicted in September, "By continuing its relationship as if nothing had happened, the US is furthering an unstable situation."

White House Propaganda Machine Set On Turbo

2012-01-27T19:09:00.000-08:00

Following his interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor and one of Washington’s highest ranking Ministers Without Portfolio, Charlie Rose keeps the spotlight on Iran and China by interviewing Tom Donilon. President Barack Obama's National Security Adviser also praised his boss as a “natural executive,” before engaging in some PR on behalf of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

If only U.S. foreign policy was as comprehensive as its accompanying propaganda campaign.

And speaking of Ministers Without Portfolios - a common position in Israel’s government, the State Department has clarified Dennis Ross’s status in Washington. The former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region was never going to embrace private life after resigning in November 2011, instead wading back into the Beltway until a position opened in the next administration. However Ross never officially left Obama’s White House, despite his formal declaration, and retains his security clearance. He visits every week and meets regularly with Obama’s National Security Council.

Yesterday a senior Israeli official confirmed that Ross met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after requesting a “private” meeting to jumpstart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The State Department's Victoria Nuland would tell reporters on Friday, "Dennis has been a good partner to administrations of all kinds, whether he was in government or out of government, and always remains in close touch."

“We have done everything we can to recruit and retain Dennis in the government,” Donilon remarked upon Ross's "resignation." “He is one of those rare individuals who has global reach.”

Ross also represents a key piece of the U.S. mainstream narrative that Obama has been overly harsh to the Israelis, and too soft on the Palestinians. The opening paragraphs of his recent Washington Post op-ed placed all of the blame on Mahmoud Abbas instead of Netanyahu; “changing the realities on the ground” functions as a codeword for allowing Israel to dictate these realities on its terms. Ross presumably lobbied Netanyahu to offer the Palestinians as little as possible in order to build their confidence in the Israeli government, a process that is likely to yield a lopsided final-status agreement.

So goes life for the point-man of backchannel negotiations between Washington and Jerusalem - another “foreign policy success” for the Obama administration.

Egypt’s School of Revolution

2012-01-26T20:52:00.000-08:00

What has changed since protesters first massed in Cairo’s streets demanding the end of Hosni Mubarak’s regime? Everything or nothing remains the same, depending on the respondent. Wednesday’s scene in Tahrir Square unfolded as if hurled through a parallel dimension, with cautious peace replacing anxious violence and Egypt’s political parties joining the youth-induced civil movement.

Most noticeable of all, the revolution’s main opponent has reversed polarity from the weaker Mubarak to his mighty Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

Wednesday's calm was a product of this strength, a “goodwill gesture” designed to cast Egypt’s military council as the revolution’s eternal guardian (security forces lurked on Tahrir’s outskirts). Egypt’s SCAF launched a variety of counter-revolutionary initiatives after Mubarak collapsed in February, but few more pivotal than its information warfare against pro-democracy protesters. Exploiting its media powers to spin the revolutionaries as Egypt’s new enemy, the SCAF has manipulated all aspects of society by oscillating between condemnation and praise. State media “repeatedly warned the public of a foreign-financed plot to undermine Egypt on Wednesday.”

The previous week, during a setup speech for January 25th, Field Marshall Hassan Tantawi declared, "Egypt is facing grave dangers it has not seen before. The armed forces is the backbone that protects Egypt. These schemes are aimed at targeting that backbone. We will not allow it and will carry out our task perfectly to hand over the nation to an elected civilian administration."

Tantawi would build on these statements in another nationally-televised address by “partially” lifting Egypt’s emergency law, arguing “we've never deviated from the aims of the revolution.” He also deployed the blanket label of “thuggery” to defend future crackdowns against pro-democracy protesters; Mohamed Attiya, a member of the Jan. 25 Youth Coalition, said that “thuggery” has become Egypt’s equivalent of “terrorism.” Shaping negative public opinion around the revolutionaries facilitates the SCAF’s political hegemony and cushioned its heavy-handed crackdown.

Yasser Ramadan of the April 6 Youth Movement explained, "People began to hate the revolution and thought it only made the economic situation bad. It's been hard to make the people believe in the revolution again."

Armed with this impression, the SCAF took preemptive action to solidify its authority after a new constitution is drafted, and subsequently leveraged political parties to keep these powers when a civilian government is sworn in. The SCAF’s totalitarian tendencies - Tantawi and his generals obeyed Mubarak for decades - eventually alienated Mohamed ElBaradei, one of Egypt’s liberal presidential candidates. Although ElBaradei lacks widespread popularity inside Egypt, he is viewed as a relatively honest and capable leader.

He recently warned that the SCAF "has insisted on going down the same old path, as if no revolution took place and no regime has fallen.”

The SCAF, on the other hand, isn’t overly concerned with ElBaradei’s decision (even though he was reportedly urged to delay his announcement). Tantawi immediately perceived the division between Tahrir and Egypt’s political opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and has capitalized on their parliamentary gains to widen this gap. Either unwilling to confront the SCAF or awaiting a later opportunity, the Brotherhood is playing along by mirroring the council’s double-sided rhetoric. Days ago the group’s secretary-general, Mohammed Badie, told a televised audience that parliament “will scrutinize the military's budget and hold the army accountable for mistakes made during the transition.”

"We respect and appreciate the army but the military council must be held accountable for any mistakes," he promised. "No one is above accountability."

Other officials, such as spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan, then apply a counter-spin: “The army is the army of the people. Some of its activities must be surrounded with secrecy and we respect that.”

Parts of the Brotherhood’s behavior can be rationalized in a beneficial way; no group possesses as much leverage to check the SCAF, leaving some protesters comfortable with the dual track of political and street pressure. This is all they can reasonably hope for in a pluralistic Egypt. However the SCAF expects much from the Brotherhood in return for political favoritism in a post-Mubarak world, a dangerous prospect for the revolutionaries. The Brotherhood regularly abstained from demonstrations against the SCAF and flooded national protests, and its Freedom and Justice Party now holds a near-majority when the 100-member drafting committee meets on a new constitution.

The SCAF will attempt to dominate this process directly and indirectly, as control over Egypt’s parliament and constitution will shield investigations into its commercial assets. Already expecting immunity for crimes committed by the military and police since Mubarak’s fall, Tantawi’s ultimate goal is finding a suitable President before June 30th.

The SCAF has further streamlined its operations by maintaining the support of Western powers, notably America. With Gulf states keeping their relations intact - the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sent Bahrain’s King to reel in Tantawi - Washington completes the international community’s buffer around Egypt’s generals, allowing them to act with minimal consequences. The SCAF is viewed as the key to every door: preserving Israel’s treaty, controlling the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nour Party, inking economic deals and sidelining the youth movement. Days of violence often passed before Washington expressed “concern,” even holding the military and protesters equally responsible. Raids on NGOs, a tactic specifically designed to test Washington’s limits and manipulate Egyptians, generated private discussions and eventual praise from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

Unconcerned with his image in Egypt’s streets, “President Obama called Egyptian Field Marshal Tantawi today [Jan. 20th] to reaffirm the close partnership between the United States and Egypt and to underscore the United States’ support for Egypt’s transition to democracy.” When Tantawi announced a partial end to Egypt’s emergency law, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland welcomed these “good steps” before taking a question on Tantawi’s use of the word “thuggery.”

“Well, there was a little footnote on this, as I understand it, that it would continue to be applied in the case of thuggery and other small cases... We are seeking some clarification from the Egyptian Government what they mean by that. But the fact that they are finally, after these many, many months of demands, taking the major step is very important for Egypt and for its future.”

As if Tantawi’s constant use of “thuggery” requires clarification.

Facing overwhelming forces, Egypt’s revolutionaries have persevered beyond any expectations outside of themselves and their supporters. The energy of youth can only accomplish so much in the face of overwhelming historic and financial powers. These groups inevitably lack experience in the political arena, contrasting the savvy veterans within the SCAF and organized parties, and need years to equalize the playing field. This inexperience is why revolution still affords the ultimate school to Egypt’s youth, strengthening them through education and by forcing them to engage on the national level. These groups will mature through a trial of fire and gradually expand their role in a new Egypt.

Wael Ghomen, one of Egypt’s high-profile revolutionaries, was recently asked by The New York Times, “As there was no clear alternative to Mubarak, was it unwise to encourage revolution?

“I’m fully aware of a lot of opinions that this was a very big downside of the revolution — that it had no leadership to take over after Mubarak stepped down. Only history will judge. Regardless, a lot of Egyptians are now empowered.”

Consequently, revolutionaries mobilized to check anti-democratic forces throughout 2011 and will continue for as long as necessary. Many outsiders perceive their actions as a failure, but their absence would allow the SCAF to delay and manipulate Egypt’s democratic transition with relative impunity. Some revolutionaries admit to temporary defeat, or else concede a return to square one, before affirming their determination to continue organizing. Others believe that their revolution isn’t back in square one, never went away, and isn’t starting anew.

They will tell you that 2012 marks the second year of Egypt’s democratic revolution.

White House Welcomes “President Saleh” to America

2012-01-25T20:37:00.000-08:00

According to a State Department press release, "Ali Abdullah Saleh is still the President of Yemen and will be accorded those privileges and immunities accorded to any head of state until a new Yemeni president is sworn in following elections on February 21."

This "landmark presidential election," in Voice of America's words, has been predetermined by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and UN at the direction of Washington and Riyadh. The Wall Street Journal observes (possibly prematurely) that Saleh will "be formally stripped of his title as president on Feb. 21, when his deputy, Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, will become head of state."

Saleh himself is reportedly stuck in Oman, having refused to board a Saudi plane and now in the process of securing a jet from another Gulf state. The Yemeni Embassy in Washington has already confirmed that Saleh will return to Yemen after receiving medical treatment in New York.

SOTU: Inside Washington’s Propaganda Machine

2012-01-25T18:08:00.000-08:00

This Foreign Policy “grading session” of President Barack Obama is typical of the shallow, mainstream analysis leading up to and following his State of the Union address. Most laud the use of drones and offer generous praise of his administration’s response to the Arab revolutions. Nine graders are also excessive given that eight take on one Glenn Greenwald - but still atoms in the propaganda campaign that has spun Obama’s foreign policy into pyrite.

Robert Kagan is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The Obama administration has fortunately ignored the "realists'" call for standing by the collapsing dictatorships in the Middle East. (How people can call themselves "realists" when advocating such hopelessly unrealistic policies is a source of wonderment.)

Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. She served as director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department from 2009-2011.

Call it the private equity approach to American foreign policy: nimble, flexible, adaptable, and responsive are all essential characteristics for success in the continually accelerating, complex system we call international affairs.

Danielle Pletka is vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

The answer, of course, is politics. Politics matters to any sane politician; but when politics suffers no competition from principle, the nation's foreign policy is rudderless. It is why our allies mistrust us, our adversaries underestimate us, and why we no longer seek to shape a better world, but instead to retreat from it.

Aaron David Miller is public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

On balance, Obama has been credible and able in foreign policy, but neither the brilliant foreign transformer nor transactional negotiator and crisis manager he wanted to be. He shouldn't take it personally; it's a cruel world out there.

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

President Obama has amassed a decidedly mixed record on foreign policy. He can boast of several worthwhile achievements during his first 3 years. He fulfilled the commitment to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, repaired much of the damage that the Bush administration had caused to America's relationship with the European democracies, and put the United States -- at least rhetorically -- on the right side of history regarding the Arab Awakening. His campaign to eliminate al Qaeda's leadership achieved numerous successes, most notably the killing of Osama Bin Laden.”

Jamie M. Fly is executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative.

In his first three years in office, Obama has made several correct tactical decisions, but he seems to lack an appreciation of America's unique role in the world and a coherent vision for the use of U.S. power and influence. What the country needs from its next president is a leader who can shape world events rather than be shaped by them. There is little to indicate that this is Barack Obama's interest or aptitude.

Heather Hurlburt is executive director of the National Security Network.

Achievement 10). Keeping the United States relevant to the Arab Spring. By choosing to ease out Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, play a key enabling role in the Libya intervention, and work hard if not so successfully behind the scenes in Bahrain and Yemen, Washington kept itself relevant to the conversation in a changing Arab world -- no small achievement, despite how far short it falls of hopes both there and here.

Glenn Greenwald is a contributing writer at Salon.com.

In sum, Obama has deftly and intelligently pursued ignominious and ignoble foreign-policy goals.

Bonus propaganda: 36 government responses to Obama’s State of the Union and only one mention of foreign policy - to praise his leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan and OBL’s raid.

Obama Assaults His Foreign Policy Critics

2012-01-24T21:21:00.000-08:00

Anyone holding low expectations for the foreign policy segment of President Barack Obama’s State of the Union probably weren’t disappointed. Washington tradition says that foreign policy is “reserved” for the end, but seven paragraphs felt like sticking an unwanted stepchild at the end of a dinner table. Obama would mill through a predictable roll-call as he crescendoed from domestic issues to the teamwork of Osama bin Laden’s raid. Yet this perfunctory atmosphere doesn’t stop U.S. foreign policy from being on track across “the globe,” from Europe and Asia to everywhere in between: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Israel.

Obama insists, “when we act together, there is nothing the United States of America can't achieve, that we've learned from our actions abroad over the last few years.”

The “lessons” of the President’s speech don’t warrant an extensive reaction beyond the conclusion that U.S. foreign policy will remain unchanged. One wouldn’t know that Iraq is experiencing a U.S.-infused political crisis with no end in sight; Sunni officials were “shocked” to hear Obama’s praise for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Meanwhile the Taliban’s momentum has been conclusively “broken,” although the only established metric for this claim is body counts and Pentagon statements. Obama also defended his “withdrawal” from a position of strength (60,000+ troops will remain into 2013), instead of running low on resources and time to fight a war that could persist long after 2014.

So audacious as to begin “from Pakistan to Yemen,” Obama efficiently transitioned from victorious war rhetoric to unconditionally supporting the Arab revolutions. Here America’s double-standard springs to life as he name-drops Gaddafi and al-Assad while ignoring Mubarak and Saleh. The latter is due into New York City at any moment for medical treatment after the U.S. Embassy approved his visit. Undaunted by the popular repercussions of Saleh’s visit, the White House has sacrificed Yemen’s pro-democracy movement to chase al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and preserve joint-hegemony with Saudi Arabia. Despite the high-profile death of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP has only grown since Obama took office in 2009. He also condoned the death-by-drone of Abdulrahman, al-Awlaki’s 16 year old son who had gone to look for him.

In Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain and even Syria, the Obama administration has failed to “support policies that lead to strong and stable democracies and open markets, because tyranny is no match for liberty.”

All of these statements were readily predictable beforehand. However Obama’s address takes a more amusing turn when he begins to directly target critics of his foreign policy: “The renewal of American leadership can be felt across the globe. Our oldest alliances in Europe and Asia are stronger than ever. Our ties to the Americas are deeper. Our iron-clad commitment to Israel's security has meant the closest military cooperation between our two countries in history. We've made it clear that America is a Pacific power, and a new beginning in Burma has lit a new hope."

Some of these claims border on the truth; Washington has successfully manipulated European powers to follow its lead in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. Hard-line rhetoric against Iran, followed by a last-minute olive branch, hedges U.S. policy on a realistic (if insincere) position. The “shift” back into Asia is naturally welcomed by America’s Pacific allies. Conversely, Chinese and Middle East underpinnings of this “Asian shift” resulted in a massive propaganda campaign with an appetite for global hegemony. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are blocked by ongoing favoritism towards Israel - not the Palestinians, as many U.S. foreign policy pundits argue. Iraq is a crisis waiting to happen, Afghanistan is mired in stalemate and Washington’s response to the Arab revolutions has highlighted the very double-standard that Osama bin Laden declared jihad against.

America’s global presence remains an undisputed fact, but the “renewal of American leadership” skipped the Middle East. So what lessons have been learned after OBL’s triumphant killing?

Obama paradoxically declares, “From the coalitions we've built to secure nuclear materials, to the missions we've led against hunger and disease; from the blows we've dealt to our enemies; to the enduring power of our moral example, America is back. Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about.”

Apparently us "cynics" don’t know what we’re talking about - so does that mean we do?

Yemen’s Gears of Counter-Revolution

2012-01-24T17:10:00.000-08:00

The rise of asymmetric warfare has suspended the possibility of entrenched conflicts fought between conventional armies, bringing dreaded “meat grinders” to a halt. Now entire populations are subjected to the political gears of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), and the fear of uncertainty is drawn equally from their own governments and fellow citizens. Yemenis currently find themselves smashed between enormous grinders: Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and foreign powers holding interests in their country.

These forces recently collided amid al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) high-profile “capture” of Rada’a, a modest town located 100 miles south of the capital. Like Yemen’s southern governorates and the local capital of Zinjibar (Abyan), Rada’a serves as a microcosm for everything wrong with international policy in Yemen. While headlines blared “AQAP takeover,” JMP officials and democratic activists busied themselves detailing Saleh’s mastery of sacrificing a town. The process combines a number of factors to simulate chaos: opportunistic militants, government-controlled “jihadists,” and the withdrawal of Saleh’s Republican Guard, which is later redeployed to the scene. Yemen’s strongman feeds on instability to maintain his rule, perversely arguing that only he is capable of stabilizing the country.

Saleh also understands - far too well - that al-Qaeda provides the quickest means of manipulating the international community. Emboldened by his immunity but still refusing to cede executive power under the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) terms, Saleh continues to exploit his cooperation against AQAP to sustain influence in Washington. The group also doubles as his go-to bogeyman in the Western audience; Rada’a produced more media coverage than Saleh’s political resistance.

Given that AQAP has increased its activities since U.S. forces escalated their operations in December 2009, the Obama administration is holding onto Saleh’s regime beyond the point of security or democracy. The longer the international community obstructs Yemen’s pro-democracy movement through an unrepresentative GCC deal, the longer Saleh will direct his energy towards survival and allow AQAP to expand. His son also sits on the military commission that is supposed to decommission his relatives; Ahmed commands the Republican Guard, a U.S.-trained “counter-terrorism” that spent 2011 terrorizing anti-government protesters and tribesmen. Concerned neither with democracy nor stability, U.S. policy is pursuing control of the Arabian Peninsula at any cost - even a stateside vacation for a potential war criminal.

This doppelgänger policy requires instability to justify hegemony.

"Neither Vice President Hadi nor anyone else will succeed in ruling and implementing real reforms if they do not preside over a unified and obedient army,” Tawakel Karman, Yemen’s resident Nobel laureate, warned upon her return. “If this doesn't happen the next president will be nothing but a pawn of the old regime.”

Despite local reports of friction between Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Yemen's Vice President of 17 years, Saleh continued to oversee government functions and communicate through Hadi until leaving for New York City on Monday. The Vice President speaks regularly with GCC Secretary General Abdullatif al-Zayani, whose bloc negotiated a power-sharing agreement between Saleh and the JMP, and al-Zayani recently praised himself for “putting an end to the Yemeni crisis according to the initiative and the United Nations resolution 2014.” Ending Yemen’s “political crisis” is a constant theme amongst Western and Gulf diplomats - a theme that will prolong the Revolution. Many protesters want to complete their quest with minimal bloodshed, making Saleh’s exile appear bearable, but the GCC’s deal is too undemocratic to achieve a popular consensus.

Washington, Riyadh, their satellites and the UN are also viewed with widespread suspicion after ignoring the streets' demands. Accordingly, Hadi is responsible for hosting veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, even allowing them to attend meetings with Yemen’s cabinet and security officials. All parties are looking to drum up financial support the GCC-controlled election in February, an "election" that will feature Hadi as a consensus candidate of Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the JMP.

Meanwhile the JMP’s Salem Basindwa, Yemen’s new Prime Minister, just concluded a GCC tour to raise his own political and financial support. Fearful of irreversibly alienating Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, the JMP continues to hedge itself around the divisive issues of Saleh’s legal status and exile. Basindwa would tell Reuters from the United Arab Emirates, "I'm hopeful he will leave (before February 21)... but let us wait and see.” A week before, the Prime Minister defended Saleh’s immunity while urging those “who think a revolution can force Saleh out of power” to “try.” Considering the repeated delays over approving Saleh’s immunity, JMP officials could be accumulating their resources for a gradual takeover after February’s election. However the umbrella organization appears most interested in securing political and financial capital, a process that would divert foreign aid from its intended recipients.

The JMP may have sincere intentions of removing Saleh’s family, but their track record prior to and during Yemen’s revolution suggests that oppositional figures desire power for themselves. Basindwa’s office later denied his statements, nor does he leave any room for Yemen’s protesters when saying things like, "the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] agrees to play a major and leading role in the development of Yemen. This is not surprising from the Kingdom that always has stood by us.”

The only foreign entity more unpopular or meddlesome than America is Saudi Arabia.

Those protesters “looking forward” to Yemen’s referendum of Hadi are easily outnumbered by Saleh’s men, the JMP and foreign powers. Last week UN envoy Jamal Benomar highlighted the Security Council's commitment to “ending the crisis in Yemen" during meetings with Hadi and Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi. Another UN report will be released on January 25th, when Benomar is due to note Yemen’s political progress as all parties steam toward February 21st. Some UNSC members (Germany, France) have mounted sporadic resistance against the GCC's undemocratic process - now Benomar is lamenting Saleh's “blanket immunity” - but these are the same countries that unanimously approved Resolution 2014 in late October.

Every part of the international plan is in working order except for Saleh himself. Shortly after Rada’a went viral, al-Qirbi told Al Arabiya that the country’s deteriorating security could delay the UN-GCC sponsored election (an excuse that can be used indefinitely). U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would respond in passing that Yemen’s election must be held on schedule to ensure a “peaceful transition,” comments that temporarily knocked al-Qirbi back into line. However the situation’s odds indicate that Washington’s efforts to remove Saleh will continue to fail in the absence of a sincere disconnect.

After multiple itineraries had him stopping in Dubai or Riyadh, the Obama administration's latest flight plan would send him through Oman on his way to New York City. This “plan” suffers from an extensive list of flaws, starting with a general lack of transparency. Putting John Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism adviser, anywhere near Yemen’s diplomacy is an automatic red-flag; although considered friendly, Brennan has been routinely outmaneuvered by Saleh. Bringing him to America after a month of international warnings - and during Obama’s State of the Union address - also demonstrates the administration’s continual insensitivity, and running him through a middle party won't prevent his return.

His son will reportedly hold down the presidential palace until he returns.

While the White House has theoretically banned Saleh from engaging in political activity, what are the consequences of resistance? Keeping him in America? Shipping him back to a Gulf state? Little of U.S. policy makes sense beyond the need to maintain influence in Yemen and keep Saleh from testifying on Washington’s military cooperation. Both the White House and State Department deny that his trip to NYC is for "political purposes," calling the timing "fortuitous" for completing the GCC’s unpopular transition. Such rhetoric prompted one reporter to ask the State Department, "why are you playing this game with him on semantics? I mean, he’s doing what you want him to do."

Saleh may be willing to play along now that he possesses immunity at the national and international level, but his trip is simultaneously relevant and irrelevant. He and the Obama administration are treading opposite paths to the same end: one would ideally keep Hadi as Vice President, the other wants February’s election to “keep the transition on track." Saleh naturally desires to remain in Yemen while the White House plans to secure influence through his exile. Saleh has allegedly requested permanent sanctuary in neighboring Oman, a sensible choice that facilitates quick access back into Yemen, or perhaps the administration will accept a compromise along his lines. After promising to lead his party when the ballot boxes open, Saleh triumphantly declared upon his exit, “We will inaugurate Abdo Rabbo Hadi as head of state after February 21st in the Presidential Palace.”

Any outcome based on the GCC's initiative leaves the JMP to scrap for power and locks Yemen’s pro-democracy movement out of the political process. Revolutionaries demand a representative transition and a clean break from Saleh’s regime, not ongoing impunity and cooperation with a tyrant.

Bahrain’s King Hamad Suffocating Himself

2012-01-23T15:00:00.000-08:00

The complex and often paradoxical nature of warfare is known to flip weakness into strength, and strength into weakness. Any actor, whether conventional or unconventional, must learn to limit or convert its deficiencies into a resource, and protect its strengths from dulling. Comfortably shielded by a thick international bubble, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa now embodies this strategic decay as some of his main advantages becomes liabilities. Not just Manama’s Fifth Fleet, which simultaneously keeps Washington in his pocket and international attention on his island.

After transiting through the nexus of politics and business - complacency is bad for both - the King’s low-intensity response to Bahrain’s uprising is incrementally suffocating his own kingdom.

Every Arab regime threaten by revolution has utilized tear gas to disrupt protesters from moving or gathering en masse. No government, however, relies more extensively on gas canisters than Bahrain’s security apparatus. The King’s small military, limited armaments and use of his police force, combined with the savvy to stay low profile, dictates a non-lethal response of rubber bullets and gas waves. Smoke clouded Manama throughout last week as Al Wefaq, Bahrain’s leading Shia oppositional party, attempted to organize a secession of rallies in the capital. Determined to crush the uprising, the monarchy rejected Al Wefaq’s permit request on the grounds of disrupting traffic and quickly smothered all dissenters.

As they often do, security forces also moved north for a funeral job in Muharraq. Here protesters had gathered to attend the burial of Yousif Muwali, whose body washed up in on January 13th. Al Wefaq alleges that Muwali was being held by police at the time of his death, while the government claims that he suffered from “psychological issues.” The government also rejected a petition to protest at Muwali’s funeral, but even authorized demonstrations require indiscriminate force to scatter. Those protesters who broke for a street outside Muharraq’s graveyard were first confronted with gas and violent force by police (likely foreign) and plain-clothes men. Police later intervened and restored order through more peaceful means.

By this point Yassin Asfour, a 14-year old asthmatic, had died of asphyxiation after being gassed at a separate protest. Several other recent casualties suffered fatal trauma to the head after being struck by gas canisters, a tactic employed in Egypt and Yemen.

So goes daily life in Bahrain, a week after King Hamad articulated a list of reforms during his “keynote” address. His changes to parliament and the constitution fell short of all established oppositional parties, along with street protesters demanding total regime change. Hamad has downplayed the island’s civil strife throughout 11-months of low-intensity conflict, whether blaming Iran for instigating a revolt or denying systematic abuses by the government. His “National Dialogue” and Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) took the cosmetic route to reform, a dead end in the Arab revolutionary wave, and the King remains determined to restore “normality” to his kingdom. Royal officials regularly meet with U.S. officials such as CENTCOM commander James Mattis and Ambassador Thomas Krajiski, resulting in official state propaganda.

“During the meeting, the Minister welcomed the US ambassador and reviewed with him existing bilateral military cooperation relations between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the friendly United States of America in addition to discussion of a number of issues of mutual concern.”

The King already defied pro-democracy protesters by holding his air show on schedule, bringing in nearly $1 billion of "business deals" while conjuring a false sense of progress. Although U.S. and British buyers were reportedly leery of Bahrain’s security environment, the conference drew high praise from Lockheed Martin’s regional president and U.S. Vice-Admiral. Charles Moore, a former commander of the Fifth Fleet, called Bahrain’s International Air Show (BIAS) “one of the best international aviation exhibitions” before touching on the uprising - and the King’s “wisdom.” His son, Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa, is equally eager to hold Bahrain’s F-1 Grand Prix in April after 2010’s event was canceled in solidarity with the February 14th movement.

Both of these events are highlighted for their economic boost, when the developed and internationally subsidized island isn’t in dire need for cash. Although 11 months of unrest cost Bahrain’s economy an estimated $2 billion in lost revenue and foreign investments, King Hamad desires the perception of “order” above all else. Order maintains political and economic control abroad, whereas disorder scares away both sets of parties. The stronger and weaker forces of an asymmetric conflict wage a constant battle over the perception of stability.

“The reinstatement of our BIC colleagues is part of an important initiative towards national reconciliation and unity for the kingdom as a whole,” Sheikh Salman bin Isa Al-Khalifa, chief executive of the Bahrain International Circuit, told reporters. “I therefore welcome back our colleagues into the BIC family as we now look to focus on the future and the important job at hand.”

Foreign Affairs Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa greeted BIAS in similar fashion: “We are looking forward and ahead and sparing no effort in bringing the country together."

The odds of Bahrain’s political collapse remains the lowest of any active uprising. Buttressed by a loyal Sunni minority and unflinching foreign support, King Hamad may be able outlast six years of determined resistance (the length of Bahrain’s last uprising) in the streets, political arena and international media. Except these odds received a boost from the regional phenomena and will continue to increase in proportion to his failed reforms. King Hamad and his foreign allies are slowly asphyxiating themselves. Trapped in their cocoon, the smoke of uprising could eventually ignite into an open blaze - to a point where Al Wefaq and Waad have no choice except to support regime change.

The King may brush aside Human Rights Watch, but deputy direct Joe Stork offers a realistic prediction of the future: “Since the crackdown on the protests authorities have violently suppressed peaceful demonstrations and silenced dissident voices through arrests, torture, and job dismissal. But people in Bahrain, and throughout the region, have made it clear that violent suppression isn’t going to make the issues go away. People want their rights.”

A wise King would give the people what they want before they demand his crown.

Syrians Face Another Month of “Monitoring”

2012-01-21T20:05:00.000-08:00

Cairo’s arena is set for another battle royal on Sunday, when the Arab League will convene to discuss its endangered mission in Syria. As Bashar al-Assad continues to direct his lethal crackdown with precise choreography, the League must choose between keeping its monitors in place and transitioning to a new strategy. This political orientation pits League members against themselves, al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s pro-democracy movement and international powers.

Since the Arab League is incapable of functioning as a neutral organization or appeasing all involved parties, who will be selected for priority status?

The League’s mission has yielded a minor split in Syria’s opposition after producing an disproportionate ratio of risk and reward. Facing a shortage of options from the international community, some protesters and activists appear to favor the League’s presence in the absence of substitute measures. Their position is understandable given al-Assad’s blackout prior to the League’s arrival; select Western journalists have accessed to the monitors’ media circles. Those protesters who already lost faith in the League’s mission agree that urban demonstrations are escalating. The minority and majority share common ground, viewing the League as a deceptive but manipulatable tool.

However current reports and rumors indicate that oppositional protesters should brace for another round of disappointment. Arab officials are holding their line - "the killings are less, the protests increase” - as the League considers extending its mission under Sudanese General Mohammed Ahmed al-Dabi. Although chaired by Qatar’s Foreign Minister (the Gulf state has vocalized support for a peacekeeping mission), multiple League sources are predicting an indecisive outcome to Sunday’s meeting. One official told Reuters, "The closer Sunday's meetings of the Arab committee and the Arab foreign ministers get, the more the conviction grows that the Arab monitoring mission in Syria should be extended.”

"Yes, there is not complete satisfaction with Syria's cooperation with the monitoring mission. But in the absence of any international plan to deal with Syria, the best option is for the monitors to stay."

The League is prepared to stand on this defense until someone knocks it off. Counter-arguing at face value proves unrealistic; the international consensus that spearheaded Libya’s intervention is lacking in Syria. Arab and Western states remain divided on how to pursue intervention, and unsure of Russia and Iran’s military intentions. General Knud Bartels, head of NATO's Military Committee, also continues to downplay the possibility of intervention, saying, "There is no planning and we are not thinking about an intervention.” This rhetorical false front is calculated to avoid provoking al-Assad, but the center contains a large kernel of truth.

The inescapable danger of this reasoning lies in protracting Syria’s revolution; both the Arab League and Western powers prefers to remove al-Assad “at the lowest cost,” an approach that favors his survival. One official said the League’s “presence offers assurance to the people because the observers can spot any violations,” but protesters report numerous incidents where AL monitors refused to meet them or ignored the regime’s atrocities. The official added, “If there is a decision to extend the mission of the observers, we are ready to send more monitors after training them in three days.” Three days of training are vastly insufficient for the task at hand, and the League’s mission would still be undermanned at 300 monitors.

"Without the correct tools, without the correct authority … we can't do the job," said one observer who requested anonymity. "Which is sad because people are dying on both sides every day."

Arguing a reduction in Syria’s casualties slides down the same slippery slope of relativity. While large-scale massacres have temporarily subsided, daily bloodshed indicates that al-Assad has no intention of halting his crackdown. He’s simply finding new ways to disguise his forces, suppress demonstrations and cover up deaths. Building on UN estimates and local sources, estimates range near 600 since the League’s first monitors landed in late December; Saturday’s death toll swings between 30 and 100. Activists now fear another vicious crackdown in Zabadani, located roughly 20 miles northwest of Damascus, after Syrian forces withdrew to the town’s perimeter.

Mohammed al Dais, of the Syrian Revolution General Commission, predicted that Damascus was waiting until after the Arab League’s meeting to attack. In the meantime Zabadani is being spun as a “hub of resistance,” where several hundred soldiers from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are fighting to save their defected comrades from prison. Their intent to rally so close to the capital is sure to attract an iron-fisted response.

The Arab League argues, “there is a conviction even among Syria opponents that the extension is better than withdrawal,” when the street opinion demands that Syria’s case be referred to the UN Security Council. Syria’s National Council (SNC) gradually withdrew to this position after greeting the League’s monitors with hesitant approval, while the FSA has openly criticized their presence as an enabler to al-Assad’s crackdown. Extending the League’s mission with superficial improvements may provide long-term gains for the opposition, but the League’s short-term position hardens Syria’s status quo.

The underlying flaw of the Arab League’s policy remains a lack of confidence; protesters will exploit its monitors out of necessity, but they are widely viewed as pawns on al-Assad’s chessboard. This trust gap casts doubt on the League’s entire mission, from its monitors’ abilities to its opposition against al-Assad’s regime. Another month also provides no time to complete an observer mission. Syria’s view will improve slightly when al-Dabi releases his team’s findings; a harsh report could generate new friction with the regime, but oppositional groups expect a clear-cut report that places full responsibility on Damascus.

"The report must document the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime against civilians in all cities and towns," the SNC said in a statement. "Ongoing human rights violations include direct orders by the regime to kill civilians using snipers, and executions by firing squad, in public squares. The SNC delegation will stress that the report must contain clear language indicating genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by the regime against unarmed civilians."

A biased report will gnaw away at the lingering hope for accountability.

The Arab League’s monitors may or may not last another month in the field, but the upshot of a failed mission remains unchanged since the bloc introduced its initiative in November. Although al-Assad’s staunch international allies have announced their readiness to block any subsequent proposal, the League’s monitors are guiding Syria towards the UNSC. Here the political battle will intensify as Syria’s armed opposition continues their preparations for a national campaign.

At least one outcome appears guaranteed: the collective international community will confront the possibility of intervention sooner than their ideal deadlines allow.

NATO’s Misguided Info-Assault On Mullar Omar

2012-01-20T21:46:00.000-08:00

Generally speaking, the insurgent’s job is to manipulate information and the counterinsurgent’s job is to clarify information. Many governments blur or ignore this division as they attempt to fight fire with fire, but the basic notion urges a counterinsurgency force to become the accurate source on the information battlefield. U.S. and NATO officials find themselves trapped within this dilemma, spinning civilian deaths as unavoidable accidents and countering Tweets from the Taliban.

Apparently U.S. military officials believed they scored a propaganda victory after a suicide bomber blew himself up in a Helmand bazaar. As potential signs of the Taliban’s desperation in its heartland, suicide bombings are ripe material for NATO’s own propaganda campaign; General John Allen, the commanding officer of America’s international coalition, announced that the Taliban had "declared outright war" on the Afghan people. However the latest bombing in Kajaki Sofla doesn’t qualify as a pure civilian target. While NATO wouldn’t disclose details, its statement conceded that civilians, Afghan security forces and coalition troops were all injured or killed in the blast.

Allen ultimately crossed the line from believable to unbelievable propaganda when he confronted Taliban leader Mullah Omar, saying he "has lost all control over Taliban insurgents.”

That Taliban attacks continue to claim civilian lives, whether indirectly or directly, is evident across Afghanistan's war-zone. By violating Omar’s “code of conduct,” the unbroken trend provides ample opportunity to criticize the Taliban’s target selection, and many Afghans wish to live in a country free of militant influence. Yet numerous studies conducted over the years indicate an equal burden of responsibility between foreign and Taliban forces, regardless of who starts the firefight. This distribution of blame obstructs NATO efforts to paint the Taliban as Afghanistan's only aggressor.

It isn’t difficult to picture a well-off Taliban foot soldier armed with his cell phone, viewing Allen’s statements and another explosive video in secession. Timing is a key ingredient of propaganda and the general overshot his bullseye, choosing urinating Marines as his backdrop to attack. Although they weren’t ordered to desecrate Taliban corpses, the incident still underscores the challenge of keeping every last soldier in line. Separately, the Taliban’s bombing in Kajaki came one day after NATO helicopters “accidentally” killed six civilians in Kunar’s Chawkay district.

Provincial governor Fazlullah Wahidi told the AFP, "The raid was not coordinated with us.”

Although the difference between an “accidental” and “intentional” bombing cannot be rendered irrelevant, NATO obliterates its share of civilians despite its public rhetoric. Foreign forces remain willing to trade two militants for six civilians in the same way that the Taliban will sacrifice 10 Afghans to kill a U.S. soldier. After voicing their obligatory regret, night raids are staunchly defended as integral to America’s “success.” Coalition commanders haven’t lost “all control” of their soldiers due to these incidents, and neither has the Taliban’s semi-mythical leader.

Insurgencies can reach a sophisticated level of organization that enables them to finish the cycle as a semi-conventional force (such as the Vietcong), or maintain relatively strict discipline (Hezbollah). They can also thrive in looser formations that encourage personal initiative within the group’s ideological boundaries. The bottom and peripheries of an asymmetric force don’t always respond to its vertical hierarchy for countless reasons; in the Taliban’s case, thousands of part-time fighters operating under minimal oversight form the insurgency's local nervous system. Individual initiative is required to survive and rogue elements are common, whether at the local or regional level. Additionally, the Taliban utilizes netwar to maintain a degree of independence between hubs.

Omar and the Haqqanis’ mutual survival could be better served through isolated coordination.

The Wall Street Journal produced a more accurate account from recent interviews with provincial commanders, reaching the conclusion that most soldiers are loyal to Omar. The Taliban has suffered undeniable losses in men and territory, generating friction between lower and mid level commander, but none are thinking surrender. They argue that rogue elements exist just like U.S. forces and, in their minds, civilian deaths are the inevitable consequences of occupation. Maulvi Darwish, a Taliban commander in the eastern Logar province, tried to explain, “There are some groups in Karzai's government that disobey government guidelines. The Taliban are also a group of people, and there are bad people and good people. The bad people are few and they won't be in the favor of peace—but the Taliban will follow whatever the Leader of the Believers decides."

As for the Haqqanis, Jalaluddin joined Omar soon after his rise and maintained loyalty ever since. His son, Sirajuddin, has made numerous attempts on Omar’s behalf to reign in Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The semi-independent network is tasked to Kabul and Jalalabad, keeping each branch of the Taliban plugged into its local and regional connections. The WSJ offers a common definition of netwar: “the insurgency isn't a coherent and tightly organized movement, and its foot soldiers and local commanders sometimes contradict the top leadership's edicts.”

More disturbingly, preliminary negotiations between Washington and Taliban liaisons are spooking some hard-line jihadists and those who have done “wrong things,” in the words of one commander. Not every foot soldier understands the need to build political capital and outmaneuver foreign powers on the international stage, as the Vietnamese leadership did. Allen’s statements appear designed to strike the insurgency’s pressure points by addressing Afghanistan's reconciliation: "These attacks against the people of Afghanistan have no effect on the progress we are together making here with our Afghan partners and will only further isolate the Taliban from the process of peace negotiation."

Thus the general is simultaneously ridiculing Omar’s inability to control his troops, and antagonizing the less-controllable areas of his network.

One commander from Paktia laid down his own red lines: "Islamic laws are implemented, there will be no foreign interference and nobody will impose this Western democracy on Afghans." This commander predicted that the Haqqanis could continue fighting at the direction of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Another commander from Khost, Mullah Ayubi, outlined a plausible mindset among the Taliban’s lower and middle ranks, explaining, "Whatever the Taliban leadership and the Leader of the Believers decides will be in accordance with Islam and Afghanistan's national interests. He is our guide and we are obligated to obey his orders. But if he makes a decision against Islam we won't follow him and he wouldn't be our guide anymore."

Allen’s rhetoric provoke the Taliban’s more independent elements, or turn into glue as Omar attempts to demonstrate his authority. As for his negotiating position, the insurgency can’t that isolated when Western sources are publicizing their negotiating progress - when the Taliban’s leadership is pleased with their results. Washington is also isolating itself by leaving out Hamid Karzai, Islamabad, and Afghanistan’s minority ethnicities.

Afghans remain fortunate that U.S. night-raids, imprecise as they can be, are more accurate than American propaganda.

White House Drowning In Iraq’s Crisis

2012-01-20T10:32:00.000-08:00

The standing of counterinsurgency suffered a heavy blow when 20+ U.S. Special Operatives landed in a modest “mansion” courtyard in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Up to this point the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan had grudgingly forced the Pentagon to think horizontally and non-militarily - to accept the political and social realities of asymmetric warfare. Iraq’s “surge” was launched with these principles in the minds of COIN proponents, such as CIA Directer David Petraeus, and President Barack Obama felt enough political pressure to affix a COIN face onto his counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

This front fell off in the jubilant aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death. Believing that America no longer had a reason to occupy Afghanistan, the majority opinion in mainstream and beltway circles has settled around cheaper, robotic counterterrorism to fight insurgents. Except COIN isn’t “dead” and cannot be killed. Systematically organized in the 1960s, the practice and its evolving theories simply phase through cycles of awareness in relation to current events. No coincidence is necessary to explain how COIN still determines the fate of U.S. policy in Iraq.

The country isn’t experiencing new instability due to a lack of U.S. troops, but a lack of political action from Washington.

Several days ago Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pushed his country another foot deeper into hostilities, taking the boycotting Iraqiya party off “leave” and formally suspending its nine ministers. Government spokesman Ali Hadi al-Moussawi downplayed the move by calling it a “vacation,” and the State Department would avoid going into details. According to spokesman Mark Toner, “In terms of the broader political situation in Iraq, we’ve continued to press on senior Iraqi politicians the importance of dialogue to work out their differences, and that continues to be our message to them.” However the Obama administration’s infrequent statements remain unchanged despite a sharp escalation in Iraq’s political crisis, creating the vivid impression that Washington is still favoring al-Maliki.

Either the administration doesn’t understand the need for open diplomacy or refuses to accept the responsibility, a dilemma with only one outcome. The less active the White House is publicly, the more publicity Iraq will receive.

Having ignored multiple advisories from Iraqiya chief Ayad Allawi, who warned in early December that “Iraq is not a democracy,” Obama greeted al-Maliki shortly afterward with the hope of turning Iraq’s page into history. The President’s approval of al-Maliki triggered a landslide of criticism from the Sunni opposition, starting with Deputy premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s assertion that al-Maliki is ruling like “a dictator.” Allawi subsequently urged the administration to act in an ominous op-ed to The New York Times; amid U.S. silence, one of its authors hit an IED outside Samarra. Finance Minster Rafe al-Essawi, a vocal opponent of the Premier, held al-Maliki's forces accountable for security lapses as officials denied the incident.

Undaunted, al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya finally called for al-Maliki’s removal after multiple attempts to arrange a national conference on even terms. U.S. officials shifted from no comment to telling Iraqiya that grievances should be kept out of the media.

Sunnis have resorted to their information campaign because of this reaction - because they have run out of political options for al-Awlaki and Washington - and Allawi isn’t finished attacking. Iraqiya’s chairman explicitly rejected the White House’s previous comments over the weekend, telling CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, “President Obama said very clearly that the United States have left Iraq as a stable and democratic country. It’s neither stable nor democratic, frankly speaking.” His interview was similarly brushed off by the State Department even though Allawi warned, “The terrorists are hitting again very severely. Al Qaeda is fully operational now in Iraq.”

His solution, though, has nothing to do with U.S. troops.

"I am not asking for the American forces to come back, but for the United States to use its diplomatic and other channels through the strategy agreement between the United States and Iraq to try and bring about sanity to the political process and inclusivity. And I think there should be frank and real discussions with the Prime Minister, between him and between the Administration, to make it very clear that what is happening in Iraq is not acceptable.”

These discussions have yet to occur due to the White House’s tepidness to confront al-Maliki, belying the widespread local support to do so. Iraqiya continues to discuss possible actions with the Kurds, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shia bloc and independent parties, citing a loss of faith across the capital. Still, Sunni officials remain undecided on their future course of action. After several Iraqiya members (al-Mutlak and spokesman Haidar al-Mulla) demanded the removal of al-Maliki before holding a national conference, Allawi alluded to the possibility while keeping his door slightly ajar.

"Iraq is at a crossroads and I say that Iraq needs forgiving leaders, who will raise above their personal hatred," he told a news conference in Baghdad. "This is not the state for which we battled the dictatorship. On the contrary it represents the return to square one by building a dictatorship in the clothing of the disfigured democracy left behind by foreign troops."

Certain that al-Maliki cannot lead a unified Iraq, but cautious of bearing responsibility for the security fallout, Iraqiya officials and their potential allies are wary of another volatile election. Spokesman Maysoon al-Damaluji also predicted, “Opposition means that we will be further targeted. Fabricated accusations will continue to go around; we will have no protection whatsoever." Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi (the third co-author of Allawi’s NYT op-ed) continues to favor “de-escalating” through negotiations. He envisions a three-tier position, starting with the full implementation of 2010‘s power-sharing agreement and depoliticalization of security forces. The second phase would lobby for a Shia replacement, and finally give way to a no-confidence vote and early elections. Nujaifi called the no-confidence motion “unrealistic” at the present time, saying, "There is not a sufficient majority for this."

One must assume that they will play this option once a majority is secured, as the other options would be theoretically exhausted. Mutlaq observed that Baghdad’s political equation isn’t ripe for withdrawing from the government, but “maybe there will be a time when we will do it. It's a possibility."

Overt political action from Washington, as counter-intuitive as it may sound, is precisely what Iraq needs at this juncture. Enough popular support exists to justify public intervention and the implementation of 2010’s power-sharing agreement; many political forces expect U.S. officials to act because al-Maliki is considered “their man.” Allawi must be awarded his seat at the head of a foreign council, and political parties in general must be allowed to act with relative freedom. Autonomy shouldn’t create excessive problems with a representative prime minister sitting in Baghdad.

In sum, Iraq must be engaged at all non-military levels to stabilize its security environment. COIN is no less applicable today than it was in 1967 or 2007.

Al Wefaq Endures Silent U.S. Counterattack

2012-01-18T14:37:00.000-08:00

They didn’t fail due to lack of effort. Whether organizing rallies to condemn international silence or defending deceased individuals who are accused of having “psychological problems,” Al Wefaq officials actively direct global attention to the movement’s cause. Bahrain’s leading oppositional force has experienced struggle before and knows the stakes now; massive social events such as revolution are the product of countless individual actions.

However Al Wefaq’s initiative has failed to pay dividends in the short-term, and continues to advance Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement outside of the international spotlight that it seeks.

Following a week of international silence between the alleged beating Nabeel Rajab, head of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa released another counterattack on Sunday to maintain his country’s blackout. Drawing exclusively from a failed “National Dialogue” and Bahrain’s “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), an internal investigation of the government’s own crimes, the King issued a number of “reforms” intended to finish Bahrain’s uprising. One amendment will substitute the parliamentary chairman as the deciding vote during joint meetings of the National Assembly, replacing the head of the Shura Council (upper chamber). Another change gives parliament members the “constitutional right to question ministers on the open floor,” along with the ability to hold a no-confidence vote. King Hamad is now obligating himself “to explain the criteria for appointing members of the Shura Council” and dismissing lawmakers. He’s also “limiting his ability” to dissolve the Lower House, impotent as the organ is.

"It is beyond doubt that the National Dialogue recommendations have outlined the shape of the reform that we are aiming to achieve and emanate from the solid base of our national experience,” he told his audience... “Our people have proven their desire for continuing with reforms. We complete the march today with those who have an honest patriotic desire for more progress and reform.”

Frequently commenting on the inability to reform “inside a vacuum,” King Hamad appears to have foreshadowed his own vacuous speech and misleading revisions. His proposal indicates just how authoritarian his rule is and how far Bahrain’s democracy has to grow. Al Wefaq has capitalized on popular dissent to transition from political and judicial reforms, including a reconfiguration of Bahrain’s parliament, to a full government overhaul. Another demand would replace the King’s uncle with a representative prime minister. Yet the prevailing fear is that Hamad has reached his limit to reform, missing a series of opportunities to repair the country’s divisions.

"People very clearly wanted an elected government, they want parliament that has actual power," said Rajab. "If we go into this detail, and go step by step... it's going to be 100 years before an elected parliament has power."

Unwilling to repeat its participation in the “National Dialogue” - Al Wefaq explicitly attended in order to disprove its credibility - the opposition met King Hamad with blunt force. A statement from Al Wefaq ridiculed the “insignificant trivia” of his reforms and expressed concern over his disconnect with Bahrain’s Shia majority. Sayyid Hadi Hasan al-Mosawi, one of the group’s resigned MP, told The New York Times, “His speech fell short of our expectations. The measures did not reflect any of the opposition or the people’s demands. The speech did not even tackle the core of the problem.”

Bahrain’s government and opposition are reading totally different books. While Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa was “drawing lessons” for the 1990’s uprising, Al Wefaq’s Ali al-Aswad told Al Jazeera, "Nothing was new. The opposition was expecting something like this from 10 years before. This is not the demand of the street. The demand is different now, after what has happened in all the Arab countries."

Keeping these demands at the forefront of its platform, Al Wefaq and political allies scheduled a "no to tyranny, yes to democracy" procession for downtown Manama. The Bahraini government rejected Al Wefaq’s proposal on Tuesday night, warning that the march will cause “traffic congestion and disturbance to embassies, commercial and government organizations.” Bahrainis were warned not to take part, and security forces crushed the pockets of activists who rallied on Wednesday. The monarchy’s excuses primarily appeal to Sunnis, many of whom are fed up with protesters, and international powers such as Gulf states and the U.S. (which defends Bahrain’s right to keep order).

The reality is that protests are often intended to disrupt, particularly during an uprising or revolution. King Hamad wants to return his island to “normal,” not fix Bahrain’s fundamental tensions that have resulted from unrepresentative rule.

As usual the Obama administration has issued no reaction to any of these events, instead following King Hamad’s lead and hiding behind the BICI. Both governments are producing parallel rhetoric, affirming Bahrain’s democratic values while lauding those reforms already undertaken. Washington has put up a wall that simultaneously absorbs criticism and reflects silence at the opposition; hollow initiatives such as the National Dialogue and BICI are then advanced to deliver military packages in accordance with U.S. law. On cue, King Hamad and Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa just received CENTCOM commander James Mattis for new security discussions.

This strategy is unlikely to change until the opposition forces Washington to alter its position through dynamic action, otherwise the King must commit a large-scale massacre to draw international attention.

Ignoring Bahrain’s uprising nevertheless remains a dangerous policy, one that has irresponsibly suppressed and ultimately increased dissent in the streets. What began as calls for reform evolved into widespread demands for regime change, generating an unsustainable political environment. Bahrain currently lacks pivotal moments to mark its trajectory - the fall of a tyrant, mass defection of troops - leaving the conflict to burn for years without the necessary response. However the country’s low intensity doesn’t eliminate the possibility of sporadic detonation. Another resigned MP, Matar Matar, predicted that the King’s speech, "won’t impact the situation, rather it could make things worse, reaffirming the idea that genuine reform is impossible for this regime.”

al-Aswad agreed: "If we accept this, we will have no power in the streets. We couldn't control the streets. The youth might go in a different direction now."

Potential Spectrum of Syrian Intervention

2012-01-17T18:34:00.000-08:00

As the dominant powers in a regional asymmetric movement, Western and Gulf nations are inherently allergic to the concept of revolution. Their officials go to great lengths to avoid the word itself, and have fallen back on a guerrilla tactic to protect their interests: false negotiations. Unlike its necessary function in genuine democracy, “dialogue” becomes a kiss of death to revolutionaries rising up against a dictator and his foreign allies. Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans forced their rulers out of power through direct action, not negotiations, while internationally-sponsored “initiatives” are prolonging Yemen, Bahrain and Syria’s uprisings.

Believing that their present situation couldn’t deteriorate any further, many Syrian protesters and local activists were the first to approve an international aid corridor and corresponding no-fly zone. Grassroots support within the Syrian National Council (SNC) gave Riad al-Asaad, de facto commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), enough confidence to threaten a large-scale campaign amid the Arab League’s drifting mission. Western capitals are suspected of planning a no-fly zone - or ground intervention - with Turkey, whose southeastern Anatolia region now serves as the FSA’s rear base. Behind this possibility lurks a regional war with Bashar al-Assad’s allies.

Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took another step towards war on Sunday when he declared his support for intervention during CBS’s “60 Minutes.” Asked whether he favors Arab nations intervening in Syria, Sheik Hamad said that "for such a situation to stop the killing some troops should go to stop the killing." His statements predictably triggered a new verbal barrage from al-Assad’s regime, which has taken shots at Qatar throughout the League’s negotiations and observer mission. Barring a dramatic change of behavior from al-Assad, the opposition movement and foreign powers, Syria is trending towards an organized conflict with geopolitical impact.

The outcome appears to break down into three scenarios that will be explored over time.

Semi-conventional Assault

Foreign capitals challenging al-Assad to resign face a strategic dilemma that hasn’t been encountered by Western powers in decades - the risk of defeat. Washington in particular has expected victory in every war since World War II, heightening the shock of political stalemate and military losses on the battlefield. External powers rightfully fear Syria’s multiple scenarios and potential impact on regional stability, but the revolution demands a commitment to direct or indirect strategies. This dilemma is generating significant friction and hesitation between al-Assad’s international opponents.

"We haven't been looking at a no-fly zone," William Hague, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, told Sky News. "There is no serious prospect certainly at the moment of the United Nations Security Council agreeing any resolution at the moment, let alone agreeing a resolution comparable to anything that happened in Libya."

Hague presents several military observations to buttress his claim, arguing that “the Syrian regime had not been relying on air power to repress protests.” The intense urban nature of Syria’s conflict also reduces the effectiveness of air superiority below Libya’s level. These points aside, intervention will require air cover to shield oppositional fighters and international peacekeepers, and to protect humanitarian corridors and convoys. Any foreign operation, whether military or non-military, will create the need for air support.

In the event that ground troops are approved - this possibility is more realistic than Western officials publicly concede - the region’s strategic orientation points to an international task force masked by select Muslim states. This spear-tip would theoretically include Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey, along with any satellites that Riyadh could bring on board (Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Morocco). Israel might also increase its clandestine activities against al-Assad, or a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission could be approved.

"The Arab League and their monitors failed in their mission and though we respect and appreciate our Arab brothers for their efforts, we think they are incapable of improving conditions in Syria or resisting this regime," al-Asaad told Reuters. "For that reason we call on them to turn the issue over to the U.N. Security Council and we ask that the international community intervene because they are more capable of protecting Syrians at this stage than our Arab brothers.”

Infantry is essential to warfare regardless of the technological innovations designed to replace them, and foreign powers must decide if they believe Syria’s revolutionaries can fill the job. This question is admittedly challenging because the same military defectors and armed civilians will face a more determined enemy than Muammar Gaddafi’s hollow force. Another problem is the lack of Arab manpower against al-Assad and his remaining allies: Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq. Any of these states could decide to support a counter-operation in his favor, while Egypt’s heavyweight army is liable to remain neutral.

With China likely to maintain its life-line to al-Assad through soft power, the greatest danger appears to stem from the possibility of overt Russian and Iranian intervention. Moscow didn’t sacrifice Gaddafi without reason, but to save its bullets for the younger, useful al-Assad. Tehran is similarly connected to his Shia regime and its nerve system to Hezbollah and Hamas, and one Quds official just pledged material support beyond Iran’s current level. This contingency is keeping Western and Gulf powers at bay, wishing to fight Iran on their terms rather than Syria’s unpredictable battleground.

Sustained Insurgency

The FSA experienced a leadership transition over the last two weeks after Brigadier General Mustafa Ahmad Al Shaikh defected to FSA headquarters in Turkey. As a regional commander in northern Syria, Al Shaikh fled the country after witnessing what he called “the regime's ruthlessness and the killings.” His first order of business is establishing a military council to oversee operations against al-Assad’s regime, starting with the gradual conscription of 30,000 new fighters. His media adviser, Fahd Al Masri, specified, "It will also help organize defections within the army and will be in contact with officers in the regular army to encourage large-scale rather than individual defections.”

The second task after organizing Syria’s diverse revolutionaries is establishing lines of communication with supportive international powers, a relatively simple task so long as military command is established on the ground. Next comes the decision whether to directly arm or finance the opposition’s arsenal. The FSA’s ranks are estimated between 15,000-30,000, with thousands of civilians theoretically willing to fight for the revolution.

General Al Shaikh publicly expects the opposition’s struggle to take “at least a year, possibly a year and a half to topple the Syrian dictator.” His general plan appears to be sound from an insurgent’s point of view: organize all armed elements (civil and martial) and “deploy them in small six to seven person squadrons” to “employ tactics of a war of attrition.” Oppositional force ratios will be increased over time as they absorb recruits and technology from the West and sympathetic Arab states, until a presence is established across the country and around Damascus.

An insurgency-infused civil war is normal for revolutionary situations, and thus seems to be the most plausible scenario for Syria’s future. Low-intensity conflict requires the least amount of effort from international powers and limits the risk of conventional warfare, which could decimate Syria beyond the revolution’s objectives. Unfortunately for the opposition, foreign actors and Syrians caught behind the regime, waging an insurgency against al-Assad’s regime is likely to protract for multiple years. Syria’s army contains several hundred thousand troops who, unlike Gaddafi’s regulars, weren’t intentionally weakened out of fear. They operate thousands of tanks and field pieces, and don’t rely on tribal or nomadic mercenaries to fight their battles. Syria’s air force, navy and special forces are equally advanced compared to Gaddafi’s forces.

The unfortunate reality is that al-Assad may launch an efficient guerrilla campaign of his own; a full-scale unconventional war will yield a bloody spectacle in its own right, capable of lasting 5-10 years and damaging a significant portion of the country. This type of war still leaves the door wide open for those proxy agents that will flood Syria from all directions. Whether conventional or asymmetric, the possibility of extended warfare and mass casualties is too real for Western and Arab powers to currently stomach.

Coup/Assassination

The final military option trades victory for defeat. Given the lengthy time-line of either course, oppositional elements and international powers may review the possibility of assassination by ground or air. This option could be attempted before open hostilities are initiated - possibly as a precursor since al-Assad will react aggressively either way - or as a desperation move deeper into the war. However the expediency of assassination could represent the most chaotic option available, lacking the popular buildup that culminates a successful revolution. Even a decapitation strike across al-Assad’s leadership could leave a resilient force defended by a strong-willed minority.

Foreign powers will likely phase across the spectrum from unconventional to conventional operations, a sound approach in light of Syria’s complex circumstances. However risk cannot be separated from warfare, and a failure to commit the appropriate forces could result in the need for greater action in the long-term.

Guerrilla State of Mind: Stalemate or Death

2012-01-16T20:29:00.000-08:00

As Washington attempts to spin its back-channel negotiations with the Taliban into a position of strength - masking an unreachable desire to eradicate the insurgency - Taliban officials have attacked Afghanistan’s political sphere with equal vigor. Spokesman Zabibullah Mujahid clarified the group’s position amid the fallout of urinating Marines, explaining, "This will not affect the negotiations with the Americans because they are only about the release of prisoners and the office in Qatar.”

"It is for this purpose and for bringing about peace and stability in Afghanistan that we have increased our political efforts to come to mutual understanding with the world in order to solve the current ongoing situation," Mujahid said in an emailed statement. "But this understanding does not mean a surrender from jihad and neither is it connected to an acceptance of the constitution of the stooge Kabul administration."

These comments strike an obvious contrast with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who recently assured Americans and Afghans that the Obama administration remains “committed to the red lines that we have consistently laid out”: renouncing violence, breaking from al-Qaeda, supporting the Afghan constitution and women’s equality. The combined rhetoric also demonstrates the illusion of private diplomacy during fourth-generation warfare (4GW); while U.S. and European diplomats hope to achieve a breakthrough out of the media spotlight, they are currently limited to increasing face-to-face familiarity between each side.

Afghanistan’s battlefield and international media function as an extension of the political back-room, an open arena where private leverage is competed for in public. Sincere as the Taliban is in pursuing a favorable settlement, the group is currently using negotiations to confuse and outmaneuver U.S. policymakers.

The insurgency has since followed up Mujahid’s statements by releasing a “formal proclamation of victory” on its website. Aware of Washington’s attempt to divide its lower ranks, the Taliban is feeling the pressure to defend its political feelers as battlefield tools. U.S. officials will surely scoff at the notion of victory after spending 2011 “breaking the Taliban’s momentum,” but the group’s latest statements paint an accurate image of its strategic mindset. Even if the insurgency’s momentum has been broken, a difficult claim to prove outright, this outcome is less noteworthy than U.S. officials acknowledge. By basing Afghanistan’s narrative on the fact that NATO was losing the battle as late as summer 2009, Washington is now justifying its march towards victory on an uphill stalemate.

Stalemate can become victory in the insurgent’s world - mere survival against overwhelming forces can become a triumph. The Taliban was nearly destroyed by Western firepower during 2001‘s invasion and left for dead, only to rebuild itself into a more lethal force of some 30,000 fighters. This network was strong enough to weather America’s surge without capitulating, and with Washington tacitly admitting that the Taliban cannot be destroyed politically or militarily, the insurgency is eager to capitalize on this concession.

“It is proved to the world that the Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted internally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic ummah. Militarily successful resistance against a gigantic international alliance, full presence on the whole soil and overall perseverance are the signs and secrets of the Islamic Emirate.”

According to Washington’s preliminary terms surrounding the release of Guantánamo prisoners, the Taliban’s high council was supposed to voice support for Afghanistan’s political process - which it did by declaring victory through the political process. Establishing an office in Qatar is being spun as another political victory and thus a display of strength, contrary to America’s demand that the Taliban use its office for non-recruiting purposes. The insurgency’s “victory” statement took numerous shots at “the international invasion.”

“The contractors of the international invasion can no more deceive the nation by their baseless talks. They used the word ‘peace’ as a propaganda fragment to deceive the people. But today as their guardians and supporters are fed up militarily and logistically with this war and are planning for retreat, they are giving contradictory statements which show their complete confusion and embarrassment.”

Many of these criticism hit their mark despite the Taliban’s outlandish rhetoric. Regional actors and observers view U.S.-Taliban negotiations as a hollow platform, a stalling tactic by both sides that lacks serious input from Kabul and Islamabad. Although Clinton and U.S. officials “have repeatedly said publicly that any reconciliation effort must be led by the Afghans themselves,” Washington seeks to negotiate directly with the Taliban in order to retain control of the terms. Kabul and Islamabad are viewed with mutual suspicion, equally capable of strong-arming the Taliban or reducing U.S. influence after the war ends.

Both capitals are trying to jump into negotiations at their preliminary stage instead of waiting for Washington to produce its own results. Islamabad, for instance, allegedly wants the U.S. to drop its preconditions, while Kabul holds the opposite position. M K Bhadrakumar of Asia Times Online adds that Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara representatives oppose negotiations until more conditions are met - such as their inclusion. U.S. officials speak of developing “confidence” with the Taliban, when the surrounding environment is experiencing a rampant crisis of confidence.

This disconnect applies friction across America and Afghanistan’s public spheres, further reducing the odds of a political settlement by 2014.

Washington’s military superiority is mirrored by its irreversible political weaknesses, generating an unfavorable dilemma as Western powers attempt to extract themselves from counterinsurgency. Erasing America and Taliban’s “red-lines” through compromise verges on the impossible; Washington demands an end to violence and a post-2014 task force, a condition that the Taliban’s leadership flatly opposes. So what if they don’t agree to Washington’s demands? Will Obama halt a withdrawal that is overwhelmingly popular with Democrats? Will a GOP candidate recommit to an unpopular war?

Accepting the fact that U.S. forces can raid Afghanistan day and night for the next 10 years, the Taliban’s leadership has adhered to guerrilla warfare by exhausting America’s political and economic capital at home. This is the definition of a stalemate, and it spells victory to the insurgent who should have been wiped out years ago.

Hakimullah’s Loss Could Be TTP’s Gain

2012-01-15T16:51:00.000-08:00

TTP deputy Wali-ur-Rehman lurks behind its chief, Hakimullah Mehsud

For the second time in as many years Hakimullah Mehsud has been reported dead at the tip of a Hellfire missile. Targeted by Predators on January 14th, 2010 after ordering a precision suicide bombing inside FOB Chapman, a CIA compound in Afghanistan's Khost province, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) chief would emerge four months later by taunting America. Now the CIA claims to have intercepted militants discussing the aftermath of January 12th’s drone strike near Miran Shah, the first since U.S. forces air-raided two Pakistani border camps.

"Six to seven TTP members were talking to each other through wireless radio in the conversations we heard, talking about Hakimullah Mehsud being hit by a drone when he was heading to a meeting at a spot near Miranshah," said one intelligence official.

Another official identified this spot as in Nawa Adda, a village in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Datta Khel is roughly 20 miles northeast of Miran Shah.

TTP spokesman Asimullah Mehsud quickly denied that the insurgency has lost its head, standard procedure during the heat of speculation. Hakimullah’s main spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, responded more colorfully by reasoning, "There is no truth in reports about his death. However, he is a human being and can die any time. He is a holy warrior and we will wish him martyrdom.” Ehsan’s bravado contains a large measure of truth for U.S. policymakers who presumably view Mehsud’s death as a small victory.

“We will continue jihad if Hakimullah is alive or dead,” he promises. “There are so many lions in this jungle and one lion will replace another one to continue this noble mission."

Having reached the temporarily conclusion that low-level militants aren’t worth the political cost after Salala ridge, U.S. officials clearly knew who they had in their sights as the Predators swarmed above Miran Shah. Taking out Mehsud was personal, as the jihadi warlord battled Washington with the same mindset. After orchestrating the bombing at FOB Chapman through Jordanian double-agent Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi - and drawing a quick missile strike by boasting - Hakimullah proceeded to inspire Faisal Shahzad’s unsuccessful Times Square bombing. Beyond his status as an enemy of America, the Pentagon and CIA make a special point of killing those who style themselves as invincible.

Removing the TTP’s chief should also benefit Islamabad by eliminating the group’s most hostile personality, a move that could help stabilize U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Passing up a high-value target like Hakimullah is generally inadvisable, however his final dividends in Afghanistan appear to swing in the opposite direction. The TTP chief’s relative isolation within his own group suggests that he’s wanted dead. Although serving as deputy to former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, the young and brash Hakimullah antagonized TTP commanders by overseeing the group’s relative decline. Too many Pakistani institutions and civilians had been targeted by Mehsud, the TTP’s most fervent al-Qaeda ideologist, and his forces are increasingly coordinating with rogue splinter groups.

Pakistan’s military response resulted in a significant reduction in tribal support by displacing over 300,000 people from Waziristan.

Anticipating the internal demand for Hakimullah’s death is a safe bet; regional commanders Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Faqir Mohammed all want him expelled from the TTP’s hierarchy. Rehman in particular believes that he should lead the TTP as a loyal branch of the Afghan Taliban, and has campaigned for the job since Baitullah was killed by drone in August 2009. Bahadur (the commander in North Waziristan) removed himself from the TTP’s umbrella in protest of Hakimullah’s behavior - he doesn’t enjoy the “emir” riding around his own territory.

All of these figures (and elements in Pakistan’s ISI) want the TTP to devote its focus towards U.S. troops in Afghanistan, not Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Mehsud stands as a main block in the pipeline between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Given that Hakimullah’s death remains conjecture, a more detailed account of the situation and the TTP’s reaction should await his confirmed demise. The strategic environment, though, is relatively basic. Removing Hakimullah would eliminate a dangerous disciple of al-Qaeda’s original core, potentially reducing the TTP’s campaign inside Pakistan. Replacing him with a “friendly” proxy - Rehman or Bahadur - should boost Islamabad’s leverage to minimize drone strikes and shift the TTP’s focus across the Durand Line.

A more daring strategy would allow Mehsud to walk while continuing to target his pro-Taliban deputies.

Unraveling Mysteries In Bahrain’s Black Hole

2012-01-14T22:08:00.000-08:00

Deftly wielding his influence abroad, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has managed to keep a low profile throughout the Arab revolutions. The island nation is fiercely guarded by Riyadh and Washington, an alliance with far-reaching benefits in the international community and media, and King Hamad’s image as a model reformer continues to stand on his “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI). Months after rejecting Al Wefaq’s request for an observer mission, the Arab League's Nabil Al Arabi arrived just in time for Hamad’s “keynote speech” on Sunday.

The King has no reason to fear the Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose Peninsula Shield was deployed in March to “protect” the monarchy from an “Iranian uprising.”

While their role hasn’t changed for hundreds of years, political allies are essential to surviving a revolution in the 21st century. They supply material and financial aid (arms, oil, cash) when needed, limit international condemnation, manipulate foreign organizations, block hostile measures and orchestrate media campaigns. However no government is immune to the publicity of killing its own people. Here the King has excelled beyond his unstable counterparts - Mubarak, Gaddafi, al-Assad and Saleh - by abstaining from their mechanized assaults. Instead the monarchy has played to its strengths by mobilizing its police force, deploying non-lethal tactics, recruiting ex-soldiers and police from friendly states (Pakistan, Jordan, UAE), and calling in armor from Riyadh.

As a result Bahrain has witnessed the lowest number of casualties amongst the sustained uprisings - more people were killed during a single day of Libya or Syria’s initial protests. This low-intensity strategy is King Hamad’s “key” to masking his presence on the international radar.

What this strategy won’t accomplish is the absolute suppression of death, injury and the desire for political freedom. The last 72 hours have produced two murky deaths, one a 24-year old found on the reclaimed Amwaj islands. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry denied any knowledge of the case, saying that an autopsy concluded death by drowning. Al Wefaq released an opposing version of Yousif Ahmed Abbas’s final hours, claiming that his parents were notified by authorities after his detainment. They suspect that he was tortured.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry promptly responded, "The father of the missing man stated that his son suffered from psychological problems, sometimes going to the beaches in the area and requiring assistance in returning home.”

Apparently “psychological problems” serves as this weekend’s special excuse. Challenging the circumstances of each death, Bahrain’s government places the burden of responsibility on protesters rather than national and foreign security units. The same goes for funerals, which are “legitimately” dispersed after they evolve into anti-government rallies. On Saturday a 59-year old woman succumbed to burns inflicted when she lit herself on fire. One Gulf report said the woman “suffered from psychological problems,” but local sources claim that she had “fallen ill” after her son’s arrest in April. He was still being held when she self-immolated on her roof.

Bahrain’s media blackout can only minimize these cases, not hide them completely. Nor can an information campaign disperse Bahrain’s opposition movement on the ground - Al Wefaq has simply turned the international community’s inaction into a central theme. On Tuesday thousands of protesters flocked to the UN’s office in Manama, where security forces allowed them to rally under the alleged specter of U.S. criticism. A more likely explanation: King Hamad realized the counter-productively of attacking a demonstration in the UN’s presence. U.S. officials expressed polite concern over the beating of Nabeel Rajab, head of Bahrain’s Center For Human Rights (BCHR), and the Obama administration immediately returned to the familiar silence that greets protesters on a daily basis.

Al Wefaq also dismissed a recent trial of two Pakistani policemen accused of “beating to death” Ali al-Saqer and Zakeriya al-Asheeri. “Torture is not just systematic,” the group said in a statement. “It is now a policy of the state.”

Undaunted, Al Wefaq held a “No Withdrawal” protest in Manama on Friday to express its determination and rally new supporters. Former parliamentarian Mattar Ebahim said authorities injured at least 13 people when they attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas, batons, stun grenades and sound bombs. Like the horror stories from Egypt’s November clashes, Ebahim claims that police are “targeting the protesters directly with tear gas canisters.” Several of the latest deaths have been attributed to injuries sustained from U.S.-made gas canisters.

None of these events are truly “mysterious.” All are products of Bahrain’s political marginalization, security crackdown and media blackout - the hardware and software of oppression.

White House Lost In Iraq’s Political Crisis

2012-01-14T10:26:00.000-08:00

Seven Iraqi monitors allegedly deserted the Arab League’s mission in Syria this week, transcending the significance of their removal beyond Syria’s borders. As the League’s walls close around Bashar al-Assad’s regime at a glacial rate, Damascus has attempted to divide the League’s decision-making between its opponents and remaining allies. Among those still pushing for a mild political transition - U.S. ally and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Except al-Maliki has bigger things to worry about - his own grip on power.

Tasked with the duty of international awareness, Saleh al-Mutlaq recently passed along Iraqiya’s message to Washington through The Associated Press. Iraq’s Deputy premier also defended his response to President Barack Obama’s cordial meeting with al-Maliki, telling CNN that he was “shocked” to hear Obama praise him as a democratic partner. al-Mutlaq proceeded to caution the White House that al-Maliki’s political ambitions threaten Iraq’s security after the U.S. withdrawal.

“Why should I regret it?” he asked on Friday. “I only said the truth.”

al-Mutlaq then took another leap of truth. Predicting that Iraq could enter a new cycle of sectarian violence with al-Maliki at the top of Baghdad’s power struggle, or possibly experience a unified uprising against his government, al-Mutlaq warned, "The longer al-Maliki stays in power, the higher the possibility of a divided Iraq.” These statements form the latest wave of information directed at al-Maliki’s “sectarian autocracy”; a NYT op-ed from Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi reads like a manifesto on al-Maliki and U.S. policy.

The party currently rests in a suspended state, its ministers placed on leave by al-Maliki as they temporarily boycott his government. Securing a fair trial for Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi, who faces charges of funding a Sunni death squad, and protecting al-Mutlaq from a no-confidence motion represent urgent demands. More important, though, is reversing 2010’s failed power-sharing agreement, which left al-Maliki in control of the Interior and Defense Ministries. Allawi was never given a position of oversight as promised, resulting in accusations that al-Maliki is politicizing Iraq’s security and intelligence agencies.

These factors (and many interrelated affairs) have inflated the demand for a national conference above al-Hashemi’s individual case. With al-Mutlaq addressing the U.S. media, Iraqiya spokesman Haidar al-Mulla told the London-based Asharq al-Awsat that, "no national reconciliation meeting can take place in Iraq whilst Nouri al-Maliki is prime minister... Maliki does not want any conference that could potentially remove him from office to take place.”

al-Mutlaq and Iraqiya aren’t the only actors operating under this tense state. On Tuesday Turkish Prime Minister Turek Erdogan phoned al-Maliki to “voice his concern over Iraq's political stand-off,” drawing a sharp rebuke from his counterpart.

Contrary to the shining “opportunity” left by U.S. soldiers and diplomats, Iraqis find themselves swamped in foreboding reports and rumors, bombings and the all-encompassing fear of new conflict. The country is drifting through an uneasy “post-war” period, simultaneously experiencing the “end” and continuation of America’s occupation. Worse still, al-Maliki is conjuring visions of Saddam Hussein (to al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist, among others), breaching America’s last line of political defense against a misguided invasion. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to rebuild their lives in peace, but the country is in no position to extract itself from a perpetual state of warfare.

The Obama administration continues to misread Iraq’s public sphere as it loses control over the image of U.S. policy. With Deputy Secretary of State William Burns en route to Baghdad through Turkey, U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey defended al-Maliki several days ago by telling Reuters, "I believe that he is trying very hard to bridge the gaps that currently exist with his partners.” Asked about al-Mutlaq’s latest interview, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland responded, “We don’t think it’s helpful for Iraqi politicians to be hashing out their differences in the media. We’d much rather see them sit down together.”

Such statements render the White House guilty of going public in al-Maliki’s favor.

In one way Obama should be personally thankful for al-Hashemi’s warrant and his ensuing flight to Kurdish territory. Iraq’s ongoing crisis traces to deep sources, however al-Mutlaq’s original statements run directly to Obama’s praise for al-Maliki - a public display of strength. The politicized debate on America’s withdrawal is shielding him from more deserving criticism, mainly Washington’s near-unconditional support for al-Maliki. As Baghdad’s present conflict drags into its second month, the White House is still calling for “all parties to enter a dialogue” when no confidence has been established.

“What we are continuing to do,” Nuland tries to explain, “as we’ve said a number of times in the last few days, is to impress upon senior Iraqi politicians the importance of direct dialogue with each other to resolve their differences and to work towards a solution that represents the interests of all Iraqis for an inclusive government and that’s within the Iraqi constitution.”

al-Maliki’s confidence crisis has spilled across Iraq’s private and public layers, and ultimately into the international media. It cannot and should not be kept private. Nor would the Obama administration devote as much attention to the problem without Sunni officials going public. The reality is that Iraqiya feels exhausted of options to influence Iraq’s political process and distribute power away from al-Maliki. Party officials must also force al-Maliki into a national conference on favorable terms; the premier wants to decide the location and conditions on his terms. The administration seems to be glossing over these considerations, instead coddling al-Maliki and blocking any sources of provocation.

This approach tacitly admits that he will respond aggressively to challenges against his rule.

Nuland lacks the information to clarify whether U.S. officials will monitor or facilitate Iraq’s national dialogue, but this offer should be readily accepted if proposed. Due to understandable political impressions and the inexcusable distraction of Afghanistan, the Obama administration has shirked from involving itself too deeply in Iraq’s political affairs. The aftermath of 2010’s parliamentary election was initially abandoned before U.S. officials launched a belated (and ill-advised) push for al-Maliki’s coalition, and the administration continues to avoid Iraq’s crisis as it sells Obama’s withdrawal. So far Washington has produced minimal results with private pressure, keeping al-Maliki on the edge but failing to walk him back.

The hour for private diplomacy has expired. Now is the time to stick both hands into Baghdad - inaction will only prolong the crisis and keep Iraq in the headlines.

“We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness,” writes Allawi. “But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.”

Removing al-Maliki from office obviously poses a greater risk to Iraq’s security and the influence retained through him. The administration must hope that Allawi’s party is attempting to leverage its dissatisfaction, starting with al-Maliki’s resignation and negotiating until receiving its allocated ministries (and various political terms). Yet moving against him, whether to back him down or remove him, will find support amongst Iraqiya, the Kurds and even anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who views al-Maliki as a personal enemy.

al-Mutlaq claimed, “The Kurds are getting more convinced that continuing to support the al-Maliki government is a mistake... and maybe boycotting Parliament is one of the ways to pressure the government to change.”

Other analysts speculate that the Kurds could exchange al-Hashimi for political concessions from al-Maliki, but President Jalal Talabani appears to be pursuing an alternative course: bring national attention and power to Kurdish territory. His chief of staff, Dr. Fuad Hussein, denied that al-Hashimi evaded his warrant, hinting that Baghdad wasn’t safe for a fair trial. Talabani added, "He does not disagree with attending court. All he asks... is to transfer the place of trial from Baghdad to Kirkuk and he is ready to go to court in Kirkuk. This is an Iraqi city which belongs to the central government."

Washington and Baghdad’s mutual dilemma doesn’t revolve around a lack of U.S. troops, whose presence would inflame popular grievances, force another government dispute, play into Iran’s narrative and embolden al-Maliki’s consolidation. Relying on U.S. troops to patch Iraq's long-standing issues completely ignores the theories of COIN and fourth-generation warfare (4GW), which demand a non-military emphasis. The real mistake is giving al-Maliki free reign to squeeze Iraqiya out of the highest levels of power, a consequential trend for all segments of Iraqi society. Limiting his power would undermine Iran’s influence and appease Riyadh - potentially salvaging U.S. influence - so Washington’s inaction comes as a modest surprise.

Iraqis don’t need another strongman to lead the country from war to democracy. They need a statesman.

Syria Devolving Into Total Chaos

2012-01-13T09:43:00.000-08:00

The Arab League’s mission in Syria has finally sprung a tangible leak. Whether Bashar al-Assad and his remaining allies in the League can plug this hole will be revealed shortly, as the mission cannot last much longer at its present rate. Amid a UN report that counted 400 dead in the last two weeks, the first monitors have begun to scurry off of Sudanese General Mohamed al-Dabi’s ship.

"Two monitors have excused themselves, an Algerian and an Sudanese," Syria operations chief Adnan Khodeir said at League headquarters in Cairo.

Anwar Malek presumably expected to find himself under immediate attack as the first deserter. Asked to estimate the ranks of his sympathizers, Malek would tell Reuters, "I cannot specify a number, but many.” When you talk to them their anger is clear.” The Algerian quickly attracted hostile fire from the Arab League and his own government, both of which denied his gruesome account of Syria’s cities. In a League statement, “Gen. Mohammed Al-Dabi, the head of the Arab monitors’ mission to Damascus, has confirmed that what the Malek said to a satellite channel does not relate to the truth in any way.”

“Since he was assigned to the Homs team, Malek did not leave the hotel for six days and did not go out with the rest of the team into the field giving the excuse that he was sick.”

The fallacy of this defense is easily demonstrable. First, Syrian protesters remark that anyone with eyes can see the conditions in oppositional cities; Malek could have looked outside and witnessed abuses in Homs. The conditions he reported match non-government accounts: "The snipers are everywhere shooting at civilians. People are being kidnapped. Prisoners are being tortured and none were released... The mission was a farce and the observers have been fooled.”

Meanwhile Secretary-General Nabil al-Arabi is alternating between bailing water and conceding his mission’s failure. After defending the League for increasing the number of protesters, removing military vehicles from cities and pushing violence pushed “to the outskirts,” as if this reaction was a positive development, al-Arabi confirmed the general content of Malek’s version. “The Syrian government isn’t acting in good faith,” he said, even telling Egyptian TV that he’s receiving “extremely worrying” reports from Dabi.

Thus Malek’s report cannot be as “baseless” as the Sudanese general labeled it.

More than one monitor is also jumping ship, burying the excuse that Malek remained inside during his deployment. New deserters include a Moroccan legal specialist, an aid worker from Djibouti and an Egyptian. Another observer told Reuters that he plans to leave on Friday, saying, "there are some people who are concerned about their safety... Some, from a professional perspective, feel they are not achieving anything." Mousab Azzawi of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights identified 11 more observers as candidates: seven Iraqis, two Kuwaitis and two Emiratis. The group had reportedly witnessed Syrian security open protesters in Deir el-Zour.

These events follow the death of French journalist Gilles Jacquier, who was killed during a grenade barrage in Homs. al-Assad’s regime naturally accused Syria’s National Council (SNC) and “terrorists” of the crime. Oppositional groups would return the accusation, and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe tacitly blamed the regime by announcing, "It's up to Syrian authorities to ensure the security of international journalists on their territory.” Although the League’s monitors aren’t necessary supposed to do anything more than watch, the impression of an untrained and ill-equipped force has poisoned the confidence that their final report will yield political action.

Facing a massive crisis of confidence, the League’s mission will struggle to survive its last week and the potential 30-day extension without an emergency response. Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani, told reporters after meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "I could not see up until now a successful mission, frankly speaking. We hope we will solve it, as we say, in the house of the Arabs, but right now the Syrian government is not helping us." Washington feels the same way, hoping for Arab solution that comes with the lowest regional price, yet this price is inevitably rising with al-Assad’s destructive behavior.

One League official in Cairo defended the organization’s lack of options, arguing, "This is not a problem with the Arab League. This is a problem with the international system. Who is willing to send in troops? Who is willing to send in a fighting force?... What is this team going to do? This team is not there to stop the violence. It is not there to pull back the military. It is not there to free prisoners. It is to verify. It is not a peacekeeping team.”

The natural barrier of deploying an inexperienced monitoring team into a conflict zone is yielding one overriding conclusion: the military option. Several League officials have acknowledged the possibility in recent days, only to argue that an operation requires 6-8 weeks to mobilize - too long for Syria’s opposition to wait. A political and military campaign can, of course, be organized simultaneously, however the League’s ideal response would maintain control of Syria’s political transition. More understandably, the League’s cumulative militaries seek to avoid al-Assad’s well-trained army in the field. Such a conflict will dwarf the battle against Gaddafi’s ragtag force and potentially draw foreign actors into a regional war.

In Moscow, Russian Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed to possess “information that NATO members and some Arab states of the Persian Gulf, acting in line with the scenario seen in Libya, intend to turn the current interference with Syrian affairs into a direct military intervention.”

This scenario may rest in the relative distance, but it’s also growing closer with each passing death, conspiracy and political breakdown. In fact al-Arabi just told Egypt’s Al Hayat, "Yes I fear a civil war and the events that we see and hear about now could lead to a civil war.” Patrushev speculated that “the main strike forces will be supplied not by France, Britain and Italy, but possibly by neighboring Turkey,” adding that Washington and Ankara are currently discussing a no-fly zone. Arab League officials have thrown Pakistan, a country familiar with UN peacekeeping missions, into a potential Arab coalition. These forces would theoretically link with the SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA) to conduct precise air and ground operations.

At this point Syria becomes too chaotic to predict with any realistic expectation of accuracy, save for the profuse bloodshed of open warfare between al-Assad and his opponents.

Three Myths of Ali Saleh’s Immunity

2012-01-11T21:16:00.000-08:00

Although instrumental in drafting the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing agreement in Yemen, including an immunity clause for Ali Abdullah Saleh’s extensive family, the Obama administration has advanced the unpopular deal in determined silence. Offering limited information since mobilizing the GCC in April, the White House and State Department eventually guided a ratification process over objections from the UN's Human Rights Council and through the Security Council. October’s Resolution 2014 would reaffirm the GCC’s initiative in full, while adding “that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.”

The distance between “will be” and “should be” equals Saleh’s immunity.

That the U.S., European powers and Gulf states support the continuation of Saleh’s regime over Yemen’s revolutionaries is well documented. Never, though, had the Obama administration explicitly articulated America’s support for the GCC’s immunity clause until Monday, when the State Department’s Victoria Nuland coolly defended Saleh’s special privileges.

“I think you’ll remember that as part of the GCC transition initiative, which President Saleh ultimately signed and which Vice President Hadi and the opposition are working together to try to implement now, there was a provision of immunity for President Saleh and those who worked with him during the period of his government. However, that had to be put into law, so that’s what they’re working on now. This is part and parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be able to move forward towards a democratic future.”

The influx of information over Saleh’s status requires extensive disassembling.

1. Immunity is the quickest way to end Yemen’s revolution

The White House’s public argument remains unchanged despite an increasing level of exposure: Saleh and dozens of relatives must be coaxed out of power to “move Yemen forward.” Immunity is critical to uprooting Saleh’s network and implementing the GCC’s terms before February 21st’s presidential election. Perhaps immunity remains the “quickest” way to end Yemen’s “crisis,” however this possibility isn’t as indisputable as the Obama administration argues. The natural counterargument is that immunity encourages Saleh’s destructive behavior, as it has since the Saudi-bankrolled GCC launched its initiative in May.

The GCC’s protection is trending towards the opposite end of the White House’s stated goal: “giving these guys confidence that their era is over.” Instead Saleh has been provided with an internationally-legitimized tool to stall his exit and maintain influence afterward. Confident that his regime survived the GCC’s “transition,” Saleh has taken Western and GCC leniency as his cue to act as he sees fit, whether inside or outside of Yemen. The strongman invited himself to New York City, then “postponed” his trip after suspecting that he wouldn’t be received as President (returning didn’t appear to be an issue). Twice he has returned from Saudi Arabia, rumored as his new vacation spot, and he will almost certainly return again before February 21st.

A minority of protesters remain open to Saleh’s immunity and exile so long as his regime follows, but this deal is preemptively compromised by other aspects of the GCC’s initiative. Saleh has already ignored a 30-day deadline to transfer executive power to his Vice President, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi; this “power struggle” is now being sold by Western capitals as political cover. Hadi did reach a combative state with Saleh’s family, primarily his son Ahmed, while filling in during Saleh’s medical leave to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s 17-year VP also submitted an immunity draft covering “all those who worked with him [Saleh] during his presidency across all civilian, military and security apparatuses.”

Saleh still expects to lead Hadi’s campaign as a consensus candidate between his ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). He has no intention of turning apolitical during the ensuing two-year transitional period.

The theory that Saleh will accept immunity over his loss of power commits a dangerous psychological error by appealing to reason. Washington as a whole publicly alternates between acknowledging Saleh’s renowned duplicity and pleading ignorance, leaking a story about "getting played" amid conditional approval for an American visa. His behavior suggests that he would rather be dead than powerless, a level of stubbornness mirrored in the Obama administration’s refusal to let go of his regime. Western and Gulf capitals continue to minimize Yemen’s revolution as a “crisis” to be resolved ASAP, demanding an end according to their time-lines and interests.

Saleh and his foreign allies want the revolution over fast, not done right - a mindset that has prolonged low-intensity conflicts throughout the last half-century. Yemen's Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) recently advised, "The GCC Initiative, with or without its Implementation Mechanism, was not and could not be answerable to the genuine legitimate demands of the Yemeni people, in the immediate future or after a hundred years."

2. Immunity is necessary to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

The complimentary theory to immunity centers around AQAP, now described as al-Qaeda’s most evolved branch and one of America’s greatest threats. This theory contends that, by removing Saleh and his inner circle from Yemen’s equation, the country can “return to normal”; counter-terrorism units can switch from killing protesters to militants in the southern governorates. This theory may be true to an extent, since Saleh grew adroit at manipulating AQAP’s growth and allegedly funding proxy jihadists. The intense battle for Yemen’s Abyan, Aden and Ma'rib governorates is a byproduct of his misrule, and Saleh's own general admitted to being abandoned over the summer. Other U.S. technology and ammunition was redeployed against Yemen's Southern Movement (SM) or shifted to the Houthis' northern front.

If a government comes into power with no need to blackmail the international community or divert military assistance away from counter-terrorism, the U.S. could finally join a capable partner in defeating AQAP.

Unfortunately this theory isn’t much tighter than Saleh’s immunity, essentially weighing Yemen’s military sphere above its political and social levels. The battle against AQAP is more ideological than physical, and removing Saleh through a legitimate process would inflict greater damage than cushioning his downfall. International headlines now read “U.S. defends Saleh’s immunity,” the literal manifestation of al-Qaeda’s ideology. Only a handful of Yemenis have joined AQAP - revolutionaries want nothing to do with al-Qaeda - but many recruits must have America's support for Saleh at the front of their minds.

These fighters could be turned upside-down and isolated (or reconverted) by defending Yemen’s democratic movement, but their ideology is currently validated by Washington’s cooperation with the regime. Prolonging Saleh’s rule through the GCC’s initiative also ensures that the south remains unstable, and that his opportunistic military partnership will continue. Yemen’s uprising and AQAP are viewed independently, as if one must end to combat the other, when AQAP should be disintegrated within a just conclusion to the revolution.

Congress appears more concerned with the star power of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP’s former cleric and propagandist, than the recruiting power of U.S. policy.

3. Immunity in the name of democracy

Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, made modest headlines last week after warning Yemen’s GCC-approved “unity government” against granting immunity for crimes against humanity. Pillay’s comments may appear honest, but directing criticism at the remnants of Saleh’s regime is grossly manipulative; the UNSC is guilty of violating its own “international human rights obligations.” Hadi, the GPC and JMP are simply doing what the UNSC ordered them to do in October.

No aspect of the GCC’s initiative is truly democratic. Organized by Saleh and his foreign allies, GCC negotiations intentionally circumvented Yemen’s youth and civil movement through the unpopular JMP. Transparency is lacking across the GCC’s proposal, from its extensive negotiations to Saleh’s signature in Riyadh, to February’s ambiguous election and oversight of Yemen’s military command. No official copy of the GCC's initiative has been released, forcing protesters to guess what happens next, nor is Yemen a GCC member. All parts of the initiative, especially its power-sharing and immunity terms, are designed to confuse and divide Yemen’s opposition.

The GCC's papers are also stained by the blood of thousands of protesters, generating and whitewashing their deaths in the same cycle. Yemen’s revolutionaries are left without any semblance of justice - and with a gruesome impression of international law.

On a shadowy level, the Obama administration is using the GCC’s initiative to conceal ongoing military support for Saleh’s regime. Drone strikes have killed an undisclosed number of civilians along with their intended targets, including al-Awlaki's 16-year old son Abdulrahman, and the U.S.-funded Republican Guard and Central Security Organization continue to spearhead Saleh’s urban crackdown. Backing immunity admits these crimes by default, but Washington still hopes to avoid the spectacle of a trial and Saleh’s inevitable snitching.

Granting his immunity has nothing to do with genuine democracy, only the political expediency of external powers.

Syrian Opposition Stuck Between AL, UN

2012-01-10T16:19:00.000-08:00

Protesters feel the bullets whiz above their heads - if they’re lucky - as they dodge between streets and allies. Higher above them snaps the fire of international powers as they vie for control of Syria’s potential transition, and finally the deafening cannon of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the Arab League’s generally accepted failure in stopping widespread bloodshed, the bloc’s mission is fulfilling another purpose by gradually breaking down relations with Damascus.

Sadly this dissolution comes with high casualties and increased polarization. The League’s current cycle has been stuck on repeat since November, when the bloc first introduced a transitional initiative to end Syria’s revolution. Last week encapsulated the previous two months: political maneuvering, inconclusive weekend meetings and daily death tolls. Monday began with another reported massacre in the Khalidiyeh neighborhood of Homs. Local activist Omar Homsi claimed that “Syrian security forces fired at protesters after noon prayer,” and that an AL delegation fled the scene without documentation. al-Assad is also amending his tactics to include more crowd-control measures (tear gas, water cannons, and nail bombs).

Syrian activist Amal Hanano submitted a blueprint of Damascus’s “new” gameplan to Foreign Policy: “The observers' arrival changed the rules of the game. The regime sends spies to take pictures of the protesters who dare speak to the observers. Before every excursion, the streets are secured in any way necessary, by bullets or arrests (for the safety of the observers or to preserve what's left of the regime's tarnished image?). The streets of Deraa have to be scrubbed clean of its people, silencing their voices and erasing any sign of dissent, to present an image of control, safely guarded by snipers lurking on rooftops.”

Unsatisfied with Cairo’s conclusion that Damascus “only partly implemented” the League’s initiative - protesters contend that none of the League’s demands have been met - Syria’s opposition launched their latest media offensive to seize the country’s narrative. Pledging to increase the number of monitors from 165 to 200 remains a futile attempt to boost confidence in the League’s mission, given that 1,000 monitors could still be guided by Syrian authorities. Quoting a protester from Deraa, where one AL monitor sparked a furor after spotting or not spotting snipers, Hanano explains how the mission couldn’t visit a funeral because no transportation was available.

Reporting from inside the mission’s media bubble, CNN’s Nic Robertson observed, “the Arab monitors who are here... are largely seen as ineffective. The language that they use, they do not criticize the government here even though the government hasn't met what the Arab League is telling it to do in terms of pulling weapons and troops off the street.”

This pervading lack of confidence has rendered the League’s mission dead in the water, leaving its monitors to float through al-Assad’s carnage until their overview is submitted on January 19th. Syria’s opposition cannot afford to wait another 9 days without any political motion, as time equals lives and the potential for wider conflict. One particular group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), has already lost faith in the League’s mission and publicly expressed its intent to attack (with arms purchased from multiple sources) if the UN doesn’t assume observer duties. Most Syrian groups seem to be coalescing around these terms in the absence of new political action and clarification. Rami Abdulrahman, head of the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, warned against "giving the regime more time to deal with the Syrian revolution.”

"The initial report is too vague, and it essentially buys the regime more time," said Rima Fleihan, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC). “We need to know what the League will do if the regime continues its crackdown in the presence of the monitors. At one point it needs to refer Syria to the U.N. Security Council."

Syria’s Local Coordination Committees (LCC) proposed its demands as follows: "Immediately announcing that the Arab observers have failed in their mission, referring the Syrian file to the UN Security Council, paving the way for imposing a no-fly zone and establishing a safe corridor for protecting the military defectors."

Accordingly, a spokesman for the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) continues to strike a more optimistic tone, saying the League’s presence has “reinvigorated” Syria’s revolution and “decreased the number of protesters killed.” These points, though true, come with substantial qualifiers. Protesters are massing to prove their existence and dare al-Assad to shoot in front of the League -and he hasn’t blinked. Dozens of dead and wounded have been documented daily since the observers arrived on December 23rd.

“Any talk of foreign intervention is an illusion, the Arab League initiative is the only way forward,” Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir said after meeting with AL Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby in Cairo.

Ideally, Syria’s opposition must reach a compromise before the League receives its full report. However the middle ground might have been destroyed by al-Assad’s bombardment, and closing the schism between the NCC and SNC, LCC and FSA essentially requires the NCC to cede its position. The NCC may feel more comfortable with UN oversight if Syria’s other networks can provide guarantees of political leadership, a task that the SNC has failed to accomplish. Somewhat reassuringly, SNC spokeswoman Basma Kadmani argued, "There is no major difference on foreign intervention... we have agreed on a joint formulation of what foreign intervention means and how it should come about if it were to come about."

Regardless of their alignment, counter-proposals from every network must be shared and ready for immediate broadcast.

The possibility of UN intervention has created a parallel gap within the Arab League, applying considerable friction to its relations with al-Assad (which may benefit the opposition by accelerating a transfer). Al Jazeera counts Elaraby as a believer in his own mission, explaining his close relations with the NCC. Meanwhile the “anti-Assad” capitals, led by Qatar, are giving him ammo to criticize the League’s mission and potentially shut it down on his terms (another potential accelerator to the UN).

"If the report comes out saying the violence has not stopped, the Arab League will have a responsibility to act on that," Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told a news conference in Cairo.

With the League’s mission set to continue relatively unchanged, al-Thani’s statements cut to the short-term endgame. Perhaps some benefit will be produced if the monitors return with reams of evidence and a complete picture to report, and if al-Assad’s non-compliance results in punitive action. Yet al-Thani, tough as he acts, has issued similar warnings for months. al-Assad shouldn’t be too concerned if Qatar poses his biggest threat. After al-Thani urged the detached dictator to “take a historic decision,” Syria’s Permanent Representative at the Arab League blasted him for “speaking on behalf of the Syrian people.”

al-Assad drowned out his officials on Tuesday with a hard-line, two-hour speech at Damascus University: “The Arab League failed for six decades to protect Arab interests. We shouldn’t be surprised it’s failed today.”

Blaming Western powers, the Arab League and “hundreds of media outlets” for instigating their revolution could form the glue that sticks Syria’s opposition together. Claiming that “external conspiracy is clear to everybody” sounds like a natural bond, and any skeptic of al-Assad’s violent mania should realize that he has no intention of ceding power. “We will declare victory soon” equates to a death sentence (al-Assad says no orders were given “for anyone to open fire on any citizen”). As the situation currently stands, the Arab League and Western powers have yet to break from al-Assad’s regime and his Eastern connections. However these counter-revolutionary forces are drifting away from each other, necessitating unity amongst Syria’s pro-democracy movement.

“The divisions are getting bigger, and I think we can expect the situation here - at the moment, stable - to deteriorate in the future,” Robertson concludes. “That's the direction it's going in.”

U.S. Explicitly Backs Saleh’s Immunity

2012-01-09T17:53:00.000-08:00

Although instrumental in drafting the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) power-sharing agreement for Yemen, an “initiative” that included immunity for Ali Abdullah Saleh’s extensive family, the Obama administration has advanced the political deal in notorious silence. No detailed information has been offered by the White House or State Department since the GCC mobilized in early May, only unflinching support for its unpopular initiative. When Washington spearheaded the GCC’s ratification process through the UN Security Council, resolution 2014 simply reaffirmed the GCC’s initiative while adding “that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable.”

Politically and legally speaking, “should be” is another world from “will be.”

Having never released an official copy of the GCC’s initiative, the international community continues to confuse and divide Yemen’s vigorous pro-democracy movement up to the present. This disinformation campaign generated modest headlines last week when Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned Yemen’s GCC-approved “unity government” against granting immunity for crimes against humanity. As honest as Pillay’s comments may appear, directing criticism at the remnants of Saleh’s regime is grossly manipulative; the UNSC - not just Yemen’s government - is guilty of violating its “international human rights obligations.”

Then again, neither Saleh nor his allies in the UNSC are likely to listen to her.

That the Obama administration has supported the continuation of Saleh’s regime over Yemen’s revolutionaries is well documented. Never, though, had the White House or State Department explicitly addressed America’s support for the GCC’s immunity clause until today. Questioned on Assistant Secretary Jeffery Feltman’s recent trip to Riyadh and discussions surrounding Saleh’s immunity, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland replied as though no one should be surprised - a rare truth from the administration.

“I think you’ll remember that as part of the GCC transition initiative, which President Saleh ultimately signed and which Vice President Hadi and the opposition are working together to try to implement now, there was a provision of immunity for President Saleh and those who worked with him during the period of his government. However, that had to be put into law, so that’s what they’re working on now. This is part and parcel of giving these guys confidence that their era is over and it’s time for Yemen to be able to move forward towards a democratic future.”

Thus the White House’s public argument remains unchanged despite a new level of exposure: Saleh and dozens of relatives must be coaxed out of power to “move Yemen forward.” Immunity is critical to implementing the GCC’s deal - and maintaining influence with the “new” government. The natural counterargument is that immunity will encourage Saleh’s destructive behavior, as it has since the GCC’s initiative launched in May, and many Yemenis still demand justice for 33 years of misrule. Furthermore, the Obama administration is blatantly covering up U.S. military support for Saleh's regime through his immunity clause.

Washington and European powers had some special concrete shoes made for the wrong side of Yemen’s revolution.

Fully analysis on Thursday, the alleged deadline for Saleh to cede power and withdraw from the country.

Who Is Really Running Yemen?

2012-01-09T13:25:00.000-08:00

International Blackout Can't Quiet Bahrain's Uprising

2012-01-08T18:07:00.000-08:00

Alwaleed bin Talal has been a busy business man lately. As his cousins labor to protect the kingdom’s “investments” during an unstable environment, either through political hegemony or military force, the Saudi billionaire Prince is diligently strengthening his King’s media front. Already in possession of a vast media network across the Gulf, Riyadh has recognized the value of information and is hoarding accordingly.

The supposedly progressive Bin Talal broke new ice in December with a symbolic $300 million investment in Twitter (4% stake), but his liberal norms shouldn’t be confused with democratic urges. The $20 billion Prince also selected Manama’s Media City to host his globally-minded Alarab news channel - as if Bahrain’s uprising could get any darker.

Like King Abdullah’s royal circle, Washington counts the efficient suppression of Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement and preservation of America’s Fifth Fleet as a “foreign policy success.” Protesters are systematically quelled each day (especially on Fridays and weekends), funerals are often dispersed with tear gas, and any march on Manama’s Pearl Square is stopped before it begins. When Al Wefaq organized a non-violent demonstration to prove the uprising’s existence, calling on protesters to stand in front of their homes, security personnel forced some of them back inside.

Two weeks ago Bahraini personnel shot up Al-Wefaq’s headquarters under an international quarantine.

Far from “over,” as NPR recently reported, the 10-month island uprising is simply blacked out by extensive Western factors. The New York Times mainly pays attention when someone important is beaten or gassed (or its own Nick Kristof). The Wall Street Journal posts favorable assessment from Bahraini officials and U.S. consultants, something the Washington Post has picked up on. Neither U.S. mainstream media nor European powers can escape the gravitational silence of the Obama administration, but ample video can be found across YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.

"Ongoing repression in Bahrain is happening amid international silence as people demand democratization and reject dictatorship," Al Wefaq tried to tell the world.

Up until Thursday the Obama administration had no public comment on any of these incidents, instead devoting its usual level of attention to Syria and Iran. The State Department’s Victoria Nuland was then confronted with the loaded question of whether Bahrain “is off your radar screen.” Nuland naturally replied with a hint of indignity - “Of course it’s not off our radar screen” - even though the Department’s last comment dates to December 9th. Unlike Thursday’s Q&A, where Nuland needed prompting to address Bahrain, the spokeswoman began her December briefing with praise for King Hamad’s “credible and transparent” Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI).

Nuland was immediately questioned about the latest suppressed funeral, but evidently hadn’t been briefed some 12 hours after the incident. This unbreakable pattern led former opposition MP Matar Matar to conclude, "The case of Bahrain is a great example of international hypocrisy. Democratic and liberation slogans go silent when it comes to Bahrain.”

In fact the BICI is functioning exactly as designed: “prove” the government’s outreach and minimize the uprising through shallow punishments and reforms. Navi Pillay, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, recently reported that her team had “yet to see any prosecution of security forces for civilian injuries and deaths.” Bahrain isn’t “off” Washington’s radar either - the administration is actively concealing an obvious blip. The last official remarks on Bahrain trace to Michael Posner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and they sound eerily similar to the monarchy’s self-adulation.

“It is a great credit to King Hamad that he initiated the BICI process and that allowed the Commission freely free hand to conduct its activities. It is unusual for a government to invite a comprehensive external review of such sensitive matters. We strongly support the King's courage in initiating the review and his commitment to address the reforms outlined in the BICI report.”

High praise for an investigation into the Kingdom’s use of torture.

Posner does deliver several choice words for King Hamad, supporting “a broader, future-oriented agenda” and expressing “concern about reports of excessive use of force... in response to ongoing street protests.” He speaks of the “need for improved community policing practices, crowd control procedures, and accountability for incidents of excessive use of force.” However these lines only superficially differ from the government’s account. For starters Posner qualifies his “concern” over “reports” of government violence, whereas he explicitly “condemns the use of violence by demonstrators which the government has an obligation to stop.”

Two Western “supercops” were also deployed to oversee Manama’s “crowd control.”

That some of Bahrain’s protesters have turned violent is indisputable. They can be seen throwing rocks, bottles and Molotov cocktails at security personnel, and adopted a dangerous tactic of obstructing highway traffic with metal rods. Wefaq chief Sheikh Ali Salman has called on all protesters to cease their use of Molotov cocktails in particular, but low-intensity violence is a natural expression of a populace that loses total confidence in the government. “My team,” said Pillay, “has come back with the message that there is a profound lack of trust in the Government.”

Posner’s rhetoric also mirrors the government’s campaign to brand Bahrain’s Shia uprising as violent and uncontrollable, fulfilling the cycle of fourth-generation warfare (4GW). No level of asymmetric resistance justifies the combination of political marginalization and disproportionate force.

Although Washington has cashed in on Iran’s Hormuz threat to highlight Bahrain’s indispensable Fifth Fleet, the Obama administration couldn’t ignore Friday’s latest incident. Speaking to al Jazeera after stepping into an ambush, Nabeel Rajab recounted how a group of peaceful (but non-permitted) protesters was confronted by Jordanian, Pakistani and Syrian riot police. Once dispersed, the head of Bahrain’s Center For Human Rights hid for “25-30 minutes” before emerging towards his car.

"Five, six, seven people, I don't know how many people. They were attacking from everywhere. When a police officer came, I heard them say, 'We found Nabeel lying down,' and I said, 'No, I'm not lying down - you're beating me... They said, 'Are Nabeel Rajab?' I said 'Yes', then they beat me more.”

At this point the Bahraini CO intervened “when he saw them beating me, they stopped, because he knew it was too much and they called an ambulance."

On Saturday the monarchy offered an alternate version of Rajab’s case, as it does after every death. Not only did he lack a permit to protest, he was medically assisted after requesting aid for an injury. Unable to avoid comment, an anonymous U.S. official would wade into the information battle to minimize Rajab’s fallout, expressing “concern” but remaining inside the Kingdom’s line.

"We are not opining on the facts of what happened here but we are very concerned about this case," he added. "In general, we are very concerned about the frequent reports of excessive use of force by the police, widespread use of tear gas."

Nuland would release a copy of his statements on Sunday - only conclude with praise for the monarchy.

“The Government of Bahrain has taken significant steps to implement recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, and we urge it to complete this important undertaking without delay and continue the work of comprehensive reform. We encourage all the citizens of Bahrain to join in this effort, which can be the foundation for genuine reconciliation and a renewed spirit of national unity.”

These statements are unlikely to satisfy the majority of Bahrain’s opposition movement or Rajab, who delivered an unvarnished assessment of U.S. policy during a recent trip to the capita. Washington’s snug relationship with the monarchy provides rare transparency in a world of shadows. Al Wefaq has responded with politically correct appreciation, but Matar cautioned against the international community’s unsustainable position. He called for the Obama administration to apply real pressure on Manama, “rather than the international community just believing the regime's fake response, which contradicts the facts on the ground.”

As for Rajab’s foreign assailants, he predicts that they will never be found. Just another means of slipping Bahrain’s uprising into darkness.

The "End" of Iraq's War: Crisis and Conspiracy

2012-01-07T10:40:00.000-08:00

A recent bombing in Salahuddin province and Iraq’s political crisis have multiple traits in common: both events require more than six days to sort out. Six months might not allow sufficient time to shed light on an attempt to eliminate a leading Sunni leader, or to neutralize Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s consolidation of power.

Rafe al-Essawi found himself at the center of an inflating media bubble as his convoy rolled by Samarra, where al-Qaeda’s 2006 destruction of the Al ‘Askarī Mosque nearly plunged Iraq into outright civil war. Barely two days had passed since The New York Times profiled an ongoing struggle between Iraq’s Prime Minister and Finance Minister, creating the impression that someone didn’t want him to return to Baghdad. The Times was also following up its own scathing op-ed from al-Essawi, Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi and Osama al-Nujaifi, Iraq’s Parliamentary Speaker.

The timing between these reports and last Sunday’s IED blast outlined the factors currently at work.

Given that an IED doesn’t necessary select its target, laying immediate blame on al-Maliki’s government would extend beyond the available forensic evidence. Yet a well-placed IED also offers an ideal masking agent for political assassination, provided that its traces are scrubbed by security forces. Confusion quickly escalated after Salahuddin Operations Command denied “any security breach,” prompting local police to accuse Baghdad of “hiding” the blast.

Salahuddin’s regional authorities declared autonomy under Iraq’s constitution in October 2011, citing interference from the central government. al-Maliki is staunchly opposed to Sunni autonomous regions.

Cautious of sparking another political battle with limited information, al-Essawi held the government accountable for “a violated security situation” and requested an investigation from the Ministry of Interior. However al-Essawi is acutely aware of the target on his head - he remains a backbone of Iraqiy’a suspended boycott - along with the fact that al-Maliki maintains control of the Interior. He could be reserving an official accusation until Baghdad’s political crisis enters its next stage.

al-Maliki’s government has, for the moment, averted political catastrophe by placing Iraqiya on leave rather than firing the Sunni bloc. The move follows his threat to replace Iraqiya with his own allies, conjuring an illusion of progress. Al-Maliki's spokesman, Ali al-Moussawi, told reporters that “steps are being taken to try to persuade the Iraqiya lawmakers to return.” If and when they do, Baghdad is expected to hold a national dialogue mediated by the Kurds and sponsored by Washington.

"The political process, in spite of all the weaknesses it suffers, is still the only solution," Nujaifi said during a televised address on Monday. "The national conference that (Iraqi President) Jalal Talabani has called for is the right way to resolve the crisis, and we hope it will succeed."

However many obstacles remain in the path of a stable, equitable government. The Kurds refuse to hand Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi over to al-Maliki after being charged with funding a Sunni death squad, and “are not happy about being dragged into the dispute between Sunnis and Shiites.” The three sides have yet to agree on a meeting place to hold negotiations, with al-Maliki pushing for Hashimi’s return to Baghdad. Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, also rejected a political alliance supposedly explored by al-Maliki’s coalition.

“This would be the most dangerous step,” he warns. “It has to be a partnership between the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds. Anything contrary to that would be disastrous.”

Meanwhile the Sunnis have assumed their position out of necessity, not because they seek a compromise with al-Maliki. Not wishing to abandoned Iraq’s central government to al-Maliki or instigate a sectarian crisis, Iraqiya still hopes to change Baghdad from the inside. They see no compromise to broker; al-Maliki must relinquish the authority that he illegally maintained after 2010’s power-sharing agreement. Although supportive of national reconciliation, Nujaifi held a televised address to declare, "Human rights have not been achieved amid the deteriorating of the political process in Iraq."

His joint op-ed with Allawi and al-Essawi came with a list of political demands: “Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.”

In spite of the mounting popular pressure against al-Maliki, Iraq’s Premier is unlikely to back down without the addition of external pressure. Nor will Sunnis be convinced by al-Maliki’s words - they must see concrete action towards national unity and power sharing. Understanding the need for outside assistance, Iraqiya’s political face welcomed Washington’s support for “another national conference to resolve the crisis.” Now the Obama administration must pursue a genuine policy of national reconciliation, a response that has yet to develop since 2010’s parliamentary election.

“The United States must make clear that a power-sharing government is the only viable option for Iraq and that American support for Mr. Maliki is conditional on his fulfilling the Erbil agreement and dissolving the unconstitutional entities through which he now rules. Likewise, American assistance to Iraq’s army, police and intelligence services must be conditioned on those institutions being representative of the nation rather than one sect or party.”

Counterproductive as increased publicity may appear, the White House must intensify its diplomacy and step deeper into Iraq’s political crisis. Tasking Vice President Joe Biden to coordinate a “dialogue” represents a failure in public diplomacy; Washington is too deep into al-Maliki’s regime to feign neutrality. The problem isn’t a failure to extend the presence of U.S. troops, as Hashimi observed: “It’s not that they left too early. In fact, they left too late. The problem is what they have left behind.”

American favoritism for al-Maliki is the root of U.S. instability.

“We are glad that your brave soldiers have made it home for the holidays and we wish them peace and happiness. But as Iraq once again teeters on the brink, we respectfully ask America’s leaders to understand that unconditional support for Mr. Maliki is pushing Iraq down the path to civil war.”

Last month U.S. officials heralded a “new opportunity” as the last combat troops exited Iraq, seemingly oblivious to al-Maliki’s ongoing consolidation of power. The Obama administration has yet to abandon this political narrative despite a vocal Sunni reaction to al-Maliki’s reception at the White House, and the subsequent crisis surrounding Hashimi, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlak and Iraqiya in general. Ultimately the White House doesn’t want to be seen as active because its officials want Iraq to fade away, but this process will keep the war in U.S. consciousness.

“Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government,” Iraqiya’s leadership warns, “Iraq is doomed.”

Syrian Regime Manufacturing Intricate Terror Propaganda

2012-01-06T19:43:00.000-08:00

Apparently Bashar al-Assad beat his former Colonel to the shock.

Less than 72 hours ago Riad al-Asaad, commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), had announced his dissatisfaction with the Arab League’s observer mission, giving monitors “a few days” to prove themselves fit for the task. Otherwise “we will take a decision which will surprise the regime and the whole world.” 24 hours and dozens of casualties later, al-Asaad declared that his tolerance for inaction had expired: “We are preparing for big operations.”

One day might be enough time for Syria’s regime to organize counter-propaganda in the form of another Damascus bombing. Three days gives al-Assad too much time to plot.

While Friday’s gruesome blast in the capital inspired nightmares to al-Assad loyalists as they passed by, oppositional forces are experiencing a severe case of déjà vu. According to the government's account, a suicide bomber detonated his 10 kilogram payload amid “a traffic place crowded with inhabitants, passersby and shops,” blowing out a bus in the process. SANA state news later designated the bus as the bomber’s target; at least 26 civilians and security personnel are reported dead, with upwards of 60 injured.

The terror attack in al-Midan, a historic neighborhood near Damascus’s old city, immediately replicated the dual suicide bombing that struck Syria’s intelligence centers on December 23rd. Again ready to broadcast, personnel from Syrian state TV found themselves on the scene within moments to control its image. So did the Assistant Regional Secretary of al-Baath Party Mohammad Saiid Bkheitan, Prime Minister Adel Safar, the Ministers of Information and Health, and a variety of security personnel.

Somehow reporting from the scene, the Guardian’s Ian Black observed Syrian officials “energetically” showing off bloody limbs. “There was a sense that the Syrian authorities wanted to show what had happened.”

This same atmosphere lingered over Damascus on December 23rd, when near-simultaneous bombings struck government targets hours before the Arab League’s arrival. Denying Syria’s popular revolution since March’s initial uprising, al-Assad’s regime has instead entrenched its hardline by accusing “terrorists” and “foreign conspirators” of fomenting dissent. Syrian personnel flooded the League’s monitors with this narrative as they escorted them to the blast sites, adding that al-Qaeda had collaborated with Syria’s opposition.

Syria’s National Council (SNC) condemned al-Assad for once again killing his own people.

Armed with his next excuse, al-Assad appears to have capitalized on al-Asaad’s statements with another high-profile terror attack. The possibility of SNC/FSA complicity is low considering that few benefits are transferred to the opposition (especially counterproductive for international intervention), but the opening was admittedly easy to exploit. Colonel Ammar al-Wawi also implied that the FSA predicted Friday’s attack, setting up a notorious pattern for the months ahead.

“We’re expecting more of these bombings in the coming days,” al-Wawi warned. “This regime is seeking to spread chaos in Syria.”

Also unconvinced by Damascus’s latest bombing, the SNC joined its military counterpart in holding al-Assad’s regime responsible for both attacks. Members of the opposition and local activists pointed out the difficulty of smuggling explosives through a dense ring of security checkpoints in the heavily-guarded Damascus. Spokesman Omar Idilbi explained, "It is a continuation of the regime's dirty game as it tries to divert attention from massive protests. We call upon for an independent international committee to investigate these crimes that we believe that the regime planned and carried out."

On top of slandering the FSA and its loose connection with the SNC, al-Assad’s regime wasted no time exploiting the Arab League’s own monitors and oppositional foreign powers. The security official that Ian Black allegedly witnessed displaying “Syrian blood” was quoted as screaming, "This is the crime of the Arab League.” Equally willing to cooperate and toy with the League’s monitors, al-Assad’s regime has used their presence to “prove” Syria’s terrorist activity.

The State Department’s Victoria Nuland remarked, "What's interesting here is that, as with previous attacks, the Assad regime has blamed just about everybody. They've blamed the opposition, they've blamed al-Qaida, they've even blamed the United States.”

Nuland finds herself linked to Damascus’s bombing after reflecting the opposition’s discontent and attempting to keep pace with more skeptical Western capitals (Paris). In a Wednesday statement, Syria`s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jihad Maqdisi declared that al-Assad’s regime "is not interested in presenting an account on compliance or noncompliance with a protocol to the US, which is not a party to the protocol in the first place but a party in inflaming and instigating violence.” SANA state media also summoned friendly media figures to accuse Washington of a “devilish act.”

Dr. Amin Huteit, “pointed out that the failure of the conspiracy against Syria drove the conspirators toward carrying out terrorist operations against innocent civilians in implementation of Washington's retaliatory strategy against Syria because of its steadfastness and commitment to its principles and refusal to succumb to the U.S. dictates.”

Although the Obama administration has responded to the Arab revolutions with continual duplicity, organizing terror attacks in Damascus only plays into al-Assad’s hands. When the equation is balanced, Syria’s government stands to gain far more than the opposition by bombing civilian and military targets. The political and military opposition, Arab League and Western powers are all exploited with one blast, triggering massive pro-Assad demonstrations in the process. This plot comes in two phases: first discredit the opposition and international community, then create additional justification to “strike back with an iron fist,” in the words of Interior Minister Ibrahim al-Shaar.

The New York Times reported, “In the chaotic aftermath of the attack, residents in nearby neighborhoods said security and paramilitary forces and loyalists to Mr. Assad went on what some described as a rampage, shooting randomly and beating and arresting people in the streets.”

Syria’s situation obviously stands at an extreme crossroads. The question doesn’t seem to be whether al-Assad will genuinely obey international demands from any party (he won’t), but how far Syria’s opposition is willing to militarize. al-Asaad believes that his former boss cannot be overthrown by peaceful demonstrations, and many protesters agree by supporting international intervention (a point of contention within Syria’s opposition groups).

However they might not have much time to synchronize before the next bomb goes off.

Syria’s Revolution Nearing Next Phase

2012-01-05T19:10:00.000-08:00

Only two weeks have elapsed since the Arab League entered a new phase of counter-revolution in Syria. After months of indecisive action, the League eventually hammered out an initiative to remove Bashar al-Assad’s regime "at the lowest cost.” In addition to the holding a national dialogue with Syria’s varied opposition, Arab League monitors initiated their mission on December 22nd to oversee the withdrawal of military forces and release of political detainees.

These maneuvers, in theory, will enable mass protests to catalyze the regime’s downfall.

Parts of Syria’s opposition and skeptical observers can accept the fact that demonstrations are intensifying in the League’s presence. A boost in raw energy has intrinsic value during revolution. They also find common ground with those willing to “give the League a chance to fail” - few actually believe in the League’s sincerity. Too much deception has already occurred in front of its monitors, who are subsequently backed by cautiously supportive officials in Cairo.

The League’s monitors insist that their mission isn’t to prevent violence, only to document and report its sources to international bodies. This position stands on quasi-valid ground, as chaperoned monitors cannot be expected to confront armed soldiers. Yet the League’s overall proposal, coupled with a discredited mission chief and 100+ deaths since his arrival, has projected an aura of complicity with al-Assad’s regime. “Today was very good and all sides were responsive,” Sudanese General Mustafa Dabi remarked after arriving in Homs.

Nor do many protesters and activists believe that the League’s monitors are digging deep enough to document Syria’s abuses. Daily violence consumed at least 30 people on Wednesday and Thursday (according to Syria’s Local Coordination Committees), a pattern that is bleeding al-Assad’s trickery into the mission’s image.

"The observers are going to areas known to be loyal to the regime," Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, told The Associated Press. "We are not seeing the release of detainees or the true removal of a military presence from the streets. Army tanks have been replaced with police armored personnel carriers that still have the capability to shoot heavy weaponry."

Oppositional sources also warn against painted military vehicles and government forces operating in civilian vehicles. One activist in the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr uploaded a video of League monitors standing in front of dirt barriers, with armored vehicles positioned close behind.

The League’s tour on Homs’ main prison unfolded in similar fashion: deception by al-Assad’s regime, initial compliance from the monitors, and hard-earned exposure by the opposition. Prison administrators attempted to steer the monitors away from political detainees only to be “greeted with chants of ‘freedom, freedom,’ and "the people want the fall of the regime.” The League’s team was eventually allowed access for presumably limited interaction.

Local activist Abu Rami further cautioned, "The security forces moved some of the detainees but the numbers are so huge they couldn't move them all. They moved some detainees to military bases and moved away the ones who are in bad health."

The number of political prisoners arrested since March is estimated between 25,000 and 100,000, and reports continue to conflict over their release.

For now the Arab League’s counter-revolution is progressing roughly as planned - gradually weaken al-Assad and maintain control of regime change - but blatant interference may trigger the next phase of Syria’s revolution. The two general positions breakdown into exploiting the mission or rejecting it entirely. Choosing the latter, Free Syrian Army (FSA) commander Riad al-Asaad recently gave the League’s monitors “a few days, or at most within a week” before he made his next move to “surprise the regime and the whole world.”

On Wednesday he slammed the League’s mission as a "mockery" with "no teeth.”

"We prepared ourselves for this stage," the defected Colonel said from his quarantined base in Turkey. "We can't force him off with the peaceful demonstrations, so we are going to force him by arms to leave. We don't believe in the Arab League mission in Syria. I think they are covering the regime and blocking any international intervention to help the Syrian people... We are preparing for big operations and have no faith in Arab League monitors or their useless mission.”

al-Asaad accused the monitors themselves of witnessing government assaults and "not doing anything about it.” He also lobbied for UN monitors to replace the League’s mission and assume the overall political lead in Syria.

Whatever the FSA’s nominal general decides to do, he must realize the necessity of coordinating all operations with Syrian’s highest oppositional authorities. Many members of the National Council (SNC) haven’t hidden their opinion of the League’s mission, condemning its inaction and fraternization with al-Assad’s regime, but Burhan Ghalioun spends time on both sides of the fence. The SNC’s chairman believes, perhaps erroneously, that "even the Arab League has no illusions about the regime's ability to meet its commitments.”

However the end result remains unchanged: allow the mission to fail under al-Assad’s weight: "It remains politically, morally and psychologically useful.”

Ghalioun’s strategy to exploit the League makes sense through the eyes of oppositional leadership - for the time being anyway. Casualties and incidents between the League and al-Assad’s regime could pressure the opposition to align with al-Asaad’s thinking. Conversely, the FSA commander lacks uniform support amongst the SNC and LCC - he’s also suspected of exaggerated his force of 20,000 - and going off on his own agenda is the quickest way to end his campaign. Not only will coordination generate a buffer between al-Assad’s “terrorist” propaganda, a revolution’s military arm loses its function when detached from its political leadership.

For his part Ghalioun addressed these concerns during an interview with BBC, saying, "We are in continuous discussions and whenever they take strategic discussions we are consulted.” The SNC, NCC, LCC and FSA must attempt to sync as closely as possible in order to maximize Syria’s revolution.

Despite the public confidence of its officials, the Arab League has scheduled an emergency session on Saturday to discuss its mission’s future. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jaber Al Thani conceded “there are some mistakes,” arguing that “they tried their best. They have less experience.” He indicated that UN assistance has been requested. How much impact Syria’s opposition and Western powers will have remains to be seen, but the League’s “mistakes” are piling up to an unsustainable level up - its mission will end one way or another within 1-4 weeks.

Syria’s opposition must be ready to politically attack at any moment.

Simulating Saleh’s Exit Strategy

2012-01-04T17:49:00.000-08:00

Beyond Yemen’s opportunistic opposition and meddling foreign powers, few individuals or parties are willing to join Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. That leaves the majority of his opponents to think like him in order to defeat him. Like an old-fashioned game show that reveals an image square by square, Saleh has gradually exposed his blueprint to confuse Yemenis and foreign powers: where will he end up, when will he land, how long will he stay or if/when will he return to Yemen?

Thus Yemen’s revolutionaries and concerned observers must entertain Saleh’s games to anticipate his end.

On Tuesday the White House confirmed a standing invitation for medical leave, prolonging a debate that briefly assumed priority in the U.S. media. Washington’s double-standard is readily demonstrable by switching Saleh’s approval with Bashar al-Assad, and Saleh’s potential arrival drew more mainstream attention than Yemen’s 11-month revolution. Despite its visible concern behind closed doors, the Obama administration has treated Saleh’s visa request and Yemen’s pro-democracy movement as inconvenient afterthoughts. Jay Carney continued this pattern by offhandedly clarifying U.S. policy three days after the strongman announced that he would remain in Yemen until further notice.

Asked about a potential time table, the White House’s press secretary responded “that the situation remains the same, that the United States is still considering President Saleh’s active request to enter the United States for the sole purpose - the sole purpose of seeking medical treatment.”

This political gamesmanship should reach its next stage in nine days. Citing government sources, the Yemen Post reports that Saleh is “under immense pressure from the west and gulf nations to leave the country and give it a chance to succeed.” Few protesters or observers are willing to believe any of Saleh’s rhetoric until he steps on a plane, and subsequent maneuvers are expected once he lands. For now his most probable location remains the U.S. by default, having declared that he only “postponed” his trip to attend unfinished political business.

Business that includes quelling dissent within his personal security units, or suppressing an ongoing government-economic strike known as the “Parallel Revolution.”

Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) recently “agreed” that he couldn’t travel abroad unless received as “President,” countering the possibility of a brief vacation to New York. Now Saleh’s party has again “decided” that he remain in Yemen and “lead his party” to February 21st’s presidential election; this news was heavily spun by his unpopular spokesman, deputy Information Minister Abdo al-Janadi. If Saleh does travel before January 12th, Washington has supposedly required him to fly through a third party to limit his control.

One official described as a “ruling family member” told the Yemen Post, “Saleh will have other options to enter the US, he will have to go to the Emirates or Ethiopia then head to the United States.”

“We’re not going to dictate his travel plans one way or the other,” the State Department’s Victoria Nuland added on Wednesday.

Given that all of this information comes from government sources, a list of jump-points could range from Kuwait to Jordan to the comfortable Saudi Arabia. Nor does any international guarantee exist to prevent Saleh from returning. Each time he withdrew to Saudi Arabia - to receive medical treatment and sign the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative - he’s triumphantly and violently returned to Washington’s “surprise.” Saleh also promised to return when he first declared his intention to travel, and shouldn’t be doubted in these particular situations.

As for the Obama administration, its strategy remains a delicate dance to remove Saleh personally while maintaining authority through his vice president, ruling party and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). The GPC and JMP would then compete for international favor, further solidifying external hegemony. Another senior official (or perhaps the same) planted a story suggesting that Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi is resisting Saleh’s attempt to reclaim authority (by not answering his calls).

"We need to move vigorously and effectively to implement the Gulf initiative and its mechanisms," Hadi told the first official session of Yemen's "new unity government."

Although a clear rift was exposed between the Vice President and Saleh’s inner circle during his absence, the consensus candidate for February’s election is too reliant on Saleh’s regime to survive without him. Saleh maintains authority as president while his relatives remain at their military commands, and the GCC’s deal has preserved his ruling party for future elections.

The final outcome of these maneuvers is a joint-PSYOP campaign between Washington and Sana'a. Loosely coordinated interests and disinformation leads toward the same goal - suppression of Yemen’s revolution - and both capitals have relentlessly countered the possibility of regime change. The administration seeks to remove Saleh so that Yemen can essentially return to normal, adding cosmetic political reforms and economic incentives to reduce popular pressure.

Upon hearing that Saleh will remain in the country, White House spokesman Tommy Vietor responded, "I would note that as part of the agreement to resolve the political crisis in Yemen, Saleh transferred executive powers to Vice President (Abdrabuh Mansur) Hadi, who is now overseeing the transition process in Yemen... Saleh signed this accord in front of the world. The United States and the international community are committed to holding him accountable to the agreement."

An open politico-military relationship isn’t in the interest of either party.

Digging through propaganda usually yields a few truths from the accumulating pile of disinformation, so the Yemen Post’s cache of intel cannot be disposed in bulk. Saleh is reportedly “worried that his ruling family will be toppled if he leaves the country for a long period of time,” a real possibility. Western and Gulf pressure does exist for the reasons mentioned above - crafting their entire narrative around completing the GCC’s initiative - so Saleh might withdraw while he still has time to return before February 21st.

Or he may choose to “overthrow the Gulf initiative and its implementation plan,” in the words of defected General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Mullah Omar Makes Latest Power Play

2012-01-03T19:32:00.000-08:00

Hakimullah Mehsud sits with Wali-ur-Rehman

A guerrilla’s weakness is usually converted to his strength: a lack of armor or infrastructure. The cell-based structure of netwar offers the same double-edged sword, diversifying an insurgency’s hierarchy and preventing its wholesale destruction. The price of this natural reaction often comes out of the insurgency’s chain-of-command and its potential to escalate operations.

The Taliban’s branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently negotiating with al-Qaeda’s remaining leadership to correct this organization flaw, according to leaks from two recent summits. Confronted with America’s relentless blitzkrieg and waning popularity inside Pakistan, the commanders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hosted meetings on November 27th and December 11th to realign with their Afghan overseers. The audience included TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud and deputy Wali-ur-Rehman (commander in South Waziristan), Maulvi Nazir (South Waziristan deputy) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (commander in North Wazirstan).

Sirajuddin Haqqani, one half of the border-straddling Haqqani network, supposedly chaired the meeting at Mullah Omar’s request. Senior al-Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi, now acting as the group’s number two, also attended to deliver a special message:"For God's sake, forget all your differences and give us fighters to boost the battle against America in Afghanistan.”

These developments are sure to spin in both directions. Some mainstream media hedged their bets appropriately, questioning whether the outreach “indicates that the militants are struggling... or conversely, that they want to make sure they hit U.S. forces hard as the Americans accelerate their withdrawal this year.” The reality is that both networks suffered extensive territorial, numerical and leadership losses heavy losses over the last three years. Unfortunately for Washington, the Taliban’s regional umbrella remains a potent guerilla force with little immediate need to seize territory or launch large-scale operations (intense activity remains ongoing in the eastern provinces).

Nor should the TTP be labeled as weak when divided, then weak when attempting to unite.

The Taliban and TTP have experienced chronic fragmentation since the 2004 death of TTP forerunner Nek Muhammad Wazir, America’s first drone kill inside Pakistan. While TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud initially attempted to assist the Afghan Taliban as Muhammed intended, Mehsud’s increasingly radicalized attacks on the Pakistani state eventually turned the TTP’s sympathizers against the group. The loss of force, provocation of the Pakistani army and alienation of local tribes prompted Mullah Omar to stage numerous interventions, including a high-profile attempt in 2009.

Yet divisions persisted when Hakimullah, Baitullah’s deputy, seized power after his boss's death-by-drone in August. Rehman and Gul Bahadur would vie for the TTP’s leadership before reluctantly ceding to Hakimullah, who styles himself as a fearless field commander. Although his charisma may be perfect for his job, most of the TTP’s sub-commanders have endured relentless operations (Pakistani and U.S.) due to his shift into North Waziristan. Radicalized by al-Qaeda beyond the other players, Hakimullah alienated some of his own lieutenants by attacking mosques and purely civilian targets, and angered older jihadists by participating in the 2011 killing of Colonel Imam.

The TTP’s incongruous stance towards Islamabad has also produced diverging accounts over whether a ceasefire was recently declared, and by whom. In retrospect December’s information battle coincides with the Taliban’s first meeting in late November. According to Pakistani media, “Following the intervention of one-eyed Omar, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban formed a joint five-member shura or council with other Pakistani militant groups on Sunday to oversee an end to attacks on Pakistani forces.”

Since the TTP’s numerous branches haven’t operated in sync for years, any increased cohesion can produce quick dividends on the Afghan battlefield. If its leadership truly aligned politically and militarily, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (and terrorist nodes across the region) will ensure a stalemate when U.S. forces march into 2015. Mullah Omar also remains the only Taliban figure that could patch the political, ethnic and territorial differences in the TTP.

Somewhat oddly, Hakimullah is the only actor refusing even though he’s the most hardened al-Qaeda ideologist.

“Yes, we signed an accord with three other major Taliban groups of Maulvi Nazeer, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and an Afghan Taliban faction to avoid killing of innocent people and kidnapping for ransom, but we did not agree with them to stop suicide attacks and our fight against Pakistani security forces," said TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan in response to Monday’s reports.

One TTP commander spilled the real juice: Hakimullah and Waliur “were at each other’s throats.” Although Rehman pledged his loyalty to al-Qaeda in 2010 and quickly countered “there are no differences between us,” South Waziristan’s commander reportedly “ordered his fighters to kill Mehsud because of his increasing closeness with al Qaeda.” A Taliban favorite, Rehman's cool headed temperament also clashes with Hakimullah’s brash personality.

As the Taliban’s equation stands, Mullah Omar still presents a fundamental dilemma for the U.S. because he is viewed differently than Osama bin Laden. Killing the Taliban’s undisputed leader by drone or raid would alienate too many Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, and Washington needs Omar to preserve any semblance of a negotiated settlement after 2014. A potential truce within the TTP, even if temporary, would also give Islamabad leverage to reclaim its sovereignty, as the government has used U.S. drones to deplete Hakimullah’s ranks.

Washington, in turn, is determined to attack those groups - Rehman, Gul Bahadur and Nazir - that remain loosely allied with Islamabad. Pakistani officials may begin to react differently if these groups focus their energy into Afghanistan, creating leverage to declare a ceasefire on U.S. drones.

The odds of a total shift in the TTP’s operational direction remain low due to these challenges and many more, however Mullah Omar’s latest attempt to connect the TTP’s hydra with his own cannot be underestimated. The stakes are rising as 2014 approaches and most of the TTP wants to concentrate on Afghanistan. Hakimullah may be eliminated and replaced within the next 1-3 years, increasing the Taliban’s influence. November’s meeting also coincided with NATO’s November 28th raid on Salala ridge, a belligerent act that might have inspired the Taliban to close ranks as Washington and Islamabad separate.

As unpopular as the TTP is, America remains Pakistan’s public enemy due to the Obama administration’s politico-military interference and abysmal diplomacy.

"From here on in we want a very formal, business- like relationship," military spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas told The Associated Press from Rawalpindi. "The lines will be drawn. There will be no more of the free run of the past, no more interpretation of rules. We want it very formal with agreed upon limits."

These vast networks appear to be drifting in opposite directions: the Taliban and TTP inching closer together, America and Pakistan shaking apart. Washington’s relationship with Kabul remains tenuous beyond the security realm, while its alliance with NATO will gradually unravel over the next three years. In this type of stalemate, a substantial increase in the Taliban’s organization could dictate the terms of a post-2014 settlement with the U.S.

Arab League Blows More Fog Over Syria

2012-01-02T16:57:00.000-08:00

The Arab League’s publicly stated mission was to disperse Syria’s fog of war. Instead its monitors brought their own fog machine to thicken a shroud of internal and external propaganda.

In the 11 days since its first monitors arrived in Homs, various Arab League officials have threatened Bashar al-Assad’s regime to comply while praising his cooperation. One member recently told reporters that "the Syrian side is facilitating everything,” while another official in Damascus said the mission’s communications are being coordinated with Syria’s Foreign Ministry. The mission’s chief, Sudanese General Mustafa al-Dabi, landed with heavy baggage and soon found himself under new criticism for downplaying the conditions of Syria’s oppositional cities - comments he has since denied. Dadi also jumped to al-Assad’s defense after one monitor was quoted as saying he saw snipers, arguing, "This man said that if he saw - by his own eyes - those snipers he will report immediately.”

After a harsh reprimand from the Arab League’s parliament, Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby emerged in Cairo to provide “clarity” to Syria’s situation.

"Yes, there is still shooting and yes, there are still snipers," he told reporters at the league's headquarters. "The objective is for us to wake up in the morning to hear that no one is killed. The mission's philosophy is to protect civilians, so if anyone is killed then our mission is incomplete... There must be a complete ceasefire."

However the end result of Elaraby’s press conference is more confusion; the word “if” draws immediate attention as civilian casualties continue to be reported. He added that it was “hard to say who is shooting whom,” a line directed towards the Free Syrian Army (FSA). FSA commander Riad Mousa al-Asaad has ordered an offensive ceasefire while the League’s monitors make their rounds, although his command within the FSA and localized armed groups isn’t absolute. That said, League monitors should be able to distinguish between guerrilla fighters and government soldiers armed with high powered sniper rifles.

The notion that insurgents are applying equivalent force is also typical of counter-revolutionary propaganda.

From this point Elaraby continued to reveal the League’s bias towards al-Assad, signaling how close the two actors remain despite their public friction. Addressing al-Dadi’s position (al-Assad allegedly selected him from a list of potentials), Elaraby called him a “respectable military man with a clean reputation.” Tasking a “military man” to lead a humanitarian could make sense in another part of the world, with another military man in charge, but Dadi broadcast a negative message across Syria’s opposition.

“His record, which I saw, does not include anything that would condemn him,” said Elaraby.

After concluding “that the mission was succeeding,” Elaraby qualified himself by saying it was “too early to draw any conclusions.” He had previously claimed that only a week would be needed to assess Syria’s situation, saying “We don't need a month.” Switching back and forth, Elaraby admitted that the League’s mission is “difficult” because crimes are still being committed in areas where monitors are present. He then defended his mission - "Give the mission a chance to prove itself on the ground” - pointing to the distribution of aid and release of 3,484 political prisoners.

Independent reports counter that al-Assad has only released dozens of prisoners so far, and warn that more are jailed each day.

Elaraby’s statements naturally drew immediate criticism from Syria’s opposition, particularly his observation that Syrian tanks and ground troops had pulled out of urban areas. The British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights did confirm that tanks had temporarily withdrawn from withdrawn from Syrian cities, but warned that government units remain active in the streets. The group’s leader, Rami Abdul-Rahman, told The Associated Press, "They can bring the tanks back and use them to fight.”

One activist in Homs, who operates under the name Abu Rami, spoke more bluntly: “Either the Arab observers are blind or they are working for the regime.” He says al-Assad’s regime has feigned withdrawal by hiding tanks inside and outside the cities.

Syria’s National Council (SNC) and National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) face an urgent need to clarify a joint-position with the Arab League. Many statements have already been delivered before and during the League’s mission, but the ongoing situation demands a concise policy that can be referred to over the next 50 days. The burden of unraveling the Arab League’s propaganda rests squarely on Syria’s revolutionaries.

Slow Unraveling of Arab League’s Syrian Plot

2012-01-01T20:37:00.000-08:00

The story is more dud than its bombshell headline. After witnessing another week of bloodshed occur right in front of (and behind) Arab League monitors, the organization’s parliamentary arm issued a scathing rebuke of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Upwards of 40 casualties were reported over the last 72 hours and al-Assad has yet to release political detainees as “promised,” escalating oppositional and Western pressure for new action.

"The mission of the Arab League team has missed its aim of stopping the killing of children and ensuring the withdrawal of troops from the Syrian streets, giving the Syrian regime a cover to commit inhumane acts under the noses of the Arab League observers," Ali Salim Al-Diqbasi, president of the Arabic Parliament, said in an interview from Kuwait.

His solutions were just as frank.

“The Arab League has only two options: Either quit the Syrian profile totally and refer it to the United Nations and the Security Council, or form an Arabic military force to confront the Syrian regime.”

al-Diqbasi’s hardline rhetoric sprinkled a cool mist over Syria’s hot battle-zones - at least someone in the Arab League is willing to state the truth. However parliament’s recommendations are non-binding and they will almost certainly be exploited in Syria’s case. The League’s overall behavior was succinctly defined by one involved official, who told The Associated Press that the bloc “wants regime change but at the lowest possible cost.”

“If the regime implements the removal of tanks and troops from the streets, 10 million Syrians will take to the streets and occupy all main squares, making the regime’s collapse a matter of time. Assad will never allow this, and the Arab League will be accused by more Syrians of complicity.”

Washington and its Western allies are currently locked into the same dilemma; both would like to see al-Assad’s regime removed, but not at the cost of regional instability. They also seek control through an international "mechanism." While the Arab League’s 4-point plan to withdraw Syrian troops from urban areas and add monitors is beginning to work in the opposition’s favor, the League’s complicity with al-Assad remains active. Beyond its chauffeured monitors, the bloc’s strategy is likely to proceed as advertised by Gulf media: denounce al-Assad’s crackdown, then call for “meaningful dialogue” with his regime.

Oppositional organization is critical to maintaining pressure on the League and UN.

The process of forming revolutionary leadership isn’t easy though, as The Washington Post reports. Instead of softening the line between Syria’s National Council (SNC) and National Coordinating Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), Friday’s “transitional” proposal triggered popular divisions within both networks. Among the criticisms: minimal local input and no call for international intervention. Both networks are trapped in a parallel dilemma with the international community: squeezing assistance out of a hesitant West.

With some quick political thinking, SNC member Rami Nakhle expected to salvage the political crisis by blocking it through the general assembly: “You can say that it is like the Syrian government signed an agreement and the people’s council refused it.”

This process, if successful, would provide a fitting juxtaposition to the Arab parliament’s impotence.

How the SNC and NCC react remains to be seen, but common sense dictates that they close ranks with their popular base. The two groups are cautious of international intervention, driving a wedge in oppositional streets, when they need more popular support to appease Western powers. A concrete plan must be formulated under the terms of intervention, such as assisting the Free Syrian Army and opening an international aid corridor.

Given the fluidity within each area of Syria’s uprising, a flashpoint could occur at any moment within the opposition, FSA, Arab League or UN. Syria’s opposition understands the need for unity amongst division, but practical and ideological demands generate an inevitably complex task. The more unified Syria’s opposition can stay amid a global counter-revolutionary network, the more likely they will succeed in bringing al-Assad’s regime down without wasting excess time.

Syrians Daring al-Assad To Shoot

2011-12-31T17:41:00.000-08:00

They heard that Syria’s situation isn’t “frightening.” They hear themselves branded as "terrorists" for a crime that they may be innocent of. Syrians decided to prove both accusations wrong on Friday, massing in enormous demonstrations across oppositional territory and daring Bashar al-Assad to shoot in front of the Arab League’s monitors.

Sadly, his soldiers did.

By the day’s end an estimated 35 casualties had been reported in Idlib, Homs, Hama, Deraa, and Douma. This assault stretches the battlefield 200+ miles from north to south, creating an unrealistic space for the League’s observers to cover. Half of Syria could qualify as “revolting” in various degrees, an area that would encompass some 30,000 square miles - leaving 150 monitors to cover 200 square miles each.

At least nine more protesters were killed on Saturday. The street-oriented Local Coordination Committees at least 140 casualties since AL personnel arrived on the 22nd.

Bloodshed aside, Syrians are ready to move while the League’s presence lasts (one month, plus an option on a second). They also have no choice in the absence of foreign media, and drawing an absolute line against the regime is vital to their struggle. For months al-Assad has demeaned the opposition as “terrorists,” fed upon the Free Syrian Army’s (FSA) insurgency, and accused foreign militants of instigating Syria’s revolution. This smear campaign recently culminated with a dual bombing in Damascus hours before the League’s arrival. Five minutes hadn’t passed when Syrian officials “revealed” a joint-attack by the opposition and al-Qaeda.

Activist Abu Khaled told Reuters, "We are determined to show them (the monitors) we exist. Whether or not there's bloodshed is not important.”

For now al-Assad’s AL shield remains operational, albeit dented. Themselves caught in a political settlement with his regime, League officials got off to a rocky start by downplaying Syria’s violence and “getting good cooperation from the government.” The initial “reassuring” assessment by Sudanese General Mustafa al-Dabi, the mission’s commander, was parroted by Russia and China as a sign of al-Assad’s goodwill. Fronting a backdrop of “massive spontaneous gatherings” against the League’s “intervention,” al-Dabi’s statements and background have already triggered oppositional calls to replace him.The League’s most “assuring” moment came late Friday, when one observer found himself surrounded by residents in Deraa. Naturally al-Assad won’t give up the Damascus-centric south easily, but this reward naturally increases the risk. Speaking with local residents, the monitor was quoted as responding, “You're telling me there are snipers? You don't have to tell me, I saw them with my own eyes."

"We're going to ask the government to remove them immediately. We'll be in touch with the Arab League back in Cairo. If the snipers are not gone in 24 hours, then there will be other measures taken."

Yet the phrasing of this warning gives the impression that al-Assad can simply remove and redeploy them, and state media rejected “reports of biased satellite channels” on Saturday. Furthermore, al-Dabi went public to “clarify” that “this man said that if he saw - by his own eyes - those snipers he will report immediately. But he didn't see [snipers]."

It should be noted that the Sudanese general allegedly denies saying that he didn’t see anything “frightening.”

A dramatic softening in al-Assad’s iron fist is unlikely to follow the last 10 days of brutality; his tactics are far more likely to conform around the League’s monitors. Live rounds will be watered down with additional tear gas, rubber bullets and other non-lethal measures, and large-scale assaults will be avoided in the League’s presence. Knowing each monitor’s location is no less important than shadowing them for intimidation purposes, and the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights counted 27 casualties in areas where no monitors were present.

One activist, Omar Idlibi, explained how al-Assad’s forces "pulled the tanks from the main streets as the team was passing by the area. They brought them back after the monitors left. This regime is maneuvering to cover up realities on the ground.”

Al-Assad undoubtedly intends to manipulate and outlast the League’s mission for two months and send them home packing. Then, like a tank pulled down an alley, government forces can reemerge for a wider crackdown.

The League’s main benefits to the opposition will come from what protesters and the revolutionary leadership make of their visit. Haytham Manna, a Paris-based dissident and spokesman for the Arab Commission for Human Rights, told The Associated Press. "Whether we like it or not, the presence of observers has had a positive psychological effect, encouraging people to stage peaceful protests...” Protesters must increase their political organization maintain a consistent energy throughout the League’s tour, as they cannot rely on the League’s good intentions to stop al-Assad’s assault.

Syria’s National Council (SNC) and National Coordination Committee (NCC) took a step in the right direction on Friday night by drafting a joint roadmap in Cairo. The opposition’s primary networks have experienced friction over key issues, including al-Assad’s immunity and Western intervention, but they must operate in tandem to overcome al-Assad’s regime.

They must also prepare for a future showdown over Riad al-Asaad’s potential contact with League officials. The FSA’s commander recently ordered a halt to all non-defensive actions “to prove that there are no armed gangs in Syria,” but the League has yet to accept his invitation to meet. The SNC, NCC and Local Coordination Committees need to put the next phase of their strategy into effect as soon as an irreversible breakdown occurs.

No more time than necessary can be wasted in the Arab League’s diplomacy, bureaucracy and deception with al-Assad’s regime.

Egypt's SCAF Steps Forward, Leaps Backward

2011-12-30T21:04:00.000-08:00

Scrambled information emerged from Egypt on Thursday.

Amid ongoing discussions between the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and its recently created Advisory Council, Egypt’s election cycle has allegedly jumped ahead from March 11th to February 22nd. A second three-part election for the country’s Shura Council is scheduled to follow the current voting for Egypt’s People’s Assembly, and the SCAF faces popular and oppositional pressure to speed up its transition to civilian rule. However many political actors oppose a premature deadline - such as January 25th - without a constitution to legally bind the SCAF.

The council hopes to boost confidence by offering a minor compromise, but its position remains ambiguous for the moment. Mohamed al-Khouly, the Advisory Council's spokesperson, told Al-Masry Al-Youm that "we cannot expect an official decree by the SCAF in that respect.”

What the SCAF did deliver publicly is 17 messages (six confirmed) across Cairo, couriered by “heavily armed men wearing the black uniforms of the central security police.” Among the recipients: the U.S.-financed National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). These organizations make for easy targets given their prior run-ins with Hosni Mubarak’s regime and overall reputation in non-democratic states. More jarring is the fact that Egypt’s military rulers count on support from the Saudi King and U.S. government, which some SCAF members tacitly accuse of fomenting protests and manipulating the elections.

The Obama administration has stuck by the SCAF at semi-great cost to America’s reputation Egypt. While the U.S. brand lost its luster years or even decades ago, the promise of Tahrir Square creating an opportunity to invert America’s unpopularity. The administration would miss its chance by first supporting Mubarak, then his spy chief and finally his military establishment, giving the SCAF a green light to pursue its own “transition.” Each subsequent abuse of power, whether seizing control of the constitutional process or beating protesters to death, has been met with obligatory resistance.

SCAF members speak with relative accuracy when accusing “foreign” or Western elements of interfering with Egypt’s democracy - the Obama administration is functioning as an enabler to the council. The Washington Post observed that Egypt's generals, "have banked on the notion that Washington continues to look at Egypt primarily through one lens: the security of Israel."

Thursday recreated a scene that has played out dozens of times since the SCAF assumed absolute command of Egypt’s affairs. Asked about U.S. conversations with Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri (a former Mubarak official) and Ambassador Sameh Shoukry, the State Department’s Victoria Nuland wouldn’t “get into the details of our private diplomatic exchanges, except to say that we were very clear that this issue needs immediate attention, and we look forward to hearing back from the Egyptian Government as soon as possible.”

Undaunted, reporters continued to probe Nuland on U.S. support for the SCAF despite her assurances that Washington “doesn’t think this action is justified.” Of course no Egyptian protester or Western capital justifies these raids, and Nuland straddled the fence by arguing, “we’ve just had a number of successful rounds of elections, elections that were generally judged to be free, fair, with open, broad participation, so that is a good thing. This is not a good thing, so we are obviously expressing our concern.”

Buttressing the State Department’s position, another senior administration went off record to clarify the White House’s private message: “This crosses a line.”

The problem with this thinking is that Washington consistently advances the SCAF’s line. Protests in Tahrir have been regularly suppressed since Mubarak’s fall, yet U.S. officials often respond by urging “all sides to refrain from violence.” Protesters rarely - if ever - generate the disproportionate violence applied to them by government forces; equally important, Washington wants protesters to avoid instigating a government response. Another fierce crackdown in November was swept away by a jubilant round of voting, followed by a less successful second round and renewed clashes with security forces.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a frequent contact of the SCAF, would express her “deep concern” about the “continuing reports of violence in Egypt.” Before adding that protesters should refrain from provocative acts, a necessary component of revolution, the Secretary called “upon the Egyptian authorities to hold accountable those, including security forces, who violate these standards.” However the notion of holding the SCAF accountable to itself degraded even further after video surfaced of Ghada Kamal’s brutal assault.

Clinton did not take kindly to female abuse, saying the “particularly shocking” incident “disgraces the state and its uniform." Defenders within the SCAF’s establishment countered that Kamal, a member of the April 6th movement, “had been insulting the army through a megaphone.”

While back-channel negotiations play an indispensable role in diplomacy, Egypt is experiencing a revolutionary juncture rather than a typical diplomatic crisis. Private diplomacy with the ruling power manifests as friction with the popular movement, and many protesters accuse Washington of shielding the SCAF on the international level. This process also encourages the council to advance the tolerance of Washington’s “red line.” On the same day that Field Marshall Hassan Tantawi pledged to investigate police abuses - which he termed “media accusations - he decided to raid U.S. NGOs in full knowledge of Washington’s response.

SCAF subsequently promised not avoid future raids and return seized property, a move “welcomed” by the administration.

That U.S. officials vocalized their feelings in this particular episode cannot be denied, but the end result fits into a familiar pattern. During a conference call with Tantawi, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta “expressed his deep concern about the raids” before “conveying his appreciation for Field Marshal Tantawi’s prompt decision to halt the raids.”

"The secretary reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Egyptian security relationship,” Pentagon spokesman George Little said in an emailed statement, “and made clear that the United States remains committed to the strategic partnership and stands ready to cooperate with Egypt as it continues its democratic transition."

Mainstream media such as The New York Times and Wall Street Journal are busy disseminating this narrative throughout the news sphere. Ignoring Panetta’s friendly conversation with Tantawi, the WSJ noted that “the decision to highlight the phone call signaled its intention to continue to pressure the Egyptian military.” The NYT similarly claimed that the Obama administration “has been especially vocal on the need for the transfer of power as the government has brutally cracked down on demonstrators demanding the generals step down.”

The Obama administration would like to see an eventual transfer of power in Egypt - but not before the SCAF blunts the rapid political realignment that could have followed Mubarak’s fall. Needing to maintain Egypt’s security status in the region, Washington is applying insufficient pressure on the SCAF to consistently abide by democratic law. From the moment of Mubarak’s fall, Washington and its allies envisioned the SCAF completing its term and securing a position of authority after transferring power.

The Saudi-bankrolled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also eager to absorb Egypt.

As a result Egyptians must continue demonstrating to hold SCAF accountable, ensuring a dual (if loose) political track with parliamentary actors. The SCAF would surely grab more power in the absence of popular checks and balances, and the international community only provides a self-interested layer of accountability. Despite their unpopularity with certain segments of Egyptian society, protesters remain the country’s vanguard against diversions to the revolution. "Efforts to suffocate them will be a major setback and will surely backfire,” Mohamed ElBaradei, Egypt’s Nobel laureate, Tweeted in the moments after Thursday's raids.

The same warning applies to Tahrir Square.

White House Still Playing Saleh’s Game

2011-12-29T20:21:00.000-08:00

Weekly overview of U.S. policy in Yemen:

In accordance with the demands of America’s presidential office, Barack Obama has been flooded with a river of updates throughout his Hawaiian vacation. From economic hardball with the GOP to terror attacks in Iraq, Syria and Nigeria, his administration encountered one interruption after another - including a visa request from one of the Arab world’s besieged dictators.

Christmas weekend in Yemen produced a chaotic microcosm of Washington’s response to 11 months of revolution. First the White House allowed Ali Abdullah Saleh’s theoretical December 23rd deadline to expire without clarification, leaving executive power firmly in his hands (instead of Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi). Over two months had passed since the UN Security Council approved a power-sharing initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), stipulating that Saleh transfer executive power to his vice president within 30 days. He would eventually sign in Riyadh on November 23rd, but Friday ended without significance.

After shaking up his cabinet through the GCC’s “mechanism,” Saleh continues to rule above his faithful Hadi and dream of reclaiming absolute authority. State media hails him as “President.” With the GCC’s immunity clause in his back pocket, Saleh remains free to assail protesters without consequence from the international community.

Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) sent Obama an emergency missive warning, “This craving for the bloodletting of innocent peaceful protesters comes even as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered ‘transition deal,’ backed by Your Excellency's Administration's strong support and guarantees, is presumably being carried out by the signing parties to the accord. You should be aware that the peaceful protesting youth and their fellow Yemeni supporters, who continuously still come out by the millions, were not party to such an unprecedented feat of political engineering drawn up mainly by despotic tyrants.”

For now Saleh’s expressed desire to visit New York represents his pledge to transfer power. Speaking as though his visa was already processed, Yemen’s president of 33 years denied that he would receive medical treatment for wounds suffered in a June assassination attempt. He simply planned some R&R before returning to lead his party through February’s presidential election, another of the GCC’s terms. This development was only briefly covered by U.S. media during its embryonic stage, but multiple reports confirmed the administration’s initial reaction: “A U.S. State Department spokesman had no immediate comment on Saleh’s plans. White House spokesman Josh Earnest declined to comment.”

Saleh’s latest maneuver finally exploded into international view once the Obama administration leaked its position on Monday night, only to retract and create an even larger scene on Tuesday.

Unable to fully explain America’s support for Saleh beyond “the War on Terror,” the White House has continually operated behind Yemen’s political and media curve. Last weekend unfolded no differently, starting with the silence that normally accompanies Yemen’s revolution. Next comes the information that Washington is “considering” Saleh’s request, followed by an alleged approval and the necessary spin: he can visit for medical treatment only. Administration officials told The New York Times that removing him from Yemen’s power struggle was “worth managing the criticism that we’d get.” One official argued that pro-democracy protesters might accept the arrangement because it would "send a signal that he's not next door [in Saudi Arabia].”

This explanation was greeted with immediate ridicule from Yemen’s growing network of online activists, and no more than an hour passed before the White House patched its own leak. However a high amount of damage has already been inflicted by “considering” Saleh’s request.

The dispersal of Yemen’s fog reveals a crystal image of cooperation between Washington and Saleh’s regime. Despite assurances that it won’t entertain his political games, the White House is playing directly into Saleh's hands by fraternizing with his officials. The administration even conceded the fact that Saleh still manages Yemen's government and military; the "condition" of leaving behind his "entourage" will ensure that. While the State Department’s Mark Toner refused to discuss Saleh’s visa in detail, he did add that the White House wishes to see the GCC initiative “continue regardless of where President Saleh is.”

“President Saleh” publicly agreed by lauding the GCC’s mediation during Saturday’s press conference. He also defended his “pluralistic regime” and praised his General People’s Congress (GPC) for sharing power with the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). A loose bloc of political and tribal networks, the JMP' is viewed as unrepresentative of Yemen’s revolutionaries.

Abdu al-Janadi, Saleh’s deputy information minister, now claims that his boss will skip his vacation due to the JMP’s “bad intentions,” and instead focus on grooming Hadi for Yemen’s upcoming election. Seemingly unable to secure an unconditional visa (Yemeni officials allegedly received confirmation), Saleh has already shifted to his popular front by declaring, “I won’t leave my people and my comrades.” An elaborate hoax remains a possibility given his duplicitous history and the attention surrounding his proposed vacation. Saleh could be engaging in political reconnaissance-in-force: measuring the White House’s level of support by provoking a reaction. He’s watched the administration approve his visa, monitored the spin of his entry and estimated his chances of returning to Yemen.

Believing that Washington will ultimately cooperate in his favor, Saleh feels secure enough to stay in Yemen and act with impunity. Thus the Obama administration remains opposed to Yemen’s democratic movement whether it grants him entry or not.

This ongoing political drama builds on a secondary diplomatic crisis that attracted minimal coverage from U.S. media. Following the GCC’s signing ceremony, Saleh promptly ordered his security units to besiege the city of Taiz and crush its revolutionary movement. The lack of international response motivated a group of protesters and activists to start their “Life March,” a 170 mile trek from Taiz to the capital of Sana’a. Galvanizing protesters by rejecting the GCC’s initiative and remembering the fallen, Yemen's Life March entered Sana’a on Saturday only to be met with lethal force.

At this point Saleh had already capitalized on the JMP’s donations to marchers, branding the Life March as an “act of anarchy and sedition, incitement and attempt to storm the capital.” On Saturday he accused marchers of "committing acts of riot as they set off from Taiz and until they reached Sana’a,” slandering the march as “a violation of the initiative and its mechanisms, an obvious violation.” U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein then appeared to echo Saleh’s statements and soon found himself on the end of a grassroots campaign to remove him.

The pro-government Yemeni Observer quoted him as saying, “It seems to have the intention not to carry out a peaceful march, but to get access to Sana'a in order to generate chaos and provoke a violent response by the security forces.”

Part of Feierstein’s comments can be attributed to the specific act of marching on Saleh’s heavily-guarded palace, and he added that “the United States supports peaceful demonstrations.” However the ambassador's rhetoric matched up too closely with Saleh's for protesters to stomach. Freedom of movement, provocation of disproportionate force and international awareness also represent the pillars of civil disobedience, and Feierstein enjoys no margin for error after cooperating with the regime. CCYRC advised Obama, “the Yemeni people have only seen your Ambassador as taking on the position of advocate and defender of Saleh's ruthless oppression of his people, almost from the start of his assignment.”

In a vain attempt to rescue Feierstein from his self-inflicted wounds, the administration again demonstrated its insensitivity by deploying John Brennan as backup. The White House’s counter-terror chief has played an active diplomatic role throughout Yemen’s revolution, defending Saleh’s counter-terrorism support and earning himself a more unpopular reputation than Feierstein. Most of Yemen’s protesters and political opposition attribute al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) growth to Saleh’s misrule, and accuse him of exploiting terrorism to leverage the international community.

Although Brennan would phone Hadi to “emphasize... the need for Yemeni security forces to show maximum restraint when dealing with demonstrations,” tasking him was like ordering an air-strike to put out a fire.

If foreign powers do expect to salvage the GCC initiative, they must remove the deal’s immunity clause and reschedule an election cycle on fair terms. Yemen's youth movement, civil activists, Houthi sect and Southern Movement must be regularly engaged in order to minimize a political vacuum, otherwise Saleh's countless opponents will reject the GCC initiative in full. A showdown over February’s election and prolonged instability should follow. A qualitative difference exists between maintaining diplomatic protocol and coordinating with an authoritarian government, and the Obama administration must exercise maximum restraint when communicating with Saleh’s officials.

Dissolving his regime into history is a prerequisite to ridding al-Qaeda from Yemen and opening a new democratic era.

Tehran Giftwraps Washington’s Wishlist

2011-12-28T22:24:00.000-08:00

Sometimes the threat of war is necessary to avert war. Other times the threat of war completes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Where Iran’s threat to close the Straight of Hormuz falls on this scale remains obscured, but blocking any part of the vital waterway will give its adversaries exactly what they want - pretext to begin military engagement.

Tehran’s fresh threat to close Hormuz - this is far from the first time - presumably makes sense at the popular level. Although Western politicians and populaces commonly perceive Iran as the Gulf’s unilateral aggressor, its behavior is partially explained by hostile encroachment. No real outreach has occurred under President Barack Obama, only a dual track of superficial diplomacy and covert operations. Surrounded by international sanctions and a regional military “umbrella” constructed by Washington, Riyadh and Jerusalem, Iranian officials such as Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi have no choice except to puff up their chests.

Iran’s navy commander, Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, added that closing the strait is “easier than drinking a glass of water.”

This threat is, ironically, as transparent as water. Unnamed Iranian officials and named economic analysts have already conceded the reality that closing Hormuz “would be committing economical suicide,” according to an official at the Ministry of Oil. In addition to a variety of traded goods, more oil flows through the 21-mile wide straight on a daily basis than any other global choke-point. Unless Iranian forces can maintain control of the straight while denying every other actor - practically impossible - Tehran is stuck on a counterproductive threat.

The timing of Rahimi’s statements is equally questionable. Peruse Iran’s media and one is sure to find ample condemnation of America’s response to the Arab revolutions; Tehran has now shifted the entire region’s focus to itself. This diversion will produce minimal effects in Syria, where Iran seeks to draw attention away from whatever Arab League monitors find during their survey. Conversely, Tehran’s threat sucked the available oxygen away from Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, a public enemy, amid comparisons to the Shah.

Iran’s political and military spheres ultimately merge in Bahrain, where Shia protesters are demonstrating against historic marginalization under King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. After releasing his Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which found minimal evidence of Iranian involvement, the King exercised his authority by delving into classified intelligence. BICI chairman Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni had reached his own conclusion after being denied access, but Hamad and his men assured Bahrainis that Tehran was driving the uprising.

Last Friday government forces opened fire on Al Wefaq’s office, generating no response from Washington. Now Iran is directly widening Bahrain’s blackout by giving a defined purpose to America’s Fifth Fleet. This pattern should continue for an indefinite period of time - as long as Washington can maintain it - and leads directly into the possibility of armed confrontation. The U.S. Navy is “ready to counter malevolent actions,” spokeswoman Lt. Rebecca Rebarich declared in an emailed statement.

“Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations. Any disruption will not be tolerated.”

Threatening to close Hormuz is like throwing a life raft to U.S. policy in the Arab world. Washington remains in a position of strength due to its overwhelming resources and political weight, but some areas of interests are taking on heavy water. Iran’s rhetoric buoys these weak spots - Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq - by feeding Washington’s appetite for fear. Any large-scale confrontation over Hormuz could also transition into an exhaustive strike on its nuclear program.

Given that heightened tensions in the Gulf reinforce U.S.-Saudi hegemony, Tehran appears to have lost its psychological battle by default.

NYT Continues Infowar Against Yemen’s Revolution

2011-12-27T23:08:00.000-08:00

After a misfired attempt to spin Ali Abdullah Saleh’s vacation in America, The New York Times’ editorial board fires a second blast of propaganda to defend itself and the White House. Full support for the Gulf Cooperation Council included:

The Obama administration is reportedly preparing to admit President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen into the United States for medical treatment. It is not an easy call. But admitting Mr. Saleh, under strict conditions, offers the best hope for speeding his exit from power and ending the repression that has cost hundreds of Yemeni lives.

We understand why the administration has moved cautiously. It does not want to be seen as giving sanctuary to a bloody dictator — one who previously curried Washington’s favor by cooperating in the fight against Al Qaeda — or to give Mr. Saleh an overseas platform from which he can stir up more trouble for Yemen. And it does not want a replay of 1979, when Iran’s ayatollahs used the excuse of Washington’s admission of the deposed shah for medical treatment to orchestrate the seizure of the American Embassy and capture of American diplomats.

The arguments for admitting Mr. Saleh are still persuasive. Most important of all, with Mr. Saleh out of the country, Yemen will have a better chance to hold credible presidential elections, now scheduled for February. While Mr. Saleh’s departure to the United States does not guarantee a fair vote or a peaceful outcome, his continued presence in Yemen makes one almost impossible.

All this year, Yemenis have risked their lives demanding an end to Mr. Saleh’s 33 years of corrupt authoritarianism. Mr. Saleh has repeatedly promised reform and then failed to deliver. After he was badly wounded in a bomb explosion in June, Mr. Saleh left for treatment in Saudi Arabia and many hoped he would not come back. Months later he did, and the abuses continue.

As news circulated this week of his possible departure, Yemeni views were divided. Some wanted him gone as soon as possible. Others bridled that he might escape justice. Many Yemenis would like to see Mr. Saleh eventually stand trial for his many bloody crimes. And Washington should not grant Mr. Saleh permanent asylum, which could shield him from future prosecution. Getting him out of Yemen right now increases the chances that his country will finally be able to move beyond his repressive rule.

Compare with the more conservative Washington Post’s rejection of Saleh’s visa, which also supports the GCC’s power-sharing agreement.

U.S. Maintains Universal Blackout In Yemen

2011-12-26T22:44:00.000-08:00

Puppet show between Feierstein and Hadi

Western and Gulf organizers leveraged a perfect day for Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign Yemen’s power-sharing agreement. Although foreign powers aimed for maximum international exposure to convince casual observers of their proaction, Yemen’s revolutionaries continue to persevere in Western obscurity. International powers from Washington to Beijing are in too deep with Saleh’s regime to let go completely, generating a media blackout worthy of its own study.

Yemen’s lack of international transparency greases the flip from coincidence to conspiracy.

November 23rd in Riyadh offered an ideal setting for Saleh’s signing ceremony, away from Yemen’s presidential palace and mass of pro-democracy protesters. Despite an international audience that included UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the appropriately-sized press gaggle, Yemen’s “transition” was drifting even further from American minds than usual. Thanksgiving brings shopping, football and more economic related matters to the table, along with a White House statement welcoming Saleh’s signature. A minority of Americans took notice of their government’s support for another dictator.

Blacking out stories through Fridays, weekends and holidays amounts to routine information control. At the same time, November 23rd’s built-in media blanket was nothing more than a favorable counter-revolutionary draw; by stamping the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative on October 20th, the UN Security Council created a rhythmic holiday cycle through monthly reviews. The notion of a holiday blackout resurfaced after Saleh declared his intent to visit America, except the White House released numerous statements over Christmas weekend.

Every day witnesses a blackout in Yemen.

The time between Friday and Monday revealed only what could be gleaned between Washington’s political lines and by translating the unspoken. First the Obama’s administration allowed Saleh’s theoretical December 23rd deadline to pass without clarification, leaving executive power firmly in his hands (instead of Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi). For now Saleh’s expressed desire to visit America stands as his pledge to transfer power. This development was only briefly covered by U.S. media, but multiple reports confirmed the Obama administration’s reaction: “A U.S. State Department spokesman had no immediate comment on Saleh’s plans. White House spokesman Josh Earnest declined to comment.”

Monday morning unfolded with minimal divergences. CBS reported, “Until now, the White House had not commented on Saleh's assertion Saturday that he would be leaving Yemen and traveling to the U.S.” A senior administration official has since explained that the White House is “considering” Saleh’s request, which will only be approved “for legitimate medical treatment." Although Saleh is notoriously deceitful, Washington’s reaction from Saturday through Monday was geared towards spinning his arrival.

The White House and State Department skipped today’s press briefing.

Armed with diversionary material, White House Deputy spokesman Josh Earnest was able to brief reporters on John Brennan’s conference call with Hadi. Seeking to calm any lingering public anxiety over Yemen, the White House’s counter-terrorism chief insisted that Obama’s administration is a "strong and fervent supporter of the Yemeni people.” He also commented on the recent violence in Sana’a, promising an investigation from Hadi and urging “Yemeni security forces to show maximum restraint when dealing with demonstrations.”

Despite the tough rhetoric against Saleh’s security forces, pushing Brennan back into public diplomacy is no less insensitive than Gerald Feierstein’s recent statements. America’s ambassador to Yemen has come under intense fire for placing the responsibility of violence on Yemen’s protesters, generating local protests and an enormous social mushroom cloud, yet the White House is allowing Feierstein’s story to run out of control. Brennan’s statement offers the only indirect evidence of awareness.

In a letter titled, “The US Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen is an Advocate for a Tyrannical Mob and Must be Removed Immediately,” Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) demands, “that the US embassy and State Department issue an official apology and that Mr. Feierstein be immediately dismissed as Ambassador of the United States to Yemen and sent home without any further delay.”

The chances of removing Feierstein appear to sit at 50-50; the ambassador is a good tool but broken tools need replacing. However Feierstein has dug too deep of a hole to climb out, opening the very real possibility that he must be rescued. CCYRC explains how “Mr. Feierstein stated, among other things, without any shred of evidence that the peaceful convoy [Life March] was armed and that the convoy was a violation of the GCC Initiative.” This complaint traces to Feierstein’s warning against marching near Saleh’s presidential palace, where government forces assaulted and killed protesters over the weekend.

The ambassador then warned against collapsing the GCC’s initiative, prompting ridicule from Yemen’s pro-democracy movement: “Mr. Feierstein surely knows that the majority of Yemenis, led by the peaceful youth protesters, oppose and are not in any way represented thereto by any signatory.”

“Almost from the start of his tenure in Yemen, Ambassador Feierstein has never been very cordial with his personal (we certainly would hope that they are not viewed as official US views, accepted by your Administration) disappointing declarations on Yemen and the Yemeni people, and Feierstein's mostly defensive stances with the tyrannical Saleh regime.”

CCYRC is speaking disingenuously to blunt the impact of its message. Protesters know that Feierstein’s microphone is controlled by Washington, and they watch him meet with Saleh’s officials on a regular basis. They witnessed their Life March toil under a media blackout. They accept the temporary reality that foreign powers (led by America and Saudi Arabia) forced the GCC initiative on them, but they cannot afford to permanently sever their U.S. outreach either.

Far from supporting Yemen’s people, the Obama administration remains primarily concerned with perpetuating Saleh’s regime through the GCC initiative. U.S. policy represents the opposite of a proactive strategy - maintain the status quo at all costs. As if to comfort Yemen’s revolutionaries, White House sources told U.S. media that Obama is being kept up to date on Yemen’s developments.

Translation: Obama's National Security Council is monitoring Yemen's media blackout from Hawaii and preparing new spin for Saleh's own vacation.

This outcome is now becoming reality. In a loaded piece of propaganda from the New York Times, U.S. have green-lit Saleh's admittance to New York-Presbyterian Hospital "as soon as the end of this week." If he chooses to accept a temporary visa, Saleh will arrive in Washington under the excuse that U.S. policy is "moving forward" without him. The Obama administration, apparently, doesn't "want to play into Mr. Saleh’s penchant for keeping people off balance," and won't play into his political games.

“The main goal is to remove him physically from Yemen so there’s no way he can meddle in the political process there,” says one official. “Getting him medical treatment seemed a logical way to do this.”

The administration's rhetoric, of course, admits that Saleh is still leading Yemen's government; the "condition" of leaving behind his entourage will ensure that. Nor will many protesters and international activists believe any part of the White House's explanation to "avoid his games," since admitting Saleh will play into his games. His visit cannot be rendered apolitical through politicking, as the White House has attempted to do, but it should provide a revolutionary opportunity.

If Saleh and Obama want to turn themselves into a lightening rod, let them.

[Update: Demonstrating the White House's overall disconnect with Yemen, press secretary Josh Earnest has already denied the NYT's report after consulting with its editors.]

Neutralizing America's Presence In Iraq

2011-12-26T10:27:00.000-08:00

In the hours after Kim Jong Il’s death went viral, U.S. intelligence agencies found themselves under rapid-fire criticism for failing to time-stamp the death of North Korea’s dictator. Unnamed “supervisors” quickly jumped on the story, defining an intelligence failure as “leaving policymakers unprepared to deal with the scenarios.” Once a significant event occurs, “the key point” is “having a solid framework to assess what might come next."

Unlike Kim’s death, U.S. officials have a good idea when Nouri al-Maliki moved on two high-ranking Iraqi politicians. And unlike a standard response to the Korean peninsula, the Obama administration's entire framework in Iraq is crumbling by the year.

The administration naturally argues that it did plan to contain Iraq’s political fallout after the final withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Speaking to the Daily Beast, Colin Kahl says the White House worked its phones all weekend to “cool down” al-Maliki’s decision-making. The message from the Pentagon’s recently-departed military adviser for Iraq: “everybody has to be careful right now.” Vice President Joe Biden also sprung into motion, privately and publicly walking al-Maliki back from an arrest warrant for Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi.

Accused of funding a Sunni assassination squad against Shia politicians, al-Hashmi has denied the charge as he weathers Iraq’s political storm in President Jalal Talabani’s guesthouse. He also blames Washington for ignoring al-Maliki’s authoritarian tendencies until a national crisis erupted.

The ongoing breakdown in U.S.-Iraqi relations indicates that the Obama administration was ill-prepared for 2012’s transition. Biden’s politicking reinforced the chummy relationship between Washington and al-Maliki, overshadowing his talks with other political leaders, while the White House risked a dangerous argument by using Baghdad’s crisis to highlight Iraq’s political growth. Press secretary Jay Carney told reporters last week, “The key metric here is that those political disputes have increasingly been resolved through negotiation, not through violence, and elections were held, a government was established - these are all signs of important progress - all while violence declined significantly.”

That Iraq’s violence has “declined significantly” from 2006-2008 is a statistical truism. Instead of thousands, hundreds of Iraqi security personnel and civilians fall victim to insurgent and terrorist attacks each month (including a vicious string of bombings over the weekend). More encouraging is the vigorous popular energy that al-Maliki’s government failed to channel after 2010‘s parliamentary election - democratic tendencies with few roots in American influence. Many parts of the country are returning to a sense of normality without Saddam Hussein lurking in the shadows, but Iraqis complain about the lack of services, economic opportunity and political freedoms. Particularly unfortunate is Washington’s simultaneous support for al-Maliki and disengagement from Baghdad as a whole.

“There is no democracy in Iraq,” says his main Sunni rival, Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi.

Al-Maliki's current behavior should have been expected, as Mike Rogers told Reuters on Thursday. Joining his fellow Republicans, the House’s intelligence chairman warned “that the sudden rapid withdrawal with no troop presence on the ground was going to leave this vacuum that would be filled with the kind of problems that you're seeing.” GOP officials and presidential candidates spent December holding President Barack Obama personally accountable for a premature withdrawal, except this logic runs into a major obstacle. If al-Maliki feels politically exposed without U.S. combat troops, extending America’s military presence would empower him to continue consolidating power.

For starters many Iraqis want U.S. troops out of their country despite the potential consequences. The explosive issue could have divided Iraq’s parliament at an earlier date, a possibility that al-Maliki acknowledged by avoiding a vote. This outcome also opens the door to a power struggle (with Sunnis, Kurds and his own coalition) and consolidation of power, along with the inevitable criticism that Obama intervened too forcefully. Iraq’s urgent dilemma isn’t a lack of U.S. troops, but al-Maliki’s governing style and the administration's soft handling of him.

The United States "left Iraq in a terrible situation,” Hashemi told the Daily Beast on Tuesday. “We are just very much closer to an autocratic system, this is the country America has left us.”

No party is happy with al-Maliki outside his shrinking coalition. Muqtada al-Sadr would have led a populist rally against the extension of U.S. troops, and the Shia cleric seized on al-Maliki’s distractions to release his own “peace code” (he also called for Hashemi’s trial under parliamentary law). Sunnis have never trusted al-Maliki, one more reason to explore their own autonomous regions. Meanwhile the Kurds, whom Washington expects to broker a negotiated settlement, won’t hand Hashimi over since “he is our guest.”

Maintaining a military presence throughout al-Maliki’s term would have delayed an explosion, potentially increasing its magnitude and injecting U.S. troops in the process.

Pulling Obama from Iraq’s detail qualified as a rare moment of sensitivity. The GOP has demanded that he intervene in Baghdad’s parliament while ignoring his direct involvement in the latest crisis: his praise of al-Maliki and the defiant response of deputy premier Saleh al-Mutlak. Maybe al-Maliki was “waiting to pounce” on Hashimi once U.S. combat troops withdrew, but Mutlak’s declaration that al-Maliki is “worse than Saddam” traces straight to Obama’s rhetoric. He’s fortunate to escape the blame he deserves, but he also needs to engage the situation personally.

"There will be a day whereby the Americans will realize that they were deceived by al-Maliki,” Mutlak predicted, ”and they will regret that.”

Nevertheless, the administration is already paying a high price for growing too comfortable with al-Maliki and Iraq’s status quo. The premier confidently strutted his true colors by rejecting Iraqiya’s proposed boycott, threatening to replace its ministers with his own allies. However the Interior and Defense ministries don’t require replacements since he never gave them up, offering easy access to Iraq’s security forces. al-Maliki’s threat is real enough to keep Iraqiya “suspended” in Baghdad’s recessed parliament, but this atmosphere isn’t conducive to governing a country - let alone repairing a war-torn country.

The situation demands that Washington draw a hard line against al-Maliki and back him down into a true coalition government. Calling on “all sides to work together” isn’t going to work - al-Maliki must be openly confronted with building an equitable Iraq. If his behavior continues, Washington will enjoy the political and popular support to employ a range of political actions in Baghdad.

Scrounging up support inside America’s capital and across the country should be a greater challenge.

Saleh Hiding In America’s Bubble

2011-12-24T21:12:00.000-08:00

The rumor seemed to crop up every week only to be chopped down by government denials and reality. Shortly after signing the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative in Riyadh, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh was allegedly headed to America for medical treatment before reappearing in Sana’a. Government officials were forced to deny this rumor just last week.

Now comes word from Saleh himself: he’s taking a short vacation stateside.

"I will go to the United States,” he told a high-profile news conference on Saturday. “Not for treatment, because I'm fine, but to get away from attention, cameras, and allow the unity government to prepare properly for elections... I'll be there for several days, but I'll return because I won't leave my people and comrades who have been steadfast for 11 months.”

Saleh’s comments prompted a perplexed fury amongst Yemen’s revolutionaries. They’re experienced enough to expect the unexpected from a self-proclaimed “snake dancer,” but doing so daily basis remains a constant grind. Friday also passed without any official transfer of power to his Vice President, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, giving rise to the possibility of disinformation. These rumors appear legitimate though; in contrast to local and Internet sources, Saleh himself confirmed in front of dozens of microphones. So did Mohammed Albasha, spokesman for Yemen’s Embassy in Washington.

The White House remains silent after 10 hours, evidence of confirmation, and the New York Times explicitly notes, “The American Embassy in Sana and officials in Washington said they had no comment about Mr. Saleh’s plans.”

Although some observers presume that Saleh’s visa is unfeasible, the Obama administration has spoken by allowing his statements to go unchallenged. Only Saleh - the “master” of al-Qaeda - could get away with this act, and arresting him would defy Washington's established logic in Yemen. U.S. officials are likely working through back-channels to formulate their next course of action.

What’s ironic is how Saleh thinks he should escape Yemen’s “attention” in America, when Yemen is the darkest place to hide. Having dodged the media frenzy around Egypt, Libya and Syria, he only deals with local press and the occasional foreign report. International media has gradually tuned out to even lower levels of awareness, ignoring many of his statements and abuses. Going to America is one of the quickest ways to attract attention.

If Saleh did just plant the seeds of another feign, he will remain cocooned in the Western and Gulf protection afforded by the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative. The power-sharing agreement left a large part of his regime in power to contend with the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), and has so far protected his military from restructuring. Ahmed, his son and commander of the Republican Guard, consulted with Western and Gulf officials only days ago.

He’s set to receive his father’s immunity as RG forces attack the finale of Yemen’s Life March.

Launched from Taizz after the government assaulted protesters throughout November and December, the Life March represents a collective rejection of the GCC initiative, Yemen’s "new" government, immunity and foreign intervention in general. Marchers arrived in Sana’a on Saturday. Some protesters proceeded down an avenue containing the presidential palace and were met with lethal force from RG and Central Security Forces. The GCC’s Western-sponsored immunity clause (still obscured under UN law) has allowed Saleh’s security forces to assault protesters with minimal international criticism and no accountability.

"The blood of the martyrs has been sold for dollars," protesters were heard shouting before coming under attack.

Not only does Saleh vow to return, the wily strongman is already re-styling himself as Yemen’s opposition for February’s presidential election - when his VP has been preselected as a consensus for the next two years. Speaking through his General People’s Congress (GPC), which currently holds the Defense and Foreign Ministries, Saleh declared that he will return and “lead political action in the heart of my party in opposition... I'll withdraw from political work and go into the street as part of the opposition."

The Obama administration appears prepared to allow this illogical act under the GCC’s initiative.

Saturday’s developments crafted a particularly unfavorable stage for Gerald Feierstein, America’s ambassador, after the unpopular diplomat rhetorically synched with Saleh. Yemen’s strongman labeled the Life March as incitement of anarchy and attempt to gain media attention before publicly reversing (and reversing again), and Feierstein reportedly demeaned the Life March as “a provocative act” as it approached the palace.

“We do not believe that such action is in the interest of the country,” he was quoted as saying.

Feierstein’s personal situation remains fluid due to limited sources; few U.S. media covered his statements and ensuing outrage, diverting the issue into social media. Some people cannot believe that Feierstein would make such inflammatory statements - others go so far as to diagnose a “panic attack” - and his comments can be attributed to the specific act of marching on Saleh’s heavily-guarded palace. He added that the United States supports peaceful demonstrations. Yet freedom of movement and the provocation of disproportionate force represent two goals of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), and Feierstein enjoys no benefit of the doubt after cooperating with the regime throughout Yemen’s 11-month revolution.

The unpopular ambassador didn't reject Saleh's statements or his immunity clause, and he's now facing a Twitter campaign to evict him: #GetoutFeierstein.

The suggestion contains a kernel of good intentions since he’s lost all legitimacy with the revolutionaries - just like the Obama administration - however Washington needs him to coordinate Yemen’s counter-revolution. A replacement would simply duplicate his rhetoric as well. Whether Saleh bunkers down in Yemen, jets to Riyadh or lounges in Virginia Beach, the international walls around him remains intact.

Syrian Bombings Trigger Massive Conspiracy

2011-12-24T00:02:00.000-08:00

The magnitude of Syria’s last 24 hours shouldn’t be surprising. Bashar al-Assad’s security forces reportedly massacred a village of people on Wednesday, two days before Arab League monitors were scheduled to arrive, and the first group touched down early Saturday morning. Everybody expected something to happen.

Yet the dual blasts at Syria’s State Security Directorate and a regional military office outside Damascus have taken al-Assad’s delirium to a whole new level.

It’s too tempting to jump as far ahead as the regime has in blaming al-Qaeda for Saturday’s bombings. Rapid precision and condemnation suggests that the government launched a fourth-generation assault on itself. In a statement released soon after the bombings, the Ministry of Interior intricately explained how “a terrorist suicide bomber in a booby-trapped car broke into the main door of the Area Security Branch in Damascus at 10:18 AM.” One minute later, “another suicide bomber drove a booby-trapped GMC 4WD car into the General Intelligence Administration building.”

The death toll sits at 44, many of them civilians, with 166 people wounded.

This horror is exactly what Syria’s government promised, creating the impression that it just delivered. Arab League monitors were immediately ushered to the scene where they were told the bombing “had the fingerprints of Al Qaeda all over.” Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Mekdad declared, "On the first day after the arrival of the Arab observers, this is the gift we get from the terrorists and al-Qaeda."

"We said it from the beginning, this is terrorism. They are killing the army and civilians."

SANA state media added, “these terrorist attacks reveal the true face of the plot targeting Syria and its security and stability at the hands of terrorist tools inside and abroad.”

By bombing its own people, Damascus hopes to unite Syrians against the opposition and counter the international community in one strike.

To be safe Western capitals and the UN condemned Damascus’s bombings in overnight statements; Washington is already facing its own wave of online conspiracies. Although these forces have applied counter-revolutionary pressure across the Arab world, they have no reason to organize these bombings. Neither does any branch of al-Qaeda - at least not at this exact moment - and its means would be equally unbelievable.

A conspiracy could pop out of any shadow (Hezbollah, Iran, Turkey, NATO) but al-Assad’s regime has positioned itself as the only beneficiary from Saturday’s terror attack.

Relative Calm Before Yemen’s Next Battle

2011-12-23T16:35:00.000-08:00

With Yemen’s Life March expected to officially arrive in the capital of Sana’a on Saturday, the country’s internal and external actors are positioning themselves for the next round of confrontation. Further analysis will follow these updates:

Life March Encountering Government Ambushes

Yemen’s current security is a mixed bag, depending on the area. While the Houthi-contested north has destabilized considerably in December and southern governorates remain in their usual disarray, some military checkpoints were removed from Yemen’s cities during the last week. Oppositional fighters followed as part of an internationally-mediated truce between Ali Abdullah Saleh, his defected general Ali Mohsen, and the al-Ahmar brothers.

However demilitarization is far from complete; both sides maintain an active presence around Yemen’s pro-democracy protesters.

Friday’s attacks mimicked Saleh’s low-key pattern of feigning cooperation before an assault; the regime’s strategy seeks to divide and conquer, rather than directly confront the Life March. According to local sources, Republican Guard and Central Security forces offered protection against pro-regime loyalists as the march passed through Dhamar, Yasleh and Khidar areas. Parts of the strung-out march were then attacked by security forces, splitting protesters from the group and isolating them in the cold. Government forces are reportedly harassing protesters along the way, preventing locals from supplying them, and allegedly kidnapping a handful of marchers.

Since the Life March aims to connect various “freedom squares” between Taizz and Sana’a, Saleh’s forces have also planned to stop others from joining. As the march swells into the “March of the Revolution,” a group of protesters came under attack in northern Sana’a as they attempted to link with the forward party. Republican Guard troops reportedly opened fire after ubiquitous plain-clothed men assaulted the crowd with sticks.

Conversely, Yemen’s government is actively highlighting the Guard’s protection as the first marchers near Sana’a; Saleh’s son (Ahmed) and nephew (Yahya) have supposedly “formalized a security plan” as commanders of the Republican Guard and Central Security. Yet the trust gap between Yemen’s pro-democracy movement and Saleh’s regime is irreversibly vast. Government forces may be slightly less inclined to attack the march under tribal protection, but this protection is regularly exploited by the regime.

Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) has already threatened that it "would not be responsible for the collapse of the initiative, while others violate its letter and spirit.”

Immunity Clause In Quasi-Limbo

The Life March encompasses many demands of Yemen’s pro-democracy movement, from political to economic to religious freedoms. Beyond the rejection of Yemen’s “unity government” between the GPC and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Life Marchers are walking in memory of the 1,000+ protesters killed over the last 11 months. The timing worked out perfectly: Saturday’s festivities coincide with Saleh’s theoretically transfer of power and a parliamentary debate on his immunity as stipulated in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative.

Hard results are another matter though, and the immunity issue was dropped from the government’s weekend agenda. UN and JMP officials are making an effort to deny Saleh’s immunity clause - claiming all parties responsible for violence "should be held accountable" - but their rhetoric has amounted to nothing more than a diversion. Neither the UNSC nor JMP want to clarify this issue at the highest level, instead keeping transparency low as they cooperate with Saleh's regime.

Until immunity is explicitly stricken from UN resolution 2014, one must assume that the clause lurks in Yemen’s political shadows. The same goes for Saleh’s status after Saturday passed without clarification, and Yemen’s strongman is set to remain “honorary president” until February’s election. Washington has left too many counterterror-related secrets in Saleh's possession to cut him loose.

West Maintains Status Quo

Since ordering the Life March to disband would be overtly unreasonable, Western and Gulf powers have progressed to their next course of action by ignoring Yemen’s protesters. Not that Life Marchers didn’t expect this possibility - they organized because the international community is ignoring them. Amid the backdrop of America’s silent consent, allied UNSC powers have taken the diplomatic lead in backing Yemen’s “unity” government.

“Yemen was on a cross section between war and peace,” UK Ambassador Jonathan Wilks said between meetings with government officials. “Thanks to Allah, Yemen chose peace and in last week we have done the first step, and we saw many improvements in the political and security aspects.”

As if Allah drafted the GCC initiative.

Separately, the European Union’s Catherine Ashton called Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi on Wednesday to inform him of her impending arrival. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will assume her counter-revolutionary duties by legitimizing the new government, ignoring Yemen’s Life March. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe also phoned the JMP’s Mohammed Salem Basindwa, now acting as Yemen’s Prime Minister, to congratulate him on “forming the national reconciliation government.”

These statements boil down to self-adulation given the West’s heavy hand within GCC negotiations. Saba state media proudly displays Saleh’s support in the UNSC, where Russia (of all countries) reaffirmed the UN’s support for the GCC initiative. The pro-government Yemeni Observer was even more blatant: “10 international and Arab ambassadors seem to be determined to work day and night for helping the vice president, who is authorized from Saleh to act as president.”

These aren’t the actions of an international community preparing to hold Saleh accountable for extensive human rights abuses and corruption. Two forces are thus marching head to head in Yemen: the pro-democracy Life March, and the international community’s lockstep march behind Saleh's regime.

Yemenis March To Energize Their Revolution

2011-12-22T18:38:00.000-08:00

A number of new slogans have emerged from the frosty path between Taizz and Sana’a. Among them: “What cold? To be revolutionary, is the source of greatest warmth.”

Triumphantly declared by Yemeni protester Rahmah Aghbary, her thinking is as metaphorical as it is literal. Frozen out of national and international negotiations, protesters are clinging to the burning desire for a new Yemen - one free of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. Protesters left Taizz with one overarching objective to their 150-mile “Life March”: determine their own future.

Yemen’s pro-democracy movement is more organized than generally credited. Unwillingly coupled with the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a fragmented oppositional umbrella, youth and civil protesters have endured the natural growing pains of revolution. Many protesters concede their own lack of progress as they navigate Yemen’s political maze and its international extension. Yet given their otherwise enthusiastic spirits, protesters are exceeding the expectations of their limited means.

Yemen’s civil revolutionaries have organized into groups and can establish political parties if afforded the time and environment to grow. They’ve also submitted alternative proposals that are no more flawed than the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative.

Negotiated under the oversight of American and Saudi officials, the foreign initiative gave birth to a power-sharing agreement between Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress and the JMP. This political settlement divided Yemen’s cabinet between the parties and left Saleh in power to oversee Yemen’s “transition” for 30 days. His Vice President of 17 years, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, is now scheduled to assume executive authority on Friday, and will run as a consensus candidate in February’s presidential election. Meanwhile Saleh’s security officials (many of them relatives) remains at their posts despite a purposed committee to restructure Yemen’s military command.

Rejecting the GCC’s initiative as foreign intervention, Yemeni protesters are particularly opposed to the immunity granted to Saleh and his family. They point out the lunacy of allowing the GCC, a monarchic bloc, to control a non-member’s future.

“These GCC states are not at all competent to deal with popular requests for liberty and freedom, not to mention democratic government, because they themselves are mostly despotic regimes,” observed Yemen’s Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC). “They themselves would never welcome such requests from their own people, let alone be ready to accommodate such demands by people in neighboring states.”

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) added its legitimacy by unanimously approving the GCC’s initiative in late October, roughly a month before Saleh would officially sign in Saudi Arabia. In the weeks following Riyadh’s ceremony, Saleh’s mechanized security units laid siege to the oppositional stronghold of Taizz. The mountainous city was long predicted as Yemen’s revolutionary epicenter - its Benghazi or Homs - and Saleh’s regime felt the need to crush Taizz’s daily protests (exploiting the JMP’s armed elements as scapegoats in the process).

Dozens of deaths failed to attract international scrutiny as involved foreign powers pressed forward with the GCC’s initiative.

Their plight ignored, Taizz’s protesters still saw an opportunity to align their march with the GCC’s timeline. Jamal Benomar, the UN’s special envoy to Yemen, recently informed the UNSC that Saleh requires additional medical treatment outside the country, pushing his immunity clause back in the spotlight (Yemen's immunity list is allegedly due on Saturday). According to Benomar, "Efforts are being made for arrangements to be concluded for him to get this treatment.” However Saleh has returned to Yemen on multiple occasions and is likely to return before February’s election.

Medical leave is, in all probability, a ruse to conceal his puppet strings and allow the GCC’s initiative to run its course.

Thus Yemenis decided on a course of preemptive action. Organized in Taizz with the intention of entering Sana’a around Saleh’s transfer day, the Life March symbolizes a collective rejection of immunity and a call for justice. As his immunity fits into the GCC’s wider initiative, organizer Waddah al-Adeeb told Reuters that protesters “reject the unity government, because it just reproduces the regime itself.” They want the world to know that Yemen is experiencing a popular revolution, not a political crisis between its two established parties.

The march's active nature is also boosting protesters' spirits.

For now the international community still refuses to listen; Russia’s Vitaly Churkin announced the UNSC’s full support for the GCC’s initiative after Benomar’s latest briefing. Western officials continue to meet with Hadi and various security commanders instead of youth representatives, reinforcing Yemen’s imperialism. Although Benomar recently claimed that Saleh won’t enjoy immunity under UN law, UNSC diplomats just met with his son Ahmed, whose Republican Guard is responsible for countless abuses before and during Yemen’s revolution.

The UN’s envoy even admits that Yemen’s youth, civil protesters, Houthi sect and Southern Movement were left out of the GCC’s deal.

Saleh’s officials have now resorted to accusing the JMP of scuttling the GCC’s initiative, and are supposedly threatening to withdraw unless foreign powers pressure the JMP into capitulation. His GPC termed the Life March as “acts of anarchy and sedition, incitement and attempt to storm the capital.” Expecting Saleh to destroy the deal himself, many protesters are anticipating assaults from his plainclothes security forces and loyalists (or thugs). They’re also holding Hadi accountable for any actions taken by Saleh’s forces - since he’s “president.”

The day when international powers finally listen to Yemen’s revolutionaries may never come, but they are equally unlikely to halt their quest for democracy.

Syrian Massacre Spotlights U.S. Double-Standard

2011-12-21T22:03:00.000-08:00

Few people are certain of the last 24 hours in Kfar Owaid - and most people probably wouldn’t want to know the details.

For the past two days Syrian security forces have engaged army defectors in Idlib province with brutal efficiency. Local activists estimate their casualties above 100, including one incident that saw upwards of 70 defectors gunned down near Idlib. Following these events (according to a composite account from opposition groups, independent activists and local witnesses), a large group of army defectors and protesters fled Kfar Owaid village in anticipation of a security unit.

One villager told the Associated Press that Syrian troops subsequently quarantined and shelled Budnaya Valley with tank artillery, guided rockets and gunfire. A handful of witnesses claim that no survivors have emerged, and allege that security personnel beheaded a local imam in the process. Initial casualties are being set at 111.

Syrian’s National Council (SNC) reacted by calling for an “emergency UN Security Council session to discuss the regime’s massacres in Zawiyah mountain, Idlib, and Homs, in particular.” Regarding al-Assad’s defiance towards the Arab League and its political initiative, the council demanded an “emergency meeting... to condemn the bloody massacres...” SNC member Murhaf Jouejati warned that Bashar al-Assad “may be trying to crush this thing before the monitors get in.”

“It was an organized massacre,” said Rami Abdul-Rahman, head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a British-based activist group. “The troops surrounded people, then killed them.”

The Syrian government, of course, denied the opposition’s version of Idlib: “Competent authorities in Daraa and Idleb countryside stormed dens of armed terrorist groups.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdisi insisted that Damascus “has been fully committed to facilitating the mission of the Arab League which will come to see the reality of the crisis.” Falling back to its secure political line, al-Assad’s regime blamed the SNA and Free Syrian Army (FSA) for “trying to sabotage the protocol.”

As the opposition is using Kfar Owaid to lobby for international protection, Makdisi charged that the SNA is “seeking to push for foreign intervention rather than accept the call to dialogue.”

While armed defectors have become a clear piece of Syria’s opposition (wanted or not), none of their actions justify the disproportionate force currently applied by al-Assad’s regime. What exactly transpired in Budnaya Valley remains undetermined, but Syria’s available intelligence appears to justify the White House’s rhetorical counteroffensive.

“The United States continues to believe that the only way to bring about the change that the Syrian people deserve is for Bashar al-Assad to leave power. The words of the Assad regime have no credibility when they continue to be followed by outrageous and deplorable actions. Only two days following the Assad regime’s decision to sign the Arab League initiative, they have already flagrantly violated their commitment to end violence and withdraw security forces from residential areas.”

Yet these words begin to lose their legitimacy outside Syria’s vacuum.

Ask any U.S. official and they will tell you that the Obama administration supports all pro-democracy movements. Many Americans and protesters know this isn’t the case. Belief isn’t necessary - Washington’s engagement in Libya and Syria offer a stark contrast between Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. Granted, what took place near Kfar Owaid could be “a massacre of unprecedented scale in Syria on Tuesday," in the words of France’s Foreign Ministry. 100 Egyptians, Yemenis or Bahrainis haven’t been killed in one day, at one place - but dozens did lose their lives in December alone.

Nor are universal rights intended to be relative.

Undaunted by external criticism, Washington has applied a day-and-night strategy to Syria and U.S.-allied regimes. This double-standard is once again spiking in Egypt, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had a “very good call” with Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri. The White House’s condemnation of heavy-handed security forces has persistently lagged behind Tahrir’s crackdown (officials naturally dispute this criticism), and U.S. statements avoided confrontation with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) until no longer politically feasible.

In addition to private assurances, the Obama administration generally continues to voice public support for the SCAF regardless of its previous statements.

The parallel between Syria and Yemen is especially vivid; foreign blocs negotiated a political settlement with the regimes of both countries. Syria’s revolutionary opposition enjoyed minor input in the Arab League’s process, and now appears discontent, while Yemen’s pro-democracy movement was shut out of GCC negotiations. A crucial divergence stems from Washington’s desire to toss al-Assad and keep Ali Saleh. Since the White House directly authored the GCC’s proposal, Saleh has escaped the thorough condemnation levied against al-Assad. The administration ignored months of violence as it pushed onward to the GCC’s signing, only criticizing Saleh for failing to approve an unpopular proposal in Yemen.

John Brennan, the White House’s counter-terrorism adviser, would recycle a phrase throughout 9/11’s 10th anniversary: “counterterrorism cooperation with Yemen is better than it's been in years."

Once Saleh did sign in Saudi Arabia, Obama extended his personal praise as Yemeni security forces besieged Taiz (Brennan would “congratulate the people of Yemen on initiating a political transition”). In polarizing contrast to the State Department’s rhetoric against al-Assad - “a signature on a piece of paper from a regime like this, that has broken promise after promise after promise, means relatively little to us” - U.S. officials welcomed Saleh’s “unity government” for proceeding with the GCC’s initiative.

What’s left of his regime remains on friendly terms with Western capitals, whose diplomats attend regular meetings Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi and various security officials related to Saleh.

Meanwhile in Bahrain, the same praise awarded to Tantawi and Saleh was quick to flow after King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa released his “Independent Commission of Inquiry.” Funded by the King, the BICI whitewashed Bahrain’s crackdown by admitting to limited abuses and punishing selected police officials. The Obama administration has proceeded to ignore the monarchy’s systematic suppression of protests and funerals - and would never touch the language of Navi Pillay.

“We continue to receive reports of the repression of small protests in Bahrain,” the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights warned upon the return of her team, “and although some security officers have reportedly been arrested, we have yet to see any prosecution of security forces for civilian injuries and deaths. Such impunity – at all levels – is a serious impediment to national reconciliation.”

America’s double-standard may have a modest effect on Russia’s political stance, but it still feeds into an obvious narrative that Washington is biased against Syria. Beyond the direct damage inflicted by Washington’s favoritism, selective democracy applies a continual source of friction between U.S. diplomacy and the region’s grassroots movements. The Obama administration expects “actions, not words” from threatened dictators - and millions of protesters expect the same from America.

Syrian Counter-Revolution Enters New Phase

2011-12-20T18:14:00.000-08:00

Bashar al-Assad has victory in his eyes. Riding high on his security forces’ crackdown against pro-democracy protesters and army defectors, Syria’s strongman now holds a sweet political settlement in his hands. Better yet, al-Assad had no need to hop a flight to Cairo (unlike Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, who inked a power-sharing deal in Riyadh), sending his foreign minister to sign in his place.

Syrian protesters and foreign observers appear to be asking two main questions: is al-Assad’s regime planning to cooperate with the Arab League rather than the UN, or stalling for more time? The answer to both questions is yes.

That al-Assad has no reason to reject the Arab League’s offer should serve as an immediate warning. While the block’s proposal calls on Syria’s army to withdraw from hostile cities, a concession that many protesters believe would capitulate the regime, regime change was left out of the League’s equation. al-Assad is only required to engage in dialogue with the opposition. Meanwhile 500 observers have received a one-month mandate that can be extended by another month “if both sides agree.” Nabil Elaraby, the Arab League’s Secretary-General, claims that his monitors can “move freely anywhere in Syria to ensure the implementation of the Arab initiative,” but they will be accompanied (and shadowed) by Syrian authorities.

Foreign Minister Walid Moallem declared, "Syrian sovereignty was preserved in the heart of the protocol.”

Moallem’s signing coincided with a three-day conference organized by Syria’s National Council (SNA). Like many Syrian protesters, the bulk of the SNA remains suspicious of al-Assad’s intentions - except the council may be playing with fire. According to several participants involved in drafting a new political document, the SNA “is readying an offer of immunity and exile to Bashar al-Assad... he can leave the country to a destination of his choosing with full immunity and allow the military to take over in conjunction with the SNC.”

Since this strategy is unlikely to draw extensive support from Syria’s streets, justifying foreign assistance (not necessarily military intervention) appears to be the SNA’s next strategic objective. Its chairman, Burhan Ghalioun, quickly branded the Arab League’s ceremony as "worthless,” and warned that al-Assad’s regime “is maneuvering and wants to buy time.” Precisely, al-Assad is maneuvering around the Arab League to buy time and improve his position.

By agreeing to the Arab League’s proposal, al-Assad isn’t simply stalling through the League or avoiding further UN action - Syria’s regime is exploiting the proposal to reconnect with the bloc. In one of his more blatant statements, Moallem expects “the beginning of cooperation between us and the Arab League, and we will welcome the Arab League observers." Damascus plans to use the League’s monitors to “get out the truth,” viewing them “as an opportunity to prove Syria was battling terrorists.” Moallem, if he is to be believed, successfully amended the League’s proposal to protect Syria’s sovereignty.

He explained how, “coordination with the Syrian government will take place via a national committee that will send reports to both sides which will be discussed before taking any other action according to the protocol and the Syrian amendments.”

Speaking before an Iraqi delegation, al-Assad told his audience that he "dealt positively with proposals presented because it's in (Syria's) interest for the world to know what is happening in Syria."

On its surface, the Arab League’s proposal represents the first tangible step to deescalating Syria’s open violence. Foreign monitors and journalists may be able to push security forces and armed defectors off the streets - but the regime will try its hardest to manipulate them. The League’s deal with al-Assad is, at its core, a settlement between the AL and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Russia, China and Western capitals.

The GCC issued a surprisingly tough statement against al-Assad’s regime, scoring easy political points during its summit in Riyadh, however the bloc continues to follow the League’s maneuvering. Russia’s Foreign Ministry naturally boasted, "Signing the protocol in Cairo guarantees the protection of all Syrians and stability in the country by applying an independent monitoring mechanism.”

Moallem “stressed” that Russia “advised signing the protocol, which Syria did.”

The imperialist nature of Syria’s initiative diminishes any benefits coming near the opposition’s direction. Although the Arab League has yet to cancel its proposed economic sanctions, Moallem expects these to be lifted after Syria “complies” with foreign monitors. He rationalized Syria’s position after the League ignored several of his memos: "we don't entreat anyone… if they think that their sanctions will affect the steadfastness of the Syrian people then they are delusional… they imposed the sanctions and they will lift them, and we won't ask for it again."

Yet Syria remains suspicious of Arab League despite a favorable political deal, deflecting criticism by accusing the bloc itself of stalling (not entirely invalid). Moallem asserted that Damascus “doesn’t fear internationalization as the West and some Arabs' intentions have been revealed,” and flipped the international position by threatening to take Syria’s case to the UN Security Council. al-Assad’s government also organized mass rallies against the Arab League’s proposal.

Western capitals have been sucked into the Arab League’s political vortex amid their quest to open additional sources of pressure on Syria. While Washington, London, Paris and Berlin responded with the same hard-line - actions, not words - they might be stepping too deep into Syria’s counter-revolutionary offensive. The U.S. and EU have thrown their weight behind the Arab League’s proposal, tacitly protecting the regime, and the State Department’s Victoria Nuland unconsciously exposed this reality on Tuesday.

“Just to be clear that there were four aspects to the Arab League program which the Syrians say they are now signed on to, so it’s not just the unfettered access to monitors. It’s also stopping all acts of violence, withdrawing armed elements from populated areas and releasing all political prisoners.”

These limited conditions prompted one journalist to ask, “so you are stepping aside from your attitude that Assad has to step out?” Nuland would respond with a flat “No.” When pressed a second time, the State’s spokeswoman took another moment to articulate, “let me just be clear on behalf of the United States of America. We continue to believe that Asad needs to step aside, that Syria cannot progress with him at the head of the government. And we are concerned that there are delaying tactics here.”

Having covered this angle over the past two months, Washington and Moscow’s behavior continues to leave the door ajar for a political settlement. The two governments recently installed a puppet in Yemen and fully support Bahrain’s monarchy over its opposition movement. Hillary Clinton and her counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, enjoyed a cordial meeting on Tuesday and would likely agree to a consensus replacement for al-Assad.

Syria’s cooperative phase with the Arab League should continue for at least a month, perhaps longer, before breaking down and entering a new counter-revolutionary phase. That leaves Syria’s opposition to fend for itself and accept any foreign assistance available (NATO, Turkey, Libya). While the League’s monitors should be shown a peaceful face, the opposition must devise a strategy to disrupt Syria’s foreign connections and seize the narrative.

al-Assad’s regime cannot be given space or time to maneuver.

GCC Holds Counter-Revolutionary Summit

2011-12-20T13:02:00.000-08:00

The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) six leaders have convened for two days in Riyadh, fresh and ready for economic meetings, political strategy sessions and propagandizing. The council will hold its 32nd summit under the false impression of “boosting peace and security in a region, which is currently witnessing chaos," according to assistant secretary-general Saad A. Alammar.

Beyond highlighting the GCC’s political integration and economic progress (a diversionary measure), the council will expend the majority of its private time plotting next year’s counter-revolutionary offensive.

Bankrolled and directed by Saudi Arabia as a buffer zone against external hegemony, the GCC’s proxy campaign first struck Egypt after missing Tunisia entirely. Gulf states toed Riyadh’s line as the King fumed over America’s “betrayal” of Hosni Mubarak, and have since tried to fold Egypt into the GCC’s network. Secretary Genera Abdul Latif Al Zayani already clarified that the mechanism “to increase cooperation and strategic partnership with the Kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan” will be discussed.

The GCC is also synched with the Arab League’s attempt to minimize regime change in Syria, freeing up its attention for more pressing battlegrounds.

The GCC’s security presence hit Bahrain hardest after Saudi Arabia deployed its Peninsula Shield across the causeway. Riyadh summoned Jordanian police to fill its ranks, a political harbinger, as well as former Sunni soldiers from the UAE and Pakistan. As a purported self-defense force, the Shield escalated Bahrain’s situation by reinforcing the perception of internal tyranny. Speaking to Bahrain TV at the Kingdom’s embassy in Riyadh, Al Zayani marked King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s 12th year in power by commending his “landmark achievements.”

These “landmarks” include “democracy, supremacy of the law and respect of human rights.”

Al Zayani also praised Bahrain’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) as "unprecedented and bold,” along with the King’s “wisdom and adherence to transparency.” On a parallel track, Iran is being prepared as a centerpiece red herring in Bahrain.

These statements are difficult to exceed, but the GCC’s political counter-revolution struck with eager vigor in Yemen. In conjunction with U.S. and European officials, GCC diplomats negotiated a power-sharing deal between Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime and the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). As a result Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi arrived in Riyadh to take his place in the background. After defending Saleh throughout Yemen’s revolution, the GCC’s initiative rewarded al-Qirbi for his loyalty by renewing his term for another two years. He’s expected to brief the GCC’s Foreign Ministers on Yemen’s presidential election in February, an election that will see a consensus candidate (Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, Saleh’s Vice President of 17 years) run unchallenged or against a handicapped populist.

The GCC’s proposal also granted Saleh’s family immunity from years of corruption charges and human rights abuses, generating widespread opposition at Yemen’s popular level. Although Western and UN officials praise the GCC’s leadership, both JMP and UN officials have actually admitted to freezing the youth out.

Further antagonizing Yemen’s situation, the GCC is so bold as to exploit its initiative as a main success. Arab media has already blanketed this angle and Western media (including Reuters, to no surprise) is quickly falling into the GCC’s narrative: “The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) opposed the popular protests that ousted the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia, but they helped negotiate a power transition in Yemen and backed measures against both Syria and Libya for their violent reaction to unrest.”

The GCC’s interference is fully exposed in the very next sentence when Reuters observes, “Of the GCC members, only Bahrain and Oman suffered major protests.” Yemen’s non-member status is one of its biggest non-stories: a non-member - and a state trying to become a functioning democracy - being overruled by kingdoms.

Geopolitically speaking, the U.S., EU, Arab League, Russia and China have converged on the GCC to amplify its counter-revolutionary effects. This development will continue to play a significant factor in the historical arch of the Arab revolutions. Wherever Western and Eastern powers align with the GCC’s interest - Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco - one is likely to find high traces of counter-revolutionary interference.

Obama Caught In Iraq’s 4GW

2011-12-18T20:54:00.000-08:00

With Iraq’s WMDs failing to turn up in any underground bunkers or freight trucks, George Bush’s administration turned to its strategic plan B in order to keep America’s political and psychological fortunes alive. Far from pampering Bush’s political allies and America’s MIC in general, U.S. troops had stormed Baghdad to free Iraq of a brutal dictator and promote democracy in the Middle East. Who could disagree with the nobility of this mission?

Not President Barack Obama, who rightfully opposed a war on false pretext and took a contrarian stand on Iraq’s surge. “Responsibly” withdrawing from a self-governing Iraq now serves as his lone political card as America’s last combat troops exit Iraq.

No one can argue that a government does exist in Baghdad, but what type remains open to interpretation. Touring Washington in a show of solidarity with Obama’s administration, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was greeted as “the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq.” This exact description needed 100 hours to foment the new phase of a long-standing political crisis in Baghdad. After Saleh al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist and one Iraq’s deputy premiers, described al-Maliki’s rule as “worse than Saddam Hussein," Iraq’s Prime Minister sent a letter to parliament asking its members to withdraw confidence from one of Ayad Allawi’s allies.

Evidently Mutlaq was "shocked" to hear Obama describe al-Maliki as "the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq."

"America left Iraq with almost no infrastructure,” he warned in a recent interview with CNN. “The political process is going in a very wrong direction, going toward a dictatorship. People are not going to accept that, and most likely they are going to ask for the division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster. Dividing the country isn't going to be smooth, because dividing the country is going to be a war before that and a war after that."

Allawi’s Iraqiya List is also using the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops to highlight the unresolved divisions within al-Maliki’s government; Iraq’s Prime Minister controls the Defense and Interior Ministries despite a power-sharing agreement. Spokesman Haider al-Mulla said the bloc “has always expressed its rejection to the policy of exclusion and marginalization, lack of power sharing, politicization of the judiciary, the lack of balance within the government institutions.” These omens gained negligible traction in the U.S. media as Obama’s officials cleared the way for their own narrative, but Iraq’s reality could only be obscured for so long.

"There is no democracy in Iraq," Allawi told the Wall Street Journal earlier this month.

Several weeks ago counterterrorism police went so far as to raid Mutlaq’s Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Hiwar). Sunday witnessed a semi-related development when Mutlaq found himself detained on the same plane as Tariq al-Hashimi, one of Iraq’s vice presidents. The group of Sunni politicians was eventually allowed to continue on their trip to visit Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, but not before government officials informed Hashimi that he may be charged for conspiring to smuggle “assassins” out of Iraq. Iraqiya is fully backed by Riyadh and Hashimi, a Sunni, has been implicated in a targeted campaign against Shia figures.

The dilemma beyond this immediate charge is al-Maliki’s credibility to conduct a proper investigation or hearing. Reuters also points out “a dispute between the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and Maliki's central government over oil and territory is also brewing.”

The majority of these developments aren’t the product of sectarian and ethnic loyalists, as the WSJ claims, but Iraq’s fundamental political divisions and personal rivalries. According to several blocs of parliament - Iraqiya, Muqtada al-Sadr and his Shia allies - America’s political favoritism also bears a portion of responsibility. Allawi was never strongly supported by Washington, but forced into working with al-Maliki’s coalition against his better judgement. Nor have U.S. officials deviated from their scripted narrative that American troops left behind a “new opportunity” for Iraqis.

Obama ultimately antagonized many of them by reminding al-Maliki that he has “a strong and enduring partner in The United States of America.” Biden similarly “reiterated the United States’ longstanding support for an inclusive partnership government” - a statement that Allawi can partially agree with. Iraqiya’s chief told Al Sumaria TV, “If Maliki adopts reconciliation and true openness, I would stand as a real supporter. Otherwise, Iraq will be facing endless tensions in the future.”

Allawi has yet to receive a consolation post that would oversee Iraq’s foreign policy and security issues, as promised by U.S. officials. Now he regrets putting his “trust in the Americans.”

"We must work hard to gather the pieces and move peacefully to a situation of true democracy; this is the responsibility of the political forces and Iraqi society especially after the United States' failure in Iraq.”

Iraqiya and the rest of Iraq’s anti-Maliki parties are operating under the impression that he’s finally weakening with the exit of U.S. troops. Mutlaq doesn’t seem to expect any trouble with a non-confidence vote, predicting that parliament is more likely to turn on al-Maliki. The former Baathist came to power under external reservations, but his warnings cannot be ignored when echoed by so many Iraqis.

"There will be a day whereby the Americans will realize that they were deceived by al-Maliki ... and they will regret that.”

Aside from an external attack or internal suicide campaign timed to America’s combat exit, the U.S. mission in Iraq couldn’t have ended on a lower note. And despite the immediate loss of life, a deep-rooted political breakdown is more consequential than a security breach. America’s combat troops have left Iraq’s security forces to test their independent abilities, but the fourth-generation war spawned by their entrance remains active. At the strategic level, praising al-Maliki on the way out undermines the last-resort argument of removing a dictator. This error could be more costly than failing to extend America’s security presence, another decision that would have encouraged al-Maliki’s behavior.

Iraqis are entering a new era - of uncertainty. Surrounded by “friends,” they must free themselves out of political strife and forge the creation of a democratic legacy.